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CVE-2026-54450

ToolHive: SSRF guard misses IPv6 NAT64 ranges (64:ff9b::/96, 64:ff9b:1::/48), allowing metadata/internal access behind a NAT64 gateway

2.9 LowFix available

ToolHive is a utility designed to simplify the deployment and management of Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. Prior to 0.29.1, networking.IsPrivateIP in pkg/networking/utilities.go omits the IPv6 NAT64 prefixes 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48, so NAT64 addresses embedding private, loopback, or link-local IPv4 targets are classified as public and allowed. The most direct attacker-controlled path begins when an external OAuth client supplies a client_id URL that CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient routes through FetchClientMetadataDocument in pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go; protectedDialerControl in pkg/networking/http_client.go and validateHost in pkg/skills/gitresolver/reference.go share the defective classification but use operator-controlled or user-controlled destinations. On a ToolHive host behind a NAT64/DNS64 gateway, the gateway translates an allowed address such as 64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe to 169.254.169.254, permitting blind probing of internal TCP or TLS reachability. The attacker-controlled CIMD path requires HTTPS, verifies certificates, and does not reflect response bodies, so the established impact is an internal reachability oracle rather than metadata credential exfiltration; the webhook client is not affected because it does not use this IP guard. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.1.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.33%Unchanged since Sep 16, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 2.9

ToolHive: SSRF guard misses IPv6 NAT64 ranges (64:ff9b::/96, 64:ff9b:1::/48), allowing metadata/internal access behind a NAT64 gateway

ToolHive is a utility designed to simplify the deployment and management of Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. Prior to 0.29.1, networking.IsPrivateIP in pkg/networking/utilities.go omits the IPv6 NAT64 prefixes 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48, so NAT64 addresses embedding private, loopback, or link-local IPv4 targets are classified as public and allowed. The most direct attacker-controlled path begins when an external OAuth client supplies a client_id URL that CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient routes through FetchClientMetadataDocument in pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go; protectedDialerControl in pkg/networking/http_client.go and validateHost in pkg/skills/gitresolver/reference.go share the defective classification but use operator-controlled or user-controlled destinations. On a ToolHive host behind a NAT64/DNS64 gateway, the gateway translates an allowed address such as 64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe to 169.254.169.254, permitting blind probing of internal TCP or TLS reachability. The attacker-controlled CIMD path requires HTTPS, verifies certificates, and does not reflect response bodies, so the established impact is an internal reachability oracle rather than metadata credential exfiltration; the webhook client is not affected because it does not use this IP guard. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.1.

Record
CVE-2026-54450
CVSS 4.0
2.9 LowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-78817 2.9

ToolHive is a utility designed to simplify the deployment and management of Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. Prior to 0.29.1, networking.IsPrivateIP in pkg/networking/utilities.go omits the IPv6 NAT64 prefixes 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48, so NAT64 addresses embedding private, loopback, or link-local IPv4 targets are classified as public and allowed. The most direct attacker-controlled path begins when an external OAuth client supplies a client_id URL that CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient routes through FetchClientMetadataDocument in pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go; protectedDialerControl in pkg/networking/http_client.go and validateHost in pkg/skills/gitresolver/reference.go share the defective classification but use operator-controlled or user-controlled destinations. On a ToolHive host behind a NAT64/DNS64 gateway, the gateway translates an allowed address such as 64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe to 169.254.169.254, permitting blind probing of internal TCP or TLS reachability. The attacker-controlled CIMD path requires HTTPS, verifies certificates, and does not reflect response bodies, so the established impact is an internal reachability oracle rather than metadata credential exfiltration; the webhook client is not affected because it does not use this IP guard. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.1.

