CVE-2026-54754
Klever-Go: Marketplace settlement mints KLV when referral % + royalty % exceed the bid (negative seller share silently skipped)
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, marketplace settlement in core/kapp/market/market.go reads MarketOrderData.ReferralPercentage from the listing while reading asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage live at purchase time. An asset owner can create a valid listing and then use AssetTrigger UpdateRoyalties to make the combined referral and royalty percentages exceed the bid. executeBuyMarket pays referral and royalty amounts unconditionally while computeMarketOwnerAmount silently skips a nonpositive seller remainder, allowing MarketBuy, BuyItNow, or auction Claim settlement to credit more KLV or sale currency than the buyer paid. This can create unbacked currency and corrupt token supply integrity. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
9.6
Klever-Go: Marketplace settlement mints KLV when referral % + royalty % exceed the bid (negative seller share silently skipped)
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, marketplace settlement in core/kapp/market/market.go reads MarketOrderData.ReferralPercentage from the listing while reading asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage live at purchase time. An asset owner can create a valid listing and then use AssetTrigger UpdateRoyalties to make the combined referral and royalty percentages exceed the bid. executeBuyMarket pays referral and royalty amounts unconditionally while computeMarketOwnerAmount silently skips a nonpositive seller remainder, allowing MarketBuy, BuyItNow, or auction Claim settlement to credit more KLV or sale currency than the buyer paid. This can create unbacked currency and corrupt token supply integrity. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.
- Record
CVE-2026-54754- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-191, CWE-367, CWE-682
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-67824
9.6
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, marketplace settlement in core/kapp/market/market.go reads MarketOrderData.ReferralPercentage from the listing while reading asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage live at purchase time. An asset owner can create a valid listing and then use AssetTrigger UpdateRoyalties to make the combined referral and royalty percentages exceed the bid. executeBuyMarket pays referral and royalty amounts unconditionally while computeMarketOwnerAmount silently skips a nonpositive seller remainder, allowing MarketBuy, BuyItNow, or auction Claim settlement to credit more KLV or sale currency than the buyer paid. This can create unbacked currency and corrupt token supply integrity. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.
- Record
EUVD-2026-67824- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8
9.6
Klever: Marketplace settlement mints KLV when referral % + royalty % exceed the bid (negative seller share silently skipped)
Summary
When a marketplace order is settled (MarketBuy / BuyItNow, and auction Claim), the buyer's
payment is split three ways — referral, royalties, and the seller (market-order owner)
remainder:
marketOwnerAmount = CurrentBid − referralAmount − royaltiesAmount
Referral and royalties are paid out unconditionally, but the seller remainder is only paid
when positive (computeMarketOwnerAmount returns Ok and pays nothing when the amount is
<= 0). When referral% + royalty% exceeds 100% of the bid, marketOwnerAmount goes negative
and is silently skipped — so the marketplace pays out more KLV / sale currency than the buyer
paid in, minting the difference out of thin air.
The combined ceiling royalty% + referral% <= 100% is checked once, at listing time (Sell).
But the two percentages are sourced asymmetrically at settlement:
- referral % is snapshotted into the order at
Sell(MarketOrderData.ReferralPercentage); - royalty % is never snapshotted — it is read live from the asset at buy time
(
asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage).
So the listing-time invariant is a time-of-check/time-of-use guarantee only. After a valid
listing, the asset owner raises the royalty MarketPercentage via AssetTrigger → UpdateRoyalties;
at the next buy the live royalty plus the snapshotted referral exceed 100%, and the settlement mints
the overflow. The minted funds land in attacker-controlled referral / royalty addresses.
This was actively exploited on mainnet (see Evidence), minting tens of millions of KLV before the emergency guard was deployed.
Affected component
- Repository:
klever-io/klever-go(node). - Settlement / mint site:
core/kapp/market/market.go—executeBuyMarket(L575+),computeReferralAmount(L361+),computeRoyaltiesAmount(L490+),computeRoyaltiesFixedDeposit(L443+),computeMarketOwnerAmount(L540+). - TOCTOU sources:
Sellcombined check (market.go:908), order snapshot of referral but not royalty (market.go:997), live royalty mutation viacore/kapp/kda/trigger.go—handleUpdateRoyaltiesNFTandSFT(L613+, setsasset.Royalties.MarketPercentageat L670). - Reachable from both
Buy(BuyItNow,market.go:204+) and auctionClaim(market.go:705,market.go:731). - Pre-fix: not gated by any fork flag — exploitable on mainnet. The fix is gated behind the new
FixMarketBuyOverflowactivation-epoch flag.
