CVE-2026-52735

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, Zebra can accept a block that zcashd rejects because the P2SH signature-operation counter undercounts redeem scripts containing a disabled opcode followed by signature opcodes. In zebra-script/src/lib.rs, p2sh_input_sigop_count used the pure-Rust script::Code::sig_op_count path, whose try_fold parser stops at disabled opcodes such as OP_CODESEPARATOR and returns only the partial count accumulated before the error. The zcashd reference implementation continues static signature-operation counting through disabled opcodes, so an attacker can broadcast P2SH spends that Zebra counts below MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS while zcashd counts above the 20,000-operation limit. If a Zebra miner includes those transactions, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it, creating a consensus chain split that affects network integrity and availability without requiring the attacker to produce a block. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, Zebra can accept a block that zcashd rejects because the P2SH signature-operation counter undercounts redeem scripts containing a disabled opcode followed by signature opcodes. In zebra-script/src/lib.rs, p2sh_input_sigop_count used the pure-Rust script::Code::sig_op_count path, whose try_fold parser stops at disabled opcodes such as OP_CODESEPARATOR and returns only the partial count accumulated before the error. The zcashd reference implementation continues static signature-operation counting through disabled opcodes, so an attacker can broadcast P2SH spends that Zebra counts below MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS while zcashd counts above the 20,000-operation limit. If a Zebra miner includes those transactions, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it, creating a consensus chain split that affects network integrity and availability without requiring the attacker to produce a block. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

Am I affected

You are affected if:

1. You run any version of zebrad up to and including v4.4.1.
2. Your node validates blocks on mainnet, testnet, or any network where both Zebra and zcashd nodes participate.

All default configurations are affected. No feature flags, non-default settings, or special build options are required.

Summary

Zebra's P2SH sigop counter uses a pure-Rust code path that short-circuits on disabled opcodes (such as OP_CODESEPARATOR), returning a partial count of zero for any sigops following the disabled opcode. The reference implementation (zcashd) correctly counts through disabled opcodes in its static sigop analysis. This produces a consensus divergence: Zebra accepts blocks that zcashd rejects when the block-wide MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000 threshold is crossed on one side but not the other.

An attacker can exploit this without mining capability. Broadcasting transactions that spend P2SH outputs with malicious redeem scripts is sufficient; any Zebra miner who includes those transactions in a block triggers a chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators.

Details

The P2SH sigop counter at zebra-script/src/lib.rs:399 calls script::Code(redeemed_bytes).sig_op_count(true), which is a pure-Rust path through zcash_script-0.4.4. The legacy (non-P2SH) sigop counter at lib.rs:282-289 correctly uses the C++ FFI via interpreter.legacy_sigop_count_script(). Only the P2SH path bypasses the FFI.

The Rust parser in zcash_script-0.4.4/src/opcode/mod.rs:1247-1260 treats 16 disabled opcodes (0x7e through 0xab, including OP_CAT, OP_SUBSTR, OP_AND, OP_OR, OP_XOR, OP_2MUL, OP_2DIV, OP_MUL, OP_DIV, OP_MOD, OP_LSHIFT, OP_RSHIFT, and OP_CODESEPARATOR) as Err(Error::Disabled(...)). The sig_op_count function at iter.rs:104-115 uses try_fold, which terminates on the first Err and returns the partial sum accumulated so far.

zcashd's GetOp2 (script.h:514-562) returns true for all non-push opcodes including the disabled range. Its GetSigOpCount(true) (script.cpp:152-174) continues counting through disabled opcodes. zcashd rejects disabled opcodes at execution time in the interpreter, not during static sigop analysis.

A redeem script of [0xab, OP_CHECKMULTISIG x 50] produces: Zebra = 0 sigops, zcashd = 1,000 sigops. Across 21 inputs in a block, Zebra computes 0 while zcashd computes 21,000, crossing the MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000 threshold on one side only.

Patches

Patched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix routes the P2SH sigop counter through the same C++ FFI already used by the legacy sigop counter.

Workarounds

There is no configuration-level workaround. All Zebra nodes validating blocks on a network shared with zcashd are affected. Upgrade as soon as the patched version is available.

Impact

A chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators. The attacker broadcasts spending transactions referencing P2SH outputs whose redeem scripts contain a disabled opcode followed by OP_CHECKSIG or OP_CHECKMULTISIG opcodes. When a Zebra miner (estimated ~30% of current network hashrate) includes these transactions in a block, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it with bad-blk-sigops. The two halves of the network diverge and every subsequent block extending the Zebra-side tip inherits the divergence.

The attacker does not need mining capability, RPC access, or any special privileges. The cost is the transaction fees for the funding and spending transactions.

Credit

Reported by @samsulselfut via a private GitHub Security Advisory submission.