Record
EUVD-2026-78817
CVSS 4.0
2.9 LowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw 2.9

ToolHive: SSRF guard misses IPv6 NAT64 ranges (64:ff9b::/96, 64:ff9b:1::/48), allowing metadata/internal access behind a NAT64 gateway

Summary

ToolHive's hand-rolled private/reserved-IP SSRF guard (networking.IsPrivateIP in pkg/networking/utilities.go) does not recognize the IPv6 NAT64 address ranges — the well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96 (RFC 6052) and the RFC 8215 local-use prefix 64:ff9b:1::/48. As a result, an address such as 64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe — the NAT64 encoding of the link-local cloud metadata address 169.254.169.254 — is classified as a public, global-unicast address and the connection is allowed. On any ToolHive deployment that sits behind a NAT64/DNS64 gateway (the default networking stack in IPv6-only Kubernetes clusters and several IPv6-only cloud environments), an attacker who controls a URL that reaches this guard can have ToolHive attempt connections to internal/link-local addresses that the guard is meant to block, bypassing the SSRF protection. In practice the effect is a blind internal-reachability probe rather than metadata-credential theft (the only fully attacker-controlled path is HTTPS-only with TLS verification and does not reflect responses) — see Impact.

The most direct attacker-controlled entry point is the embedded OAuth authorization server's Client ID Metadata Document (CIMD) fetcher: an external OAuth client presents client_id=https://<attacker-domain>/path, and CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient fetches that URL through the same guard. The same IsPrivateIP table is also shared by the protectedDialerControl HTTP clients (registry, OIDC discovery, token introspection) and the skills git-clone host check (pkg/skills/gitresolver), though those destinations are operator-/user-configured rather than attacker-controlled. (Note: the webhook client is not affected — it enforces only the HTTPS scheme via ValidatingTransport and performs no IP-based check.)

Details

pkg/networking/utilities.go builds a privateIPBlocks table and IsPrivateIP:

func init() {
	for _, cidr := range []string{
		"127.0.0.0/8", "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16",
		"169.254.0.0/16", "::1/128", "fe80::/10", "fc00::/7",
		"100.64.0.0/10", "192.0.2.0/24", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
		"224.0.0.0/4", "ff00::/8",
	} { /* ... append to privateIPBlocks ... */ }
}

func IsPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
	if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
		return true
	}
	for _, block := range privateIPBlocks {
		if block.Contains(ip) {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

The table contains no entry for 64:ff9b::/96 or 64:ff9b:1::/48. A NAT64 address is a normal global-unicast IPv6 address: net.IP.IsGlobalUnicast() returns true and it matches none of the listed blocks, so IsPrivateIP returns false.

The CIMD fetcher (pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go, newCIMDHTTPClient) is the careful, post-resolution, anti-rebinding path that nonetheless inherits the gap:

ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost(ctx, host)
// ...
for _, ipStr := range ips {
	ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
	// ...
	if !ip.IsLoopback() && networking.IsPrivateIP(ip) {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("cimd: refusing connection to private address %s", ipStr)
	}
	dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
	return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ipStr, port))
}

Because IsPrivateIP(64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe) is false, the dialer proceeds. In a NAT64 network the kernel's NAT64 gateway transparently translates that IPv6 destination to a connection to 169.254.169.254.

Trust boundary: the CIMD URL originates from the client_id of an external OAuth client at authorize/token time (CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient → IsClientIDMetadataDocumentURL(id) → cimd.FetchClientMetadataDocument(ctx, id)), so it is fully attacker-controlled. The protectedDialerControl HTTP clients used for registry, OIDC discovery, and token introspection (pkg/networking/http_client.go → AddressReferencesPrivateIp → IsPrivateIP) and the skills git-clone host check…

Record
GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
CVSS 4.0
2.9 LowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 2.9