Root cause
1. Settlement pays referral + royalty unconditionally, seller remainder only if positive
core/kapp/market/market.go — executeBuyMarket (L575+):
referralAmount, _ := tools.ComputePercentageI64(marketOrder.CurrentBid,
int64(marketOrder.ReferralPercentage), ...) // L583: SNAPSHOT referral %
royaltiesAmount, _ := tools.ComputePercentageI64(marketOrder.CurrentBid,
int64(asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage), ...) // L587: LIVE royalty %
marketOwnerAmount := marketOrder.CurrentBid - referralAmount - royaltiesAmount // L591: can go negative
// ---- FIX (FixMarketBuyOverflow), added by the patch ----
if m.forkController.FixMarketBuyOverflow() && marketOwnerAmount < 0 { // L593-596
ctx.Receipts().AddError(ctx.ContractID(), common.ErrFieldInvalidRoyalties, common.ErrInvalidValue.Error())
return transaction.Transaction_AmountInvalid, common.ErrInvalidValue
}
m.computeReferralAmount(ctx, marketOrder, referralAmount, currencyID) // pays referral in full
m.computeRoyaltiesFixedDeposit(ctx, marketOrder, asset) // pays fixed royalty (KLV)
m.computeRoyaltiesAmount(ctx, marketOrder, asset, currencyID, royaltiesAmount) // pays % royalty in full
m.computeMarketOwnerAmount(ctx, marketOrder, currencyID, marketOwnerAmount) // <-- skips when <= 0
computeMarketOwnerAmount (L540-542) — the silent skip:
func (m *marketKapp)…
- Record
GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-191, CWE-367, CWE-682
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
9.6
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, marketplace settlement in core/kapp/market/market.go reads MarketOrderData.ReferralPercentage from the listing while reading asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage live at purchase time. An asset owner can create a valid listing and then use AssetTrigger UpdateRoyalties to make the combined referral and royalty percentages exceed the bid. executeBuyMarket pays referral and royalty amounts unconditionally while computeMarketOwnerAmount silently skips a nonpositive seller remainder, allowing MarketBuy, BuyItNow, or auction Claim settlement to credit more KLV or sale currency than the buyer paid. This can create unbacked currency and corrupt token supply integrity. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.
- Record
CVE-2026-54754- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-191, CWE-367, CWE-682
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
9.6
Klever-Go: Marketplace settlement mints KLV when referral % + royalty % exceed the bid (negative seller share silently skipped)
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, marketplace settlement in core/kapp/market/market.go reads MarketOrderData.ReferralPercentage from the listing while reading asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage live at purchase time. An asset owner can create a valid listing and then use AssetTrigger UpdateRoyalties to make the combined referral and royalty percentages exceed the bid. executeBuyMarket pays referral and royalty amounts unconditionally while computeMarketOwnerAmount silently skips a nonpositive seller remainder, allowing MarketBuy, BuyItNow, or auction Claim settlement to credit more KLV or sale currency than the buyer paid. This can create unbacked currency and corrupt token supply integrity. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.
- Record
CVE-2026-54754- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-191, CWE-367, CWE-682
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8
9.6
Klever: Marketplace settlement mints KLV when referral % + royalty % exceed the bid (negative seller share silently skipped)
Summary
When a marketplace order is settled (MarketBuy / BuyItNow, and auction Claim), the buyer's
payment is split three ways — referral, royalties, and the seller (market-order owner)
remainder:
marketOwnerAmount = CurrentBid − referralAmount − royaltiesAmount
Referral and royalties are paid out unconditionally, but the seller remainder is only paid
when positive (computeMarketOwnerAmount returns Ok and pays nothing when the amount is
<= 0). When referral% + royalty% exceeds 100% of the bid, marketOwnerAmount goes negative
and is silently skipped — so the marketplace pays out more KLV / sale currency than the buyer
paid in, minting the difference out of thin air.
The combined ceiling royalty% + referral% <= 100% is checked once, at listing time (Sell).
But the two percentages are sourced asymmetrically at settlement:
- referral % is snapshotted into the order at
Sell(MarketOrderData.ReferralPercentage); - royalty % is never snapshotted — it is read live from the asset at buy time
(
asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage).
So the listing-time invariant is a time-of-check/time-of-use guarantee only. After a valid
listing, the asset owner raises the royalty MarketPercentage via AssetTrigger → UpdateRoyalties;
at the next buy the live royalty plus the snapshotted referral exceed 100%, and the settlement mints
the overflow. The minted funds land in attacker-controlled referral / royalty addresses.
This was actively exploited on mainnet (see Evidence), minting tens of millions of KLV before the emergency guard was deployed.
