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CVE-2026-53530

ratex-parser panics on `\verb` with a multibyte delimiter (UTF-8 byte-boundary slice)

8.7 HighFix available

RaTeX is a KaTeX-compatible math rendering engine written in Rust. Prior to version 0.1.11, the public parser entrypoint ratex_parser::parse(&str) panics on the 9-byte input \verbéxé (i.e. \verb followed by the non-ASCII delimiter é). When handling a \verb command, the parser slices the verbatim argument with byte indices (arg[1..arg.len() - 1]); if the delimiter character is multibyte UTF-8, index 1 lands inside that character and Rust panics with “byte index 1 is not a char boundary”. Because RaTeX’s release profile sets panic = "abort" (Cargo.toml:48), the panic aborts the entire process — not just the current request/thread — making this a hard denial of service for any service that renders untrusted LaTeX. Version 0.1.11 fixes the issue.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.43%Up 0.2 points since Aug 22, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 8.7

ratex-parser panics on `\verb` with a multibyte delimiter (UTF-8 byte-boundary slice)

RaTeX is a KaTeX-compatible math rendering engine written in Rust. Prior to version 0.1.11, the public parser entrypoint ratex_parser::parse(&str) panics on the 9-byte input \verbéxé (i.e. \verb followed by the non-ASCII delimiter é). When handling a \verb command, the parser slices the verbatim argument with byte indices (arg[1..arg.len() - 1]); if the delimiter character is multibyte UTF-8, index 1 lands inside that character and Rust panics with “byte index 1 is not a char boundary”. Because RaTeX’s release profile sets panic = "abort" (Cargo.toml:48), the panic aborts the entire process — not just the current request/thread — making this a hard denial of service for any service that renders untrusted LaTeX. Version 0.1.11 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-53530
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-248, CWE-400, CWE-1285
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-64179 8.7

RaTeX is a KaTeX-compatible math rendering engine written in Rust. Prior to version 0.1.11, the public parser entrypoint ratex_parser::parse(&str) panics on the 9-byte input \verbéxé (i.e. \verb followed by the non-ASCII delimiter é). When handling a \verb command, the parser slices the verbatim argument with byte indices (arg[1..arg.len() - 1]); if the delimiter character is multibyte UTF-8, index 1 lands inside that character and Rust panics with “byte index 1 is not a char boundary”. Because RaTeX’s release profile sets panic = "abort" (Cargo.toml:48), the panic aborts the entire process — not just the current request/thread — making this a hard denial of service for any service that renders untrusted LaTeX. Version 0.1.11 fixes the issue.

Record
EUVD-2026-64179
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-4hgp-59h5-gvrj 8.7

ratex-parser panics on `\verb` with a multibyte delimiter (UTF-8 byte-boundary slice)

Summary

The public parser entrypoint ratex_parser::parse(&str) panics on the 9-byte input \verbéxé (i.e. \verb followed by the non-ASCII delimiter é). When handling a \verb command, the parser slices the verbatim argument with byte indices (arg[1..arg.len() - 1]); if the delimiter character is multibyte UTF-8, index 1 lands inside that character and Rust panics with “byte index 1 is not a char boundary”. Because RaTeX’s release profile sets panic = "abort" (Cargo.toml:48), the panic aborts the entire process — not just the current request/thread — making this a hard denial of service for any service that renders untrusted LaTeX.

Details

Affected code

crates/ratex-parser/src/parser.rs, parse_symbol_inner:

if let Some(stripped) = text.strip_prefix("\\verb") {       // parser.rs:901
    self.consume();
    let arg = stripped.to_string();                         // e.g. "éxé"
    let star = arg.starts_with('*');
    let arg = if star { &arg[1..] } else { &arg };          // parser.rs:905  (also byte-sliced)
    if arg.len() < 2 {                                      // byte length
        return Err(ParseError::new("\\verb assertion failed", Some(&nucleus)));
    }
    let body = arg[1..arg.len() - 1].to_string();           // parser.rs:910  <-- PANIC on multibyte delimiter
    ...
}

For input \verbéxé: arg = "éxé", where é = U+00E9 (bytes C3 A9). arg.len() is the byte length (5), the < 2 guard passes, and arg[1..4] starts at byte index 1 — inside the first é (bytes 0..2) — so the slice panics. The lexer groups \verb<delim>…<delim> correctly with char semantics (lexer.rs lex_verb); only the parser mishandles it.

PoC

<img width="1109" height="205" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cd4bc6ae-23dd-458f-826c-6ce4e85c7005" />

$ printf '\\verb\xc3\xa9x\xc3\xa9\n' | ./target/release/parse
thread 'main' panicked at crates/ratex-parser/src/parser.rs:910:27:
start byte index 1 is not a char boundary; it is inside 'é' (bytes 0..2 of string)
Aborted (core dumped)            # exit 134 — panic=abort kills the whole process

Impact

Any application that renders untrusted LaTeX through RaTeX (web “render this math” endpoint, WASM in-browser use, the FFI embedded in another app) can be crashed by a tiny string. With panic = "abort" in release builds, the crash takes down the whole process / server, so a single malicious formula causes a full-service DoS (and, in batch pipelines, drops all queued work).

Remediation

Slice by character boundaries instead of byte indices, mirroring the UTF-8-correct logic the lexer already uses. For example:

let chars: Vec<char> = arg.chars().collect();
if chars.len() < 2 { return Err(ParseError::new("\\verb assertion failed", Some(&nucleus))); }
let body: String = chars[1..chars.len() - 1].iter().collect();

(Apply the same char-aware handling to the * strip at parser.rs:905.) More broadly, consider not using panic = "abort" for builds embedded in long-running services, and/or wrapping parsing in catch_unwind at the FFI/WASM boundary — but the byte-slice fix is the direct correction.

