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CVE-2026-50125

MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion

7.5 HighFix available

MKP is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes. Prior to 0.4.1, cmd/server/main.go exposes the default HTTP endpoint and pkg/mcp/server.go registers the unauthenticated get_resource tool, which accepts attacker-controlled limitBytes and tailLines values for the pods logs subresource. buildPodLogOpts() in pkg/k8s/subresource.go parses those values as unbounded int64 parameters, and defaultGetPodLogs() copies the returned Kubernetes log stream through io.Copy into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without an application-side cap. A remote attacker who can reach the default port 8080 MCP endpoint and select a pod with sufficiently large accumulated logs can send one tools/call request that causes large allocations and additional response copies, while the request-frequency limiter does not constrain per-request volume. This can exhaust process memory, terminate the MKP server, and deny the MCP service; observed testing showed more than one GiB of RSS growth while handling a 128 MiB requested stream. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.1.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.49%Up 0.1 points since Sep 18, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 7.5

MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion

MKP is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes. Prior to 0.4.1, cmd/server/main.go exposes the default HTTP endpoint and pkg/mcp/server.go registers the unauthenticated get_resource tool, which accepts attacker-controlled limitBytes and tailLines values for the pods logs subresource. buildPodLogOpts() in pkg/k8s/subresource.go parses those values as unbounded int64 parameters, and defaultGetPodLogs() copies the returned Kubernetes log stream through io.Copy into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without an application-side cap. A remote attacker who can reach the default port 8080 MCP endpoint and select a pod with sufficiently large accumulated logs can send one tools/call request that causes large allocations and additional response copies, while the request-frequency limiter does not constrain per-request volume. This can exhaust process memory, terminate the MKP server, and deny the MCP service; observed testing showed more than one GiB of RSS growth while handling a 128 MiB requested stream. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.1.

Record
CVE-2026-50125
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-400
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-82412 7.5

MKP is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes. Prior to 0.4.1, cmd/server/main.go exposes the default HTTP endpoint and pkg/mcp/server.go registers the unauthenticated get_resource tool, which accepts attacker-controlled limitBytes and tailLines values for the pods logs subresource. buildPodLogOpts() in pkg/k8s/subresource.go parses those values as unbounded int64 parameters, and defaultGetPodLogs() copies the returned Kubernetes log stream through io.Copy into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without an application-side cap. A remote attacker who can reach the default port 8080 MCP endpoint and select a pod with sufficiently large accumulated logs can send one tools/call request that causes large allocations and additional response copies, while the request-frequency limiter does not constrain per-request volume. This can exhaust process memory, terminate the MKP server, and deny the MCP service; observed testing showed more than one GiB of RSS growth while handling a 128 MiB requested stream. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.1.

Record
EUVD-2026-82412
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj 7.5

MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion

Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled limitBytes/tailLines Causes Memory Exhaustion

Summary

The MKP (Model Context Protocol for Kubernetes) server exposes a get_resource MCP tool that proxies Kubernetes pod log requests. User-supplied limitBytes and tailLines parameters are parsed as unbounded int64 values and forwarded directly to the Kubernetes API. The server then reads the entire returned log stream into an in-memory bytes.Buffer using io.Copy without any application-side size cap. A remote unauthenticated attacker can exploit this to exhaust the MKP server's memory by sending a single crafted tools/call request, leading to process termination (OOM kill) and denial of service. Dynamic reproduction confirmed the MKP process RSS grew from 25.8 MB to 1,179.3 MB (+1,153.4 MB) while handling one request with limitBytes=134217728.

Details

The vulnerability exists in pkg/k8s/subresource.go in the buildPodLogOpts() and defaultGetPodLogs() functions.

Source — unbounded parameter parsing (pkg/k8s/subresource.go:171–181):

// pkg/k8s/subresource.go
defaultLimitBytes := int64(32 * 1024) // 32 KB — only used when parameters map is nil
...
if limitBytes, ok := parameters["limitBytes"]; ok {
    if b, err := strconv.ParseInt(limitBytes, 10, 64); err == nil {
        podLogOpts.LimitBytes = &b  // no upper-bound check
    }
}
if tailLines, ok := parameters["tailLines"]; ok {
    if lines, err := strconv.ParseInt(tailLines, 10, 64); err == nil {
        podLogOpts.TailLines = &lines  // no upper-bound check
    }
}

When the parameters map is non-nil (always true for attacker-supplied input), buildPodLogOpts() is called at pkg/k8s/subresource.go:94–96 and overwrites the 32 KB default entirely. The attacker can therefore supply any positive int64 value (up to 2147483647 or 9223372036854775807) as limitBytes.

