CVE-2026-49464

NL Portal Backend Libraries provide backend components for Dutch government portals that interact with residents, customers, suppliers, and partner organizations. The nl.nl-portal:taak package from version 1.5.0 through 3.0.0 fails to verify ownership when processing the submitTaakV2 GraphQL mutation, allowing an authenticated user who knows or guesses another user’s task ID to read its form data, overwrite its submitted data, and mark the task as completed. Version 3.0.1 contains a patch. As a workaround, block the submitTaakV2 mutation at the API gateway or restrict the /graphql endpoint to trusted networks

NL Portal Backend Libraries provide backend components for Dutch government portals that interact with residents, customers, suppliers, and partner organizations. The nl.nl-portal:taak package from version 1.5.0 through 3.0.0 fails to verify ownership when processing the submitTaakV2 GraphQL mutation, allowing an authenticated user who knows or guesses another user’s task ID to read its form data, overwrite its submitted data, and mark the task as completed. Version 3.0.1 contains a patch. As a workaround, block the submitTaakV2 mutation at the API gateway or restrict the /graphql endpoint to trusted networks

Impact

In versions from 1.5.0 up to and including 3.0.0, any authenticated portal user could complete and tamper with another user's open task by submitting it on their behalf. The task submission endpoint accepted a task ID and a payload, but it never checked whether the task actually belonged to the user making the call.

An attacker who held a valid login (a normal burger OAuth token) and who knew or guessed another user's task ID could:

• Mark someone else's task as completed.
• Overwrite the data submitted with that task — the verzonden_data — with arbitrary input of their choosing.
• Receive the full task back in the GraphQL response, including the form data that the legitimate owner had already entered. This leaks personal data belonging to the original user.

Functionally this means a malicious authenticated user could submit and alter forms in any other user's name, while at the same time reading what that user had previously filled in. Both the integrity of submitted data and the confidentiality of form contents are affected.

The vulnerable code was introduced together with the Taak V2 implementation (commit bb1c1ecf, 2024-06-04) and first shipped in the 1.5.x release line. Earlier 1.x releases did not contain this resolver.

Patches

Upgrade to 3.0.1 or later.

Fix commit: 8e699add — "Add auth check for task submission".

Workarounds

Until the upgrade is applied, block the submitTaakV2 GraphQL mutation at the API gateway, or restrict the /graphql endpoint to trusted networks.

Technical details

The resolver nl.nlportal.zgw.taak.service.TaakService.submitTaakV2(id, submission, authentication) fetched the task object by UUID and immediately transitioned it to the AFGEROND state, writing record.data.portaalformulier.verzondenData from caller-supplied input. No check verified that the task's identificatie matched the authenticated burger.

The fix adds a call to a new isAuthorizedForTaak(authentication, objectsApiTask) before the status change. The check compares identificatie.type and identificatie.value against the authenticated principal and validates the task's eigenaar for bedrijf machtigingen.

Credits

Discovered during the nl-portal-backend-libraries penetration testing engagement (phase 1, May 2026). Vendor attribution to be added before publication.

NL Portal Backend Libraries provide backend components for Dutch government portals that interact with residents, customers, suppliers, and partner organizations. The nl.nl-portal:taak package from version 1.5.0 through 3.0.0 fails to verify ownership when processing the submitTaakV2 GraphQL mutation, allowing an authenticated user who knows or guesses another user’s task ID to read its form data, overwrite its submitted data, and mark the task as completed. Version 3.0.1 contains a patch. As a workaround, block the submitTaakV2 mutation at the API gateway or restrict the /graphql endpoint to trusted networks

NL Portal Backend Libraries provide backend components for Dutch government portals that interact with residents, customers, suppliers, and partner organizations. The nl.nl-portal:taak package from version 1.5.0 through 3.0.0 fails to verify ownership when processing the submitTaakV2 GraphQL mutation, allowing an authenticated user who knows or guesses another user’s task ID to read its form data, overwrite its submitted data, and mark the task as completed. Version 3.0.1 contains a patch. As a workaround, block the submitTaakV2 mutation at the API gateway or restrict the /graphql endpoint to trusted networks

Impact

In versions from 1.5.0 up to and including 3.0.0, any authenticated portal user could complete and tamper with another user's open task by submitting it on their behalf. The task submission endpoint accepted a task ID and a payload, but it never checked whether the task actually belonged to the user making the call.

An attacker who held a valid login (a normal burger OAuth token) and who knew or guessed another user's task ID could:

• Mark someone else's task as completed.
• Overwrite the data submitted with that task — the verzonden_data — with arbitrary input of their choosing.
• Receive the full task back in the GraphQL response, including the form data that the legitimate owner had already entered. This leaks personal data belonging to the original user.

Functionally this means a malicious authenticated user could submit and alter forms in any other user's name, while at the same time reading what that user had previously filled in. Both the integrity of submitted data and the confidentiality of form contents are affected.

The vulnerable code was introduced together with the Taak V2 implementation (commit bb1c1ecf, 2024-06-04) and first shipped in the 1.5.x release line. Earlier 1.x releases did not contain this resolver.

Patches

Upgrade to 3.0.1 or later.

Fix commit: 8e699add — "Add auth check for task submission".

Workarounds

Until the upgrade is applied, block the submitTaakV2 GraphQL mutation at the API gateway, or restrict the /graphql endpoint to trusted networks.

Technical details

The resolver nl.nlportal.zgw.taak.service.TaakService.submitTaakV2(id, submission, authentication) fetched the task object by UUID and immediately transitioned it to the AFGEROND state, writing record.data.portaalformulier.verzondenData from caller-supplied input. No check verified that the task's identificatie matched the authenticated burger.

The fix adds a call to a new isAuthorizedForTaak(authentication, objectsApiTask) before the status change. The check compares identificatie.type and identificatie.value against the authenticated principal and validates the task's eigenaar for bedrijf machtigingen.

Credits

Discovered during the nl-portal-backend-libraries penetration testing engagement (phase 1, May 2026). Vendor attribution to be added before publication.