Affected component
- Repository:
klever-io/klever-go(node). - Settlement / mint site:
core/kapp/market/market.go—executeBuyMarket(L575+),computeReferralAmount(L361+),computeRoyaltiesAmount(L490+),computeRoyaltiesFixedDeposit(L443+),computeMarketOwnerAmount(L540+). - TOCTOU sources:
Sellcombined check (market.go:908), order snapshot of referral but not royalty (market.go:997), live royalty mutation viacore/kapp/kda/trigger.go—handleUpdateRoyaltiesNFTandSFT(L613+, setsasset.Royalties.MarketPercentageat L670). - Reachable from both
Buy(BuyItNow,market.go:204+) and auctionClaim(market.go:705,market.go:731). - Pre-fix: not gated by any fork flag — exploitable on mainnet. The fix is gated behind the new
FixMarketBuyOverflowactivation-epoch flag.
Root cause
1. Settlement pays referral + royalty unconditionally, seller remainder only if positive
core/kapp/market/market.go — executeBuyMarket (L575+):
referralAmount, _ := tools.ComputePercentageI64(marketOrder.CurrentBid,
int64(marketOrder.ReferralPercentage), ...) // L583: SNAPSHOT referral %
royaltiesAmount, _ := tools.ComputePercentageI64(marketOrder.CurrentBid,
int64(asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage), ...) // L587: LIVE royalty %
marketOwnerAmount := marketOrder.CurrentBid - referralAmount - royaltiesAmount // L591: can go negative
// ---- FIX (FixMarketBuyOverflow), added by the patch ----
if m.forkController.FixMarketBuyOverflow() && marketOwnerAmount < 0 { // L593-596
ctx.Receipts().AddError(ctx.ContractID(), common.ErrFieldInvalidRoyalties, common.ErrInvalidValue.Error())
return transaction.Transaction_AmountInvalid, common.ErrInvalidValue
}
m.computeReferralAmount(ctx, marketOrder, referralAmount, currencyID) // pays referral in full
m.computeRoyaltiesFixedDeposit(ctx, marketOrder, asset) // pays fixed royalty (KLV)
m.computeRoyaltiesAmount(ctx, marketOrder, asset, currencyID, royaltiesAmount) // pays % royalty in full
m.computeMarketOwnerAmount(ctx, marketOrder, currencyID, marketOwnerAmount) // <-- skips when <= 0
computeMarketOwnerAmount (L540-542) — the silent skip:
func (m *marketKapp)…
- Record
GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8- CVSS 3.1
- 9.6 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-191, CWE-367, CWE-682
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Show 4 moreShow less
OSVGO-2026-6315 No score
Klever: Marketplace settlement mints KLV when referral % + royalty % exceed the bid (negative seller share silently skipped) in github.com/klever-io/klever-go
Klever: Marketplace settlement mints KLV when referral % + royalty % exceed the bid (negative seller share silently skipped) in github.com/klever-io/klever-go
- Record
GO-2026-6315- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21812-1 No score
Security update for govulncheck-vulndb
This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:
- Update to version 0.0.20260902T191204 2026-09-02T19:12:04Z (jsc#PED-11136).
Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:
- GO-2026-6305 CVE-2026-55834 GHSA-2wvm-8mvp-22qv
- GO-2026-6306 CVE-2026-55064 GHSA-44v6-7fxq-vgf4
- GO-2026-6307 CVE-2026-55067 GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g
- GO-2026-6308 CVE-2026-55066 GHSA-5pg6-m483-7vrg
- GO-2026-6309 CVE-2026-54746 GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg
- GO-2026-6310 CVE-2026-54755 GHSA-cgc5-v3f2-8m2v
- GO-2026-6311 CVE-2026-54766 GHSA-f27p-pw2p-9pr4
- GO-2026-6312 CVE-2026-55108 GHSA-fmgp-q6jx-gg3x
- GO-2026-6313 CVE-2026-55065 GHSA-gg93-x632-9ccv
- GO-2026-6314 CVE-2026-55569 GHSA-mf5c-hw34-4hpp
- GO-2026-6315 CVE-2026-54754 GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8
- GO-2026-6316 CVE-2026-55068 GHSA-x8mj-6p3q-g5pp
- GO-2026-6317 CVE-2026-55588 GHSA-298f-872v-2rcx
- GO-2026-6318 CVE-2026-55621 GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f
- GO-2026-6319 CVE-2026-55622 GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
- GO-2026-6320 CVE-2026-55245 GHSA-w98g-5w9p-p3rc
- GO-2026-6321 CVE-2026-55484 GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj
- GO-2026-6322 CVE-2026-55678 GHSA-p378-jp5r-gpgw
- GO-2026-6323 CVE-2026-55763 GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv
- GO-2026-6324 CVE-2026-55761 GHSA-x626-fcwx-f5pc
- GO-2026-6325 CVE-2026-27878 GHSA-6xff-cpcq-vpw2
- GO-2026-6326 CVE-2026-55784 GHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv
- GO-2026-6327 CVE-2026-55874 GHSA-56wq-x3wv-3ff4
- GO-2026-6328 CVE-2026-55785 GHSA-fp46-6vfw-gc9c
- GO-2026-6329 CVE-2026-55873 GHSA-hgpf-8634-g44c
- GO-2026-6330 CVE-2026-55764 GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x
- GO-2026-6333 CVE-2026-25712 GHSA-37w2-86g3-h4qh
- GO-2026-6334 CVE-2026-24690 GHSA-47rq-xp99-92mx
- GO-2026-6335 CVE-2026-27657 GHSA-4c8f-3m6h-m56r
- GO-2026-6336 CVE-2026-26232 GHSA-5v69-g2m3-3hq3
- GO-2026-6337 CVE-2026-28705 GHSA-7jvx-g65v-r899
- GO-2026-6338 CVE-2026-22547 GHSA-922f-hfwp-p56f
- GO-2026-6339 CVE-2026-20909 GHSA-fhq3-p242-2qpf
- GO-2026-6340 CVE-2026-25718 GHSA-h697-89cp-24q8
- GO-2026-6341 CVE-2026-26307 GHSA-h9c5-x7g8-4q7f
- GO-2026-6342 CVE-2026-26247 GHSA-m5ch-ppfx-xv3v
- GO-2026-6354 CVE-2026-78662
- GO-2026-6355 CVE-2026-56855
- Update to version 0.0.20260828T144745 2026-08-28T14:47:45Z.