Sink — unbounded in-memory copy (pkg/k8s/subresource.go:114–115):

buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
_, err = io.Copy(buf, podLogs)  // entire Kubernetes stream copied into RAM

The stream from Kubernetes is read without limit into a heap-allocated bytes.Buffer. Subsequent JSON serialisation and MCP response wrapping create additional copies, meaning the actual RSS increase is a multiple of the raw log size (observed: ~9×).

Attack path (source → sink):

| Step | Location | Description | |------|----------|-------------| | 1 | cmd/server/main.go:30 | Server binds to :8080 on all interfaces; no authentication by default | | 2 | pkg/mcp/server.go:131 | NewGetResourceTool() registered unconditionally (no --read-write required) | | 3 | pkg/mcp/get_resource.go:28–38 | Attacker-controlled parameters map parsed from CallToolRequest | | 4 | pkg/mcp/get_resource.go:76 | client.GetResource(..., parameters) called | | 5 | pkg/k8s/subresource.go:32–33 | resource=pods + subresource=logs routes into getPodLogs | | 6 | pkg/k8s/subresource.go:171–181 | limitBytes / tailLines parsed without upper bound (source) | | 7 | pkg/k8s/subresource.go:114–115 | io.Copy(buf, podLogs) loads full stream into bytes.Buffer (sink) |

The rate limiter (pkg/ratelimit/config.go:16–17) caps only request frequency (120 req/min) and places no limit on per-request data volume, providing no meaningful mitigation.

Suggested remediation:

+const (
+    maxPodLogTailLines  int64 = 1000
+    maxPodLogLimitBytes int64 = 1024 * 1024  // 1 MB hard cap
+)
+
 buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
-_, err = io.Copy(buf, podLogs)
+limitedLogs := &io.LimitedReader{R: podLogs, N: maxPodLogLimitBytes + 1}
+_, err = io.Copy(buf, limitedLogs)
+if limitedLogs.N == 0 {
+    return nil, fmt.Errorf("pod logs exceed maximum size of %d bytes", maxPodLogLimitBytes)
+}

 if limitBytes, ok := parameters["limitBytes"]; ok {
     if b, err := strconv.ParseInt(limitBytes, 10, 64); err == nil {
+        if b <= 0 || b > maxPodLogLimitBytes {
+  …
Record
GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-400
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 7.5

MKP is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes. Prior to 0.4.1, cmd/server/main.go exposes the default HTTP endpoint and pkg/mcp/server.go registers the unauthenticated get_resource tool, which accepts attacker-controlled limitBytes and tailLines values for the pods logs subresource. buildPodLogOpts() in pkg/k8s/subresource.go parses those values as unbounded int64 parameters, and defaultGetPodLogs() copies the returned Kubernetes log stream through io.Copy into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without an application-side cap. A remote attacker who can reach the default port 8080 MCP endpoint and select a pod with sufficiently large accumulated logs can send one tools/call request that causes large allocations and additional response copies, while the request-frequency limiter does not constrain per-request volume. This can exhaust process memory, terminate the MKP server, and deny the MCP service; observed testing showed more than one GiB of RSS growth while handling a 128 MiB requested stream. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.1.

Record
CVE-2026-50125
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-400
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 7.5

MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion

MKP is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes. Prior to 0.4.1, cmd/server/main.go exposes the default HTTP endpoint and pkg/mcp/server.go registers the unauthenticated get_resource tool, which accepts attacker-controlled limitBytes and tailLines values for the pods logs subresource. buildPodLogOpts() in pkg/k8s/subresource.go parses those values as unbounded int64 parameters, and defaultGetPodLogs() copies the returned Kubernetes log stream through io.Copy into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without an application-side cap. A remote attacker who can reach the default port 8080 MCP endpoint and select a pod with sufficiently large accumulated logs can send one tools/call request that causes large allocations and additional response copies, while the request-frequency limiter does not constrain per-request volume. This can exhaust process memory, terminate the MKP server, and deny the MCP service; observed testing showed more than one GiB of RSS growth while handling a 128 MiB requested stream. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.1.

Record
CVE-2026-50125
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-400
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj 7.5

MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion

Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled limitBytes/tailLines Causes Memory Exhaustion

Summary

The MKP (Model Context Protocol for Kubernetes) server exposes a get_resource MCP tool that proxies Kubernetes pod log requests. User-supplied limitBytes and tailLines parameters are parsed as unbounded int64 values and forwarded directly to the Kubernetes API. The server then reads the entire returned log stream into an in-memory bytes.Buffer using io.Copy without any application-side size cap. A remote unauthenticated attacker can exploit this to exhaust the MKP server's memory by sending a single crafted tools/call request, leading to process termination (OOM kill) and denial of service. Dynamic reproduction confirmed the MKP process RSS grew from 25.8 MB to 1,179.3 MB (+1,153.4 MB) while handling one request with limitBytes=134217728.

Details

The vulnerability exists in pkg/k8s/subresource.go in the buildPodLogOpts() and defaultGetPodLogs() functions.