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, Zebra can accept a block that zcashd rejects because the P2SH signature-operation counter undercounts redeem scripts containing a disabled opcode followed by signature opcodes. In zebra-script/src/lib.rs, p2sh_input_sigop_count used the pure-Rust script::Code::sig_op_count path, whose try_fold parser stops at disabled opcodes such as OP_CODESEPARATOR and returns only the partial count accumulated before the error. The zcashd reference implementation continues static signature-operation counting through disabled opcodes, so an attacker can broadcast P2SH spends that Zebra counts below MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS while zcashd counts above the 20,000-operation limit. If a Zebra miner includes those transactions, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it, creating a consensus chain split that affects network integrity and availability without requiring the attacker to produce a block. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, Zebra can accept a block that zcashd rejects because the P2SH signature-operation counter undercounts redeem scripts containing a disabled opcode followed by signature opcodes. In zebra-script/src/lib.rs, p2sh_input_sigop_count used the pure-Rust script::Code::sig_op_count path, whose try_fold parser stops at disabled opcodes such as OP_CODESEPARATOR and returns only the partial count accumulated before the error. The zcashd reference implementation continues static signature-operation counting through disabled opcodes, so an attacker can broadcast P2SH spends that Zebra counts below MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS while zcashd counts above the 20,000-operation limit. If a Zebra miner includes those transactions, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it, creating a consensus chain split that affects network integrity and availability without requiring the attacker to produce a block. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

Am I affected

You are affected if:

1. You run any version of zebrad up to and including v4.4.1.
2. Your node validates blocks on mainnet, testnet, or any network where both Zebra and zcashd nodes participate.

All default configurations are affected. No feature flags, non-default settings, or special build options are required.

Summary

Zebra's P2SH sigop counter uses a pure-Rust code path that short-circuits on disabled opcodes (such as OP_CODESEPARATOR), returning a partial count of zero for any sigops following the disabled opcode. The reference implementation (zcashd) correctly counts through disabled opcodes in its static sigop analysis. This produces a consensus divergence: Zebra accepts blocks that zcashd rejects when the block-wide MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000 threshold is crossed on one side but not the other.

An attacker can exploit this without mining capability. Broadcasting transactions that spend P2SH outputs with malicious redeem scripts is sufficient; any Zebra miner who includes those transactions in a block triggers a chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators.

Details

The P2SH sigop counter at zebra-script/src/lib.rs:399 calls script::Code(redeemed_bytes).sig_op_count(true), which is a pure-Rust path through zcash_script-0.4.4. The legacy (non-P2SH) sigop counter at lib.rs:282-289 correctly uses the C++ FFI via interpreter.legacy_sigop_count_script(). Only the P2SH path bypasses the FFI.

The Rust parser in zcash_script-0.4.4/src/opcode/mod.rs:1247-1260 treats 16 disabled opcodes (0x7e through 0xab, including OP_CAT, OP_SUBSTR, OP_AND, OP_OR, OP_XOR, OP_2MUL, OP_2DIV, OP_MUL, OP_DIV, OP_MOD, OP_LSHIFT, OP_RSHIFT, and OP_CODESEPARATOR) as Err(Error::Disabled(...)). The sig_op_count function at iter.rs:104-115 uses try_fold, which terminates on the first Err and returns the partial sum accumulated so far.

zcashd's GetOp2 (script.h:514-562) returns true for all non-push opcodes including the disabled range. Its GetSigOpCount(true) (script.cpp:152-174) continues counting through disabled opcodes. zcashd rejects disabled opcodes at execution time in the interpreter, not during static sigop analysis.

A redeem script of [0xab, OP_CHECKMULTISIG x 50] produces: Zebra = 0 sigops, zcashd = 1,000 sigops. Across 21 inputs in a block, Zebra computes 0 while zcashd computes 21,000, crossing the MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000 threshold on one side only.

Patches

Patched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix routes the P2SH sigop counter through the same C++ FFI already used by the legacy sigop counter.

Workarounds

There is no configuration-level workaround. All Zebra nodes validating blocks on a network shared with zcashd are affected. Upgrade as soon as the patched version is available.

Impact

A chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators. The attacker broadcasts spending transactions referencing P2SH outputs whose redeem scripts contain a disabled opcode followed by OP_CHECKSIG or OP_CHECKMULTISIG opcodes. When a Zebra miner (estimated ~30% of current network hashrate) includes these transactions in a block, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it with bad-blk-sigops. The two halves of the network diverge and every subsequent block extending the Zebra-side tip inherits the divergence.

The attacker does not need mining capability, RPC access, or any special privileges. The cost is the transaction fees for the funding and spending transactions.

Credit

Reported by @samsulselfut via a private GitHub Security Advisory submission.