Record
GHSA-4hgp-59h5-gvrj
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-248, CWE-400, CWE-1285
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 8.7

RaTeX is a KaTeX-compatible math rendering engine written in Rust. Prior to version 0.1.11, the public parser entrypoint ratex_parser::parse(&str) panics on the 9-byte input \verbéxé (i.e. \verb followed by the non-ASCII delimiter é). When handling a \verb command, the parser slices the verbatim argument with byte indices (arg[1..arg.len() - 1]); if the delimiter character is multibyte UTF-8, index 1 lands inside that character and Rust panics with “byte index 1 is not a char boundary”. Because RaTeX’s release profile sets panic = "abort" (Cargo.toml:48), the panic aborts the entire process — not just the current request/thread — making this a hard denial of service for any service that renders untrusted LaTeX. Version 0.1.11 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-53530
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Weakness
CWE-248, CWE-400, CWE-1285
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 8.7

ratex-parser panics on `\verb` with a multibyte delimiter (UTF-8 byte-boundary slice)

RaTeX is a KaTeX-compatible math rendering engine written in Rust. Prior to version 0.1.11, the public parser entrypoint ratex_parser::parse(&str) panics on the 9-byte input \verbéxé (i.e. \verb followed by the non-ASCII delimiter é). When handling a \verb command, the parser slices the verbatim argument with byte indices (arg[1..arg.len() - 1]); if the delimiter character is multibyte UTF-8, index 1 lands inside that character and Rust panics with “byte index 1 is not a char boundary”. Because RaTeX’s release profile sets panic = "abort" (Cargo.toml:48), the panic aborts the entire process — not just the current request/thread — making this a hard denial of service for any service that renders untrusted LaTeX. Version 0.1.11 fixes the issue.

Record
CVE-2026-53530
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-1285, CWE-248, CWE-400
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-4hgp-59h5-gvrj 8.7

ratex-parser panics on `\verb` with a multibyte delimiter (UTF-8 byte-boundary slice)

Summary

The public parser entrypoint ratex_parser::parse(&str) panics on the 9-byte input \verbéxé (i.e. \verb followed by the non-ASCII delimiter é). When handling a \verb command, the parser slices the verbatim argument with byte indices (arg[1..arg.len() - 1]); if the delimiter character is multibyte UTF-8, index 1 lands inside that character and Rust panics with “byte index 1 is not a char boundary”. Because RaTeX’s release profile sets panic = "abort" (Cargo.toml:48), the panic aborts the entire process — not just the current request/thread — making this a hard denial of service for any service that renders untrusted LaTeX.

Details

Affected code

crates/ratex-parser/src/parser.rs, parse_symbol_inner:

if let Some(stripped) = text.strip_prefix("\\verb") {       // parser.rs:901
    self.consume();
    let arg = stripped.to_string();                         // e.g. "éxé"
    let star = arg.starts_with('*');
    let arg = if star { &arg[1..] } else { &arg };          // parser.rs:905  (also byte-sliced)
    if arg.len() < 2 {                                      // byte length
        return Err(ParseError::new("\\verb assertion failed", Some(&nucleus)));
    }
    let body = arg[1..arg.len() - 1].to_string();           // parser.rs:910  <-- PANIC on multibyte delimiter
    ...
}

For input \verbéxé: arg = "éxé", where é = U+00E9 (bytes C3 A9). arg.len() is the byte length (5), the < 2 guard passes, and arg[1..4] starts at byte index 1 — inside the first é (bytes 0..2) — so the slice panics. The lexer groups \verb<delim>…<delim> correctly with char semantics (lexer.rs lex_verb); only the parser mishandles it.

PoC

<img width="1109" height="205" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cd4bc6ae-23dd-458f-826c-6ce4e85c7005" />

$ printf '\\verb\xc3\xa9x\xc3\xa9\n' | ./target/release/parse
thread 'main' panicked at crates/ratex-parser/src/parser.rs:910:27:
start byte index 1 is not a char boundary; it is inside 'é' (bytes 0..2 of string)
Aborted (core dumped)            # exit 134 — panic=abort kills the whole process

Impact

Any application that renders untrusted LaTeX through RaTeX (web “render this math” endpoint, WASM in-browser use, the FFI embedded in another app) can be crashed by a tiny string. With panic = "abort" in release builds, the crash takes down the whole process / server, so a single malicious formula causes a full-service DoS (and, in batch pipelines, drops all queued work).

Remediation

Slice by character boundaries instead of byte indices, mirroring the UTF-8-correct logic the lexer already uses. For example:

let chars: Vec<char> = arg.chars().collect();
if chars.len() < 2 { return Err(ParseError::new("\\verb assertion failed", Some(&nucleus))); }
let body: String = chars[1..chars.len() - 1].iter().collect();

(Apply the same char-aware handling to the * strip at parser.rs:905.) More broadly, consider not using panic = "abort" for builds embedded in long-running services, and/or wrapping parsing in catch_unwind at the FFI/WASM boundary — but the byte-slice fix is the direct correction.

Record
GHSA-4hgp-59h5-gvrj
CVSS 4.0
8.7 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-1285, CWE-248, CWE-400
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
ratex-parser
crates.io
before 0.1.11
0.1.11

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-53530 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.7) in Erweixin Ratex, published July 7, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.43%, the 37th percentile. Fixed in ratex-parser 0.1.11.

References

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