Source — unbounded parameter parsing (pkg/k8s/subresource.go:171–181):

// pkg/k8s/subresource.go
defaultLimitBytes := int64(32 * 1024) // 32 KB — only used when parameters map is nil
...
if limitBytes, ok := parameters["limitBytes"]; ok {
    if b, err := strconv.ParseInt(limitBytes, 10, 64); err == nil {
        podLogOpts.LimitBytes = &b  // no upper-bound check
    }
}
if tailLines, ok := parameters["tailLines"]; ok {
    if lines, err := strconv.ParseInt(tailLines, 10, 64); err == nil {
        podLogOpts.TailLines = &lines  // no upper-bound check
    }
}

When the parameters map is non-nil (always true for attacker-supplied input), buildPodLogOpts() is called at pkg/k8s/subresource.go:94–96 and overwrites the 32 KB default entirely. The attacker can therefore supply any positive int64 value (up to 2147483647 or 9223372036854775807) as limitBytes.

Sink — unbounded in-memory copy (pkg/k8s/subresource.go:114–115):

buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
_, err = io.Copy(buf, podLogs)  // entire Kubernetes stream copied into RAM

The stream from Kubernetes is read without limit into a heap-allocated bytes.Buffer. Subsequent JSON serialisation and MCP response wrapping create additional copies, meaning the actual RSS increase is a multiple of the raw log size (observed: ~9×).

Attack path (source → sink):

| Step | Location | Description | |------|----------|-------------| | 1 | cmd/server/main.go:30 | Server binds to :8080 on all interfaces; no authentication by default | | 2 | pkg/mcp/server.go:131 | NewGetResourceTool() registered unconditionally (no --read-write required) | | 3 | pkg/mcp/get_resource.go:28–38 | Attacker-controlled parameters map parsed from CallToolRequest | | 4 | pkg/mcp/get_resource.go:76 | client.GetResource(..., parameters) called | | 5 | pkg/k8s/subresource.go:32–33 | resource=pods + subresource=logs routes into getPodLogs | | 6 | pkg/k8s/subresource.go:171–181 | limitBytes / tailLines parsed without upper bound (source) | | 7 | pkg/k8s/subresource.go:114–115 | io.Copy(buf, podLogs) loads full stream into bytes.Buffer (sink) |

The rate limiter (pkg/ratelimit/config.go:16–17) caps only request frequency (120 req/min) and places no limit on per-request data volume, providing no meaningful mitigation.

Suggested remediation:

+const (
+    maxPodLogTailLines  int64 = 1000
+    maxPodLogLimitBytes int64 = 1024 * 1024  // 1 MB hard cap
+)
+
 buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
-_, err = io.Copy(buf, podLogs)
+limitedLogs := &io.LimitedReader{R: podLogs, N: maxPodLogLimitBytes + 1}
+_, err = io.Copy(buf, limitedLogs)
+if limitedLogs.N == 0 {
+    return nil, fmt.Errorf("pod logs exceed maximum size of %d bytes", maxPodLogLimitBytes)
+}

 if limitBytes, ok := parameters["limitBytes"]; ok {
     if b, err := strconv.ParseInt(limitBytes, 10, 64); err == nil {
+        if b <= 0 || b > maxPodLogLimitBytes {
+  …
Record
GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-400
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-5978 No score

MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion in github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp

MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled limitBytes/tailLines Causes Memory Exhaustion in github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp

Record
GO-2026-5978
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1 No score

Security update for govulncheck-vulndb

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

  • GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
  • GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
  • GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
  • GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
  • GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
  • GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
  • GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
  • GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
  • GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
  • GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
  • GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
  • GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
  • GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
  • GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
  • GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
  • GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
  • GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
  • GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
  • GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
  • GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
  • GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
  • GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
  • GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
  • GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
  • GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
  • GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
  • GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
  • GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
  • GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
  • GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
  • GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
  • GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
  • GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
  • GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
  • GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
  • GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
  • GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
  • GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
  • GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
  • GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
  • GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
  • GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
  • GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
  • GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
  • GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
  • GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
  • GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
  • GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
  • GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
  • GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
  • GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
  • GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
  • GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
  • GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
  • GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
  • GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
  • GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
  • GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
  • GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
  • GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
  • GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
  • GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
  • GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
  • GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
  • GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
  • GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
  • GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
  • GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
  • GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
  • GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
  • GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
  • GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
  • GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
  • GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
  • GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
  • GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
  • GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…
Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp
Go
 before 0.4.1
0.4.1
govulncheck-vulndb
openSUSE:Leap 16.0
From an advisory covering 1734 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1
0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, facts
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-50125 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) in Stackloklabs Mkp, published July 14, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.49%, the 42nd percentile. Fixed in github.com/StacklokLabs/mkp 0.4.1.

References

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