ToolHive is a utility designed to simplify the deployment and management of Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. Prior to 0.29.1, networking.IsPrivateIP in pkg/networking/utilities.go omits the IPv6 NAT64 prefixes 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48, so NAT64 addresses embedding private, loopback, or link-local IPv4 targets are classified as public and allowed. The most direct attacker-controlled path begins when an external OAuth client supplies a client_id URL that CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient routes through FetchClientMetadataDocument in pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go; protectedDialerControl in pkg/networking/http_client.go and validateHost in pkg/skills/gitresolver/reference.go share the defective classification but use operator-controlled or user-controlled destinations. On a ToolHive host behind a NAT64/DNS64 gateway, the gateway translates an allowed address such as 64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe to 169.254.169.254, permitting blind probing of internal TCP or TLS reachability. The attacker-controlled CIMD path requires HTTPS, verifies certificates, and does not reflect response bodies, so the established impact is an internal reachability oracle rather than metadata credential exfiltration; the webhook client is not affected because it does not use this IP guard. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.1.

Record
CVE-2026-54450
CVSS 4.0
2.9 LowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 2.9

ToolHive: SSRF guard misses IPv6 NAT64 ranges (64:ff9b::/96, 64:ff9b:1::/48), allowing metadata/internal access behind a NAT64 gateway

ToolHive is a utility designed to simplify the deployment and management of Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. Prior to 0.29.1, networking.IsPrivateIP in pkg/networking/utilities.go omits the IPv6 NAT64 prefixes 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48, so NAT64 addresses embedding private, loopback, or link-local IPv4 targets are classified as public and allowed. The most direct attacker-controlled path begins when an external OAuth client supplies a client_id URL that CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient routes through FetchClientMetadataDocument in pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go; protectedDialerControl in pkg/networking/http_client.go and validateHost in pkg/skills/gitresolver/reference.go share the defective classification but use operator-controlled or user-controlled destinations. On a ToolHive host behind a NAT64/DNS64 gateway, the gateway translates an allowed address such as 64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe to 169.254.169.254, permitting blind probing of internal TCP or TLS reachability. The attacker-controlled CIMD path requires HTTPS, verifies certificates, and does not reflect response bodies, so the established impact is an internal reachability oracle rather than metadata credential exfiltration; the webhook client is not affected because it does not use this IP guard. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.1.

Record
CVE-2026-54450
CVSS 4.0
2.9 LowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw 2.9

ToolHive: SSRF guard misses IPv6 NAT64 ranges (64:ff9b::/96, 64:ff9b:1::/48), allowing metadata/internal access behind a NAT64 gateway

Summary

ToolHive's hand-rolled private/reserved-IP SSRF guard (networking.IsPrivateIP in pkg/networking/utilities.go) does not recognize the IPv6 NAT64 address ranges — the well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96 (RFC 6052) and the RFC 8215 local-use prefix 64:ff9b:1::/48. As a result, an address such as 64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe — the NAT64 encoding of the link-local cloud metadata address 169.254.169.254 — is classified as a public, global-unicast address and the connection is allowed. On any ToolHive deployment that sits behind a NAT64/DNS64 gateway (the default networking stack in IPv6-only Kubernetes clusters and several IPv6-only cloud environments), an attacker who controls a URL that reaches this guard can have ToolHive attempt connections to internal/link-local addresses that the guard is meant to block, bypassing the SSRF protection. In practice the effect is a blind internal-reachability probe rather than metadata-credential theft (the only fully attacker-controlled path is HTTPS-only with TLS verification and does not reflect responses) — see Impact.

The most direct attacker-controlled entry point is the embedded OAuth authorization server's Client ID Metadata Document (CIMD) fetcher: an external OAuth client presents client_id=https://<attacker-domain>/path, and CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient fetches that URL through the same guard. The same IsPrivateIP table is also shared by the protectedDialerControl HTTP clients (registry, OIDC discovery, token introspection) and the skills git-clone host check (pkg/skills/gitresolver), though those destinations are operator-/user-configured rather than attacker-controlled. (Note: the webhook client is not affected — it enforces only the HTTPS scheme via ValidatingTransport and performs no IP-based check.)

