CVE-2026-54458

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions prior to 29.0 contain a stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in the YPTSocket plugin. Any unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated origin of every administrator currently viewing a page that renders the YPTSocket online-users debug panel. plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php issues a signed WebSocket token to any anonymous caller, and MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen at plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php lines 91 and 110 reads the attacker-controlled webSocketSelfURI and page_title query parameters from the WebSocket connection URL with no validation. Both values persist into the in-memory SQLite connections table and broadcast inside the users_id_online array sent to every connected client; on the client, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js::updateSocketUserCard interpolates the broadcast page_title into an HTML template literal that is passed to jQuery $.append(html), which parses attacker bytes into live DOM nodes including <img> with inline event handlers. Successful attackers can can read non-HttpOnly cookies and the CSRF token rendered into the admin dashboard, issue authenticated requests to any admin-only endpoint, exfiltrate the admin dashboard DOM, and chain into any admin-context mutation. When the victim is an AVideo administrator, the attacker turns a single anonymous WebSocket connection into full administrative takeover via the admin's own session. This issue has been patched by https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8be71e53ccbe9b84b30870db386fb4d2b11e1c16.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions prior to 29.0 contain a stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in the YPTSocket plugin. Any unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated origin of every administrator currently viewing a page that renders the YPTSocket online-users debug panel. plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php issues a signed WebSocket token to any anonymous caller, and MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen at plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php lines 91 and 110 reads the attacker-controlled webSocketSelfURI and page_title query parameters from the WebSocket connection URL with no validation. Both values persist into the in-memory SQLite connections table and broadcast inside the users_id_online array sent to every connected client; on the client, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js::updateSocketUserCard interpolates the broadcast page_title into an HTML template literal that is passed to jQuery $.append(html), which parses attacker bytes into live DOM nodes including <img> with inline event handlers. Successful attackers can can read non-HttpOnly cookies and the CSRF token rendered into the admin dashboard, issue authenticated requests to any admin-only endpoint, exfiltrate the admin dashboard DOM, and chain into any admin-context mutation. When the victim is an AVideo administrator, the attacker turns a single anonymous WebSocket connection into full administrative takeover via the admin's own session. This issue has been patched by https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8be71e53ccbe9b84b30870db386fb4d2b11e1c16.

Summary

A stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability (CWE-79) in the AVideo YPTSocket plugin lets any unauthenticated remote attacker execute arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated origin of every administrator currently viewing a page that renders the YPTSocket online-users debug panel. plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php issues a signed WebSocket token to any anonymous caller, and MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen at plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php lines 91 and 110 reads the attacker-controlled webSocketSelfURI and page_title query parameters from the WebSocket connection URL with no validation. Both values persist into the in-memory SQLite connections table and broadcast inside the users_id_online array sent to every connected client; on the client, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js::updateSocketUserCard interpolates the broadcast page_title into an HTML template literal that is passed to jQuery $.append(html), which parses attacker bytes into live DOM nodes including <img> with inline event handlers.

Details

plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php issues a WebSocket token to any caller; the only gate is AVideoPlugin::isEnabledByName("YPTSocket"). The token-issuance helper getEncryptedInfo() at plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:21-24 writes $_REQUEST['webSocketSelfURI'] directly into the per-token state without validation:

// plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:21-24
if (!empty($_REQUEST['webSocketSelfURI'])) {
    $msgObj->selfURI = $_REQUEST['webSocketSelfURI'];
} else {
    $msgObj->selfURI = getSelfURI();
}

On WebSocket open, MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen reads webSocketSelfURI and page_title from the connection URL query string and persists both verbatim into the in-memory SQLite connections table:

// plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php:91 and :110
$client['selfURI']    = $wsocketGetVars['webSocketSelfURI'];        // line 91
$client['page_title'] = @utf8_encode(@$wsocketGetVars['page_title']); // line 110

utf8_encode is not an HTML encode. The broadcast helper dbGetUniqueUsers() (plugin/YPTSocket/db.php:288-300) selects both columns without escape and returns them as part of users_id_online, which msgToResourceId() at MessageSQLiteV2.php:444 places in the outbound JSON frame sent to every connected client. JSON encoding escapes " to \" for transport, but the receiving browser's JSON.parse(event.data) reverses the escape and restores the raw HTML bytes before they reach script.js.

On the client, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js::updateSocketUserCard (lines 638 to 700) interpolates the broadcast page_title into an HTML template literal and passes the result to jQuery $.append(html):

// plugin/YPTSocket/script.js:685-691
if (userData.page_title) textParts.push(userData.page_title);
const finalText = textParts.join(' ');
const html = `<a href="${selfURI}" target="_blank" ...>
                <i class="far fa-compass"></i> ${finalText}
              </a>`;
$(`#${socketUserDivID} .socketUserPages`).append(html);  // sink

jQuery's .append(html) parses the string with the browser HTML parser, building live DOM nodes for any tag the attacker supplied, including <img> with inline event handlers. The browser's load attempt on the attacker-supplied src fails and the inline onerror event handler fires synchronously inside the admin's authenticated origin.

The victim precondition is that the YPTSocket online-users debug panel (#socketUsersURI) is rendered in the admin's DOM. plugin/YPTSocket/footer.php:12 renders the panel when User::isAdmin() && !empty($obj->debugSocket). The debugSocket plugin flag is true by default after enable, so any admin viewing any logged-in AVideo page with the standard YPTSocket footer holds a live broadcast subscription.

