CVE-2026-52827

Kimai is an open-source time tracking application. Prior to 2.59.0, the KIMAI_SESSION cookie issued after password verification but before TOTP completion is accepted by every /api route because config/packages/security.yaml protects the API with IS_AUTHENTICATED and App\API\Authentication\ApiRequestMatcher routes an existing session through the main firewall. A Scheb TwoFactorToken satisfies that access rule, and App\Voter\ApiVoter grants API access to its User, allowing an attacker with a valid account password to use authenticated REST API operations without entering the second factor even though web routes remain blocked. This issue is fixed in version 2.59.0.

Kimai is an open-source time tracking application. Prior to 2.59.0, the KIMAI_SESSION cookie issued after password verification but before TOTP completion is accepted by every /api route because config/packages/security.yaml protects the API with IS_AUTHENTICATED and App\API\Authentication\ApiRequestMatcher routes an existing session through the main firewall. A Scheb TwoFactorToken satisfies that access rule, and App\Voter\ApiVoter grants API access to its User, allowing an attacker with a valid account password to use authenticated REST API operations without entering the second factor even though web routes remain blocked. This issue is fixed in version 2.59.0.

Summary

Two-factor authentication (TOTP) can be fully bypassed for the REST API. The KIMAI_SESSION cookie returned in the response to the login request; issued after only the password is verified, before the TOTP step; is already accepted as authenticated by every /api/* endpoint.

So after submitting just the password, the web UI correctly holds the browser at the TOTP screen (/en/auth/2fa), but the cookie from that same login response can be replayed against the API to act as the user without ever entering the second factor. This affects any account with 2FA enabled and requires only the account password.

Details

Affected Component

• The API firewall / authorization.

config/packages/security.yaml guards the API with { path: '^/api', roles: IS_AUTHENTICATED }. During 2FA the session carries a Scheb TwoFactorToken, which satisfies IS_AUTHENTICATED (it is a real, non-anonymous token). App\API\Authentication\ApiRequestMatcher returns !$request->hasPreviousSession(), so a request that carries the login session skips the stateless API firewall and is served by the main session firewall; Scheb's TwoFactorAccessDecider::isAccessible() then evaluates IS_AUTHENTICATED to true for ^/api and lets it through, and App\Voter\ApiVoter grants API to any token whose user is a User. Web routes are not affected because they require concrete roles (e.g. ROLE_USER) that a TwoFactorToken does not hold.

PoC

A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.

Impact

Two-factor authentication provides no protection for the REST API. If an attacker obtains a user's password (phishing, credential stuffing, reuse, breach); exactly the threat 2FA is meant to defend against; they get full authenticated API access as that user without the second factor. The whole exploit is a single cookie taken from the login response; no API token, Bearer header or CSRF token is required.

Solution

• The /api/ firewall now uses IS_AUTHENTICATED_REMEMBERED which is only assigned after 2FA. The historically used IS_AUTHENTICATED flag is applied immediately after login and before 2FA happened.
• The APIVoter checks both $token instanceof TwoFactorTokenInterface and isGranted('IS_AUTHENTICATED_2FA_IN_PROGRESS', $user) to make sure that the user is not currently in the 2FA step.
• Regression tests were added to prevent future escalation of the same issue.

See https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-v8hx-4vx8-wc96 for more information.

Kimai is an open-source time tracking application. Prior to 2.59.0, the KIMAI_SESSION cookie issued after password verification but before TOTP completion is accepted by every /api route because config/packages/security.yaml protects the API with IS_AUTHENTICATED and App\API\Authentication\ApiRequestMatcher routes an existing session through the main firewall. A Scheb TwoFactorToken satisfies that access rule, and App\Voter\ApiVoter grants API access to its User, allowing an attacker with a valid account password to use authenticated REST API operations without entering the second factor even though web routes remain blocked. This issue is fixed in version 2.59.0.

Kimai is an open-source time tracking application. Prior to 2.59.0, the KIMAI_SESSION cookie issued after password verification but before TOTP completion is accepted by every /api route because config/packages/security.yaml protects the API with IS_AUTHENTICATED and App\API\Authentication\ApiRequestMatcher routes an existing session through the main firewall. A Scheb TwoFactorToken satisfies that access rule, and App\Voter\ApiVoter grants API access to its User, allowing an attacker with a valid account password to use authenticated REST API operations without entering the second factor even though web routes remain blocked. This issue is fixed in version 2.59.0.

Summary

Two-factor authentication (TOTP) can be fully bypassed for the REST API. The KIMAI_SESSION cookie returned in the response to the login request; issued after only the password is verified, before the TOTP step; is already accepted as authenticated by every /api/* endpoint.

So after submitting just the password, the web UI correctly holds the browser at the TOTP screen (/en/auth/2fa), but the cookie from that same login response can be replayed against the API to act as the user without ever entering the second factor. This affects any account with 2FA enabled and requires only the account password.

Details

Affected Component

• The API firewall / authorization.

config/packages/security.yaml guards the API with { path: '^/api', roles: IS_AUTHENTICATED }. During 2FA the session carries a Scheb TwoFactorToken, which satisfies IS_AUTHENTICATED (it is a real, non-anonymous token). App\API\Authentication\ApiRequestMatcher returns !$request->hasPreviousSession(), so a request that carries the login session skips the stateless API firewall and is served by the main session firewall; Scheb's TwoFactorAccessDecider::isAccessible() then evaluates IS_AUTHENTICATED to true for ^/api and lets it through, and App\Voter\ApiVoter grants API to any token whose user is a User. Web routes are not affected because they require concrete roles (e.g. ROLE_USER) that a TwoFactorToken does not hold.

PoC

A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.

Impact

Two-factor authentication provides no protection for the REST API. If an attacker obtains a user's password (phishing, credential stuffing, reuse, breach); exactly the threat 2FA is meant to defend against; they get full authenticated API access as that user without the second factor. The whole exploit is a single cookie taken from the login response; no API token, Bearer header or CSRF token is required.

Solution

• The /api/ firewall now uses IS_AUTHENTICATED_REMEMBERED which is only assigned after 2FA. The historically used IS_AUTHENTICATED flag is applied immediately after login and before 2FA happened.
• The APIVoter checks both $token instanceof TwoFactorTokenInterface and isGranted('IS_AUTHENTICATED_2FA_IN_PROGRESS', $user) to make sure that the user is not currently in the 2FA step.
• Regression tests were added to prevent future escalation of the same issue.

See https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-v8hx-4vx8-wc96 for more information.