Details

pkg/networking/utilities.go builds a privateIPBlocks table and IsPrivateIP:

func init() {
	for _, cidr := range []string{
		"127.0.0.0/8", "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16",
		"169.254.0.0/16", "::1/128", "fe80::/10", "fc00::/7",
		"100.64.0.0/10", "192.0.2.0/24", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
		"224.0.0.0/4", "ff00::/8",
	} { /* ... append to privateIPBlocks ... */ }
}

func IsPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
	if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
		return true
	}
	for _, block := range privateIPBlocks {
		if block.Contains(ip) {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

The table contains no entry for 64:ff9b::/96 or 64:ff9b:1::/48. A NAT64 address is a normal global-unicast IPv6 address: net.IP.IsGlobalUnicast() returns true and it matches none of the listed blocks, so IsPrivateIP returns false.

The CIMD fetcher (pkg/oauthproto/cimd/fetch.go, newCIMDHTTPClient) is the careful, post-resolution, anti-rebinding path that nonetheless inherits the gap:

ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost(ctx, host)
// ...
for _, ipStr := range ips {
	ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
	// ...
	if !ip.IsLoopback() && networking.IsPrivateIP(ip) {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("cimd: refusing connection to private address %s", ipStr)
	}
	dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
	return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ipStr, port))
}

Because IsPrivateIP(64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe) is false, the dialer proceeds. In a NAT64 network the kernel's NAT64 gateway transparently translates that IPv6 destination to a connection to 169.254.169.254.

Trust boundary: the CIMD URL originates from the client_id of an external OAuth client at authorize/token time (CIMDStorageDecorator.GetClient → IsClientIDMetadataDocumentURL(id) → cimd.FetchClientMetadataDocument(ctx, id)), so it is fully attacker-controlled. The protectedDialerControl HTTP clients used for registry, OIDC discovery, and token introspection (pkg/networking/http_client.go → AddressReferencesPrivateIp → IsPrivateIP) and the skills git-clone host check…

Record
GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
CVSS 4.0
2.9 LowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-5996 No score

ToolHive: SSRF guard misses IPv6 NAT64 ranges (64:ff9b::/96, 64:ff9b:1::/48), allowing metadata/internal access behind a NAT64 gateway in github.com/stacklok/toolhive

ToolHive: SSRF guard misses IPv6 NAT64 ranges (64:ff9b::/96, 64:ff9b:1::/48), allowing metadata/internal access behind a NAT64 gateway in github.com/stacklok/toolhive

Record
GO-2026-5996
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1 No score

Security update for govulncheck-vulndb

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

  • GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
  • GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
  • GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
  • GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
  • GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
  • GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
  • GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
  • GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
  • GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
  • GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
  • GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
  • GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
  • GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
  • GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
  • GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
  • GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
  • GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
  • GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
  • GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
  • GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
  • GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
  • GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
  • GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
  • GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
  • GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
  • GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
  • GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
  • GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
  • GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
  • GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
  • GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
  • GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
  • GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
  • GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
  • GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
  • GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
  • GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
  • GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
  • GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
  • GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
  • GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
  • GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
  • GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
  • GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
  • GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
  • GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
  • GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
  • GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
  • GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
  • GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
  • GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
  • GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
  • GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
  • GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
  • GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
  • GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
  • GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
  • GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
  • GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
  • GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
  • GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
  • GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
  • GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
  • GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
  • GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
  • GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
  • GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
  • GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
  • GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
  • GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
  • GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
  • GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
  • GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
  • GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
  • GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
  • GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
  • GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…
Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/stacklok/toolhive
Go
 through 0.29.0
0.29.1
github.com/stacklok/toolhive
Go
 before 0.29.1
0.29.1
govulncheck-vulndb
openSUSE:Leap 16.0
From an advisory covering 1734 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1
0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, facts
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-54450 is a low vulnerability (CVSS 2.9) in Stacklok Toolhive, published July 15, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.33%, the 25th percentile. Fixed in github.com/stacklok/toolhive 0.29.1.

References

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