Affected product: AVideo (WWBN), YPTSocket plugin Tested version: master branch (snapshot dated 2026-05-22)

PoC

The AVideo deployment must have the YPTSocket…

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions prior to 29.0 contain a stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in the YPTSocket plugin. Any unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated origin of every administrator currently viewing a page that renders the YPTSocket online-users debug panel. plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php issues a signed WebSocket token to any anonymous caller, and MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen at plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php lines 91 and 110 reads the attacker-controlled webSocketSelfURI and page_title query parameters from the WebSocket connection URL with no validation. Both values persist into the in-memory SQLite connections table and broadcast inside the users_id_online array sent to every connected client; on the client, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js::updateSocketUserCard interpolates the broadcast page_title into an HTML template literal that is passed to jQuery $.append(html), which parses attacker bytes into live DOM nodes including <img> with inline event handlers. Successful attackers can can read non-HttpOnly cookies and the CSRF token rendered into the admin dashboard, issue authenticated requests to any admin-only endpoint, exfiltrate the admin dashboard DOM, and chain into any admin-context mutation. When the victim is an AVideo administrator, the attacker turns a single anonymous WebSocket connection into full administrative takeover via the admin's own session. This issue has been patched by https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8be71e53ccbe9b84b30870db386fb4d2b11e1c16.

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions prior to 29.0 contain a stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in the YPTSocket plugin. Any unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated origin of every administrator currently viewing a page that renders the YPTSocket online-users debug panel. plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php issues a signed WebSocket token to any anonymous caller, and MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen at plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php lines 91 and 110 reads the attacker-controlled webSocketSelfURI and page_title query parameters from the WebSocket connection URL with no validation. Both values persist into the in-memory SQLite connections table and broadcast inside the users_id_online array sent to every connected client; on the client, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js::updateSocketUserCard interpolates the broadcast page_title into an HTML template literal that is passed to jQuery $.append(html), which parses attacker bytes into live DOM nodes including <img> with inline event handlers. Successful attackers can can read non-HttpOnly cookies and the CSRF token rendered into the admin dashboard, issue authenticated requests to any admin-only endpoint, exfiltrate the admin dashboard DOM, and chain into any admin-context mutation. When the victim is an AVideo administrator, the attacker turns a single anonymous WebSocket connection into full administrative takeover via the admin's own session. This issue has been patched by https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8be71e53ccbe9b84b30870db386fb4d2b11e1c16.

Summary

A stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability (CWE-79) in the AVideo YPTSocket plugin lets any unauthenticated remote attacker execute arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated origin of every administrator currently viewing a page that renders the YPTSocket online-users debug panel. plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php issues a signed WebSocket token to any anonymous caller, and MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen at plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php lines 91 and 110 reads the attacker-controlled webSocketSelfURI and page_title query parameters from the WebSocket connection URL with no validation. Both values persist into the in-memory SQLite connections table and broadcast inside the users_id_online array sent to every connected client; on the client, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js::updateSocketUserCard interpolates the broadcast page_title into an HTML template literal that is passed to jQuery $.append(html), which parses attacker bytes into live DOM nodes including <img> with inline event handlers.

Details

plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php issues a WebSocket token to any caller; the only gate is AVideoPlugin::isEnabledByName("YPTSocket"). The token-issuance helper getEncryptedInfo() at plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:21-24 writes $_REQUEST['webSocketSelfURI'] directly into the per-token state without validation:

// plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:21-24
if (!empty($_REQUEST['webSocketSelfURI'])) {
    $msgObj->selfURI = $_REQUEST['webSocketSelfURI'];
} else {
    $msgObj->selfURI = getSelfURI();
}

On WebSocket open, MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen reads webSocketSelfURI and page_title from the connection URL query string and persists both verbatim into the in-memory SQLite connections table:

// plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php:91 and :110
$client['selfURI']    = $wsocketGetVars['webSocketSelfURI'];        // line 91
$client['page_title'] = @utf8_encode(@$wsocketGetVars['page_title']); // line 110

utf8_encode is not an HTML encode. The broadcast helper dbGetUniqueUsers() (plugin/YPTSocket/db.php:288-300) selects both columns without escape and returns them as part of users_id_online, which msgToResourceId() at MessageSQLiteV2.php:444 places in the outbound JSON frame sent to every connected client. JSON encoding escapes " to \" for transport, but the receiving browser's JSON.parse(event.data) reverses the escape and restores the raw HTML bytes before they reach script.js.

On the client, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js::updateSocketUserCard (lines 638 to 700) interpolates the broadcast page_title into an HTML template literal and passes the result to jQuery $.append(html):

// plugin/YPTSocket/script.js:685-691
if (userData.page_title) textParts.push(userData.page_title);
const finalText = textParts.join(' ');
const html = `<a href="${selfURI}" target="_blank" ...>
                <i class="far fa-compass"></i> ${finalText}
              </a>`;
$(`#${socketUserDivID} .socketUserPages`).append(html);  // sink

jQuery's .append(html) parses the string with the browser HTML parser, building live DOM nodes for any tag the attacker supplied, including <img> with inline event handlers. The browser's load attempt on the attacker-supplied src fails and the inline onerror event handler fires synchronously inside the admin's authenticated origin.

The victim precondition is that the YPTSocket online-users debug panel (#socketUsersURI) is rendered in the admin's DOM. plugin/YPTSocket/footer.php:12 renders the panel when User::isAdmin() && !empty($obj->debugSocket). The debugSocket plugin flag is true by default after enable, so any admin viewing any logged-in AVideo page with the standard YPTSocket footer holds a live broadcast subscription.

Affected product: AVideo (WWBN), YPTSocket plugin Tested version: master branch (snapshot dated 2026-05-22)

PoC

The AVideo deployment must have the YPTSocket…