CVE-2026-54150

next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.

next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.

Impact

The HTTP route handler exported by next-video/request-handler — which the README instructs consumers to mount at /api/video — allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary .json files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup.

The handler's GET endpoint accepts a url query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between "remote URL" and "local file path" is a regex check for ^https?://. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, .json is appended, and the file is read with fs.readFile and returned in the HTTP response — with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard.

On a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum:

• The Next.js Server Actions AES encryption key (.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json)
• The Next.js Preview/Draft Mode keys (previewModeId, previewModeSigningKey, previewModeEncryptionKey)
• Internal build manifests, route registries, and absolute runtime paths
• Application-specific asset metadata (e.g. Mux uploadId, assetId, playbackId values stored in videos/*.json)

Any application that mounted /api/video following the documented one-liner is affected.

Patches

2.8.1

Workarounds

Until a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the url parameter before passing it through:

• Reject any url value that does not begin with https://, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts.
• Alternatively, remove the /api/video route entirely if your application only uses build-time import of local video files and does not use <Video src="https://..."> with string URLs at runtime.

References

• src/request-handler.ts — the vulnerable GET handler
• src/assets.ts — getAssetPath(), where the local-vs-remote branching occurs
• src/utils/utils.ts — isRemote(), the sole guard between the two branches
• src/config.ts — loadAsset(), which performs the unconstrained fs.readFile

next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.

next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.

Impact

The HTTP route handler exported by next-video/request-handler — which the README instructs consumers to mount at /api/video — allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary .json files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup.

The handler's GET endpoint accepts a url query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between "remote URL" and "local file path" is a regex check for ^https?://. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, .json is appended, and the file is read with fs.readFile and returned in the HTTP response — with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard.

On a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum:

• The Next.js Server Actions AES encryption key (.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json)
• The Next.js Preview/Draft Mode keys (previewModeId, previewModeSigningKey, previewModeEncryptionKey)
• Internal build manifests, route registries, and absolute runtime paths
• Application-specific asset metadata (e.g. Mux uploadId, assetId, playbackId values stored in videos/*.json)

Any application that mounted /api/video following the documented one-liner is affected.

Patches

2.8.1

Workarounds

Until a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the url parameter before passing it through:

• Reject any url value that does not begin with https://, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts.
• Alternatively, remove the /api/video route entirely if your application only uses build-time import of local video files and does not use <Video src="https://..."> with string URLs at runtime.

References

• src/request-handler.ts — the vulnerable GET handler
• src/assets.ts — getAssetPath(), where the local-vs-remote branching occurs
• src/utils/utils.ts — isRemote(), the sole guard between the two branches
• src/config.ts — loadAsset(), which performs the unconstrained fs.readFile