CVE-2026-54723

devpi is a Python package index staging server and packaging, testing, and release tool. Prior to 6.20.2 and 7.0.0b3, a server configured with the primary or deprecated master role allows an unauthenticated, modified GET request to the +changelog route because verify_primary does not reject a missing identity and therefore fails to require ReplicaIdentity. The response can disclose complete database content, including Argon2 password hashes and identifiers and salts for devpi-tokens; exposed hashes may be subject to dictionary attacks, and public tokens may assist attempts to derive the server secret. Large responses can also consume significant CPU, input/output capacity, and bandwidth. Servers using the standalone role are not exposed through replication, and an instance served exclusively through nginx with devpi-lockdown redirects the request to login with no known exploit. This issue is fixed in devpi-server versions 6.20.2 and 7.0.0b3.

devpi is a Python package index staging server and packaging, testing, and release tool. Prior to 6.20.2 and 7.0.0b3, a server configured with the primary or deprecated master role allows an unauthenticated, modified GET request to the +changelog route because verify_primary does not reject a missing identity and therefore fails to require ReplicaIdentity. The response can disclose complete database content, including Argon2 password hashes and identifiers and salts for devpi-tokens; exposed hashes may be subject to dictionary attacks, and public tokens may assist attempts to derive the server secret. Large responses can also consume significant CPU, input/output capacity, and bandwidth. Servers using the standalone role are not exposed through replication, and an instance served exclusively through nginx with devpi-lockdown redirects the request to login with no known exploit. This issue is fixed in devpi-server versions 6.20.2 and 7.0.0b3.

Impact

If the replication protocol is enabled by using the primary (or deprecated master) role for a server instance, then the +changelog URL route can be used to read the complete database content including password hashes, and the ids and salts of tokens from devpi-tokens by using a trivially modified GET request.

The leaked hashes use the argon2 algorithm, so they are not immediately at risk by brute-force methods, but dictionary attacks are feasible. If a database leak could have happened, it is advised to change the passwords after a patched version or other mitigation is in place.

When devpi-tokens is in use, the quality of the server secret is important. It might be possible to derive the server secret if actual tokens are public by using similar techniques to finding the password for a hash. If a database leak could have happened and any tokens are public, it is advised to change the server secret.

Besides the information leak this can be used to produce significant CPU, IO and bandwidth usage depending on the database size.

Patches

The logic bug causing this issue is fixed with devpi-server 6.20.2 and devpi-server 7.0.0b3.

Workarounds

When replication isn't used the role can explicitly be set to standalone.

If the server instance is exclusively served through nginx with the devpi-lockdown plugin, the request is redirected to the login form due to missing user information. There is no known exploit in this case.

devpi is a Python package index staging server and packaging, testing, and release tool. Prior to 6.20.2 and 7.0.0b3, a server configured with the primary or deprecated master role allows an unauthenticated, modified GET request to the +changelog route because verify_primary does not reject a missing identity and therefore fails to require ReplicaIdentity. The response can disclose complete database content, including Argon2 password hashes and identifiers and salts for devpi-tokens; exposed hashes may be subject to dictionary attacks, and public tokens may assist attempts to derive the server secret. Large responses can also consume significant CPU, input/output capacity, and bandwidth. Servers using the standalone role are not exposed through replication, and an instance served exclusively through nginx with devpi-lockdown redirects the request to login with no known exploit. This issue is fixed in devpi-server versions 6.20.2 and 7.0.0b3.

devpi is a Python package index staging server and packaging, testing, and release tool. Prior to 6.20.2 and 7.0.0b3, a server configured with the primary or deprecated master role allows an unauthenticated, modified GET request to the +changelog route because verify_primary does not reject a missing identity and therefore fails to require ReplicaIdentity. The response can disclose complete database content, including Argon2 password hashes and identifiers and salts for devpi-tokens; exposed hashes may be subject to dictionary attacks, and public tokens may assist attempts to derive the server secret. Large responses can also consume significant CPU, input/output capacity, and bandwidth. Servers using the standalone role are not exposed through replication, and an instance served exclusively through nginx with devpi-lockdown redirects the request to login with no known exploit. This issue is fixed in devpi-server versions 6.20.2 and 7.0.0b3.

Impact

If the replication protocol is enabled by using the primary (or deprecated master) role for a server instance, then the +changelog URL route can be used to read the complete database content including password hashes, and the ids and salts of tokens from devpi-tokens by using a trivially modified GET request.

The leaked hashes use the argon2 algorithm, so they are not immediately at risk by brute-force methods, but dictionary attacks are feasible. If a database leak could have happened, it is advised to change the passwords after a patched version or other mitigation is in place.

When devpi-tokens is in use, the quality of the server secret is important. It might be possible to derive the server secret if actual tokens are public by using similar techniques to finding the password for a hash. If a database leak could have happened and any tokens are public, it is advised to change the server secret.

Besides the information leak this can be used to produce significant CPU, IO and bandwidth usage depending on the database size.

Patches

The logic bug causing this issue is fixed with devpi-server 6.20.2 and devpi-server 7.0.0b3.

Workarounds

When replication isn't used the role can explicitly be set to standalone.

If the server instance is exclusively served through nginx with the devpi-lockdown plugin, the request is redirected to the login form due to missing user information. There is no known exploit in this case.

Impact

If the replication protocol is enabled by using the primary (or deprecated master) role for a server instance, then the +changelog URL route can be used to read the complete database content including password hashes, and the ids and salts of tokens from devpi-tokens by using a trivially modified GET request.

The leaked hashes use the argon2 algorithm, so they are not immediately at risk by brute-force methods, but dictionary attacks are feasible. If a database leak could have happened, it is advised to change the passwords after a patched version or other mitigation is in place.

When devpi-tokens is in use, the quality of the server secret is important. It might be possible to derive the server secret if actual tokens are public by using similar techniques to finding the password for a hash. If a database leak could have happened and any tokens are public, it is advised to change the server secret.

Besides the information leak this can be used to produce significant CPU, IO and bandwidth usage depending on the database size.

Patches

The logic bug causing this issue is fixed with devpi-server 6.20.2 and devpi-server 7.0.0b3.

Workarounds

When replication isn't used the role can explicitly be set to standalone.

If the server instance is exclusively served through nginx with the devpi-lockdown plugin, the request is redirected to the login form due to missing user information. There is no known exploit in this case.