- GO-2026-6303 CVE-2026-56854
- Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21812-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVSUSE-SU-2026:23692-1 No score
Security update for govulncheck-vulndb
This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:
- Update to version 0.0.20260902T191204 2026-09-02T19:12:04Z (jsc#PED-11136).
Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:
- GO-2026-6305 CVE-2026-55834 GHSA-2wvm-8mvp-22qv
- GO-2026-6306 CVE-2026-55064 GHSA-44v6-7fxq-vgf4
- GO-2026-6307 CVE-2026-55067 GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g
- GO-2026-6308 CVE-2026-55066 GHSA-5pg6-m483-7vrg
- GO-2026-6309 CVE-2026-54746 GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg
- GO-2026-6310 CVE-2026-54755 GHSA-cgc5-v3f2-8m2v
- GO-2026-6311 CVE-2026-54766 GHSA-f27p-pw2p-9pr4
- GO-2026-6312 CVE-2026-55108 GHSA-fmgp-q6jx-gg3x
- GO-2026-6313 CVE-2026-55065 GHSA-gg93-x632-9ccv
- GO-2026-6314 CVE-2026-55569 GHSA-mf5c-hw34-4hpp
- GO-2026-6315 CVE-2026-54754 GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8
- GO-2026-6316 CVE-2026-55068 GHSA-x8mj-6p3q-g5pp
- GO-2026-6317 CVE-2026-55588 GHSA-298f-872v-2rcx
- GO-2026-6318 CVE-2026-55621 GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f
- GO-2026-6319 CVE-2026-55622 GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
- GO-2026-6320 CVE-2026-55245 GHSA-w98g-5w9p-p3rc
- GO-2026-6321 CVE-2026-55484 GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj
- GO-2026-6322 CVE-2026-55678 GHSA-p378-jp5r-gpgw
- GO-2026-6323 CVE-2026-55763 GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv
- GO-2026-6324 CVE-2026-55761 GHSA-x626-fcwx-f5pc
- GO-2026-6325 CVE-2026-27878 GHSA-6xff-cpcq-vpw2
- GO-2026-6326 CVE-2026-55784 GHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv
- GO-2026-6327 CVE-2026-55874 GHSA-56wq-x3wv-3ff4
- GO-2026-6328 CVE-2026-55785 GHSA-fp46-6vfw-gc9c
- GO-2026-6329 CVE-2026-55873 GHSA-hgpf-8634-g44c
- GO-2026-6330 CVE-2026-55764 GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x
- GO-2026-6333 CVE-2026-25712 GHSA-37w2-86g3-h4qh
- GO-2026-6334 CVE-2026-24690 GHSA-47rq-xp99-92mx
- GO-2026-6335 CVE-2026-27657 GHSA-4c8f-3m6h-m56r
- GO-2026-6336 CVE-2026-26232 GHSA-5v69-g2m3-3hq3
- GO-2026-6337 CVE-2026-28705 GHSA-7jvx-g65v-r899
- GO-2026-6338 CVE-2026-22547 GHSA-922f-hfwp-p56f
- GO-2026-6339 CVE-2026-20909 GHSA-fhq3-p242-2qpf
- GO-2026-6340 CVE-2026-25718 GHSA-h697-89cp-24q8
- GO-2026-6341 CVE-2026-26307 GHSA-h9c5-x7g8-4q7f
- GO-2026-6342 CVE-2026-26247 GHSA-m5ch-ppfx-xv3v
- GO-2026-6354 CVE-2026-78662
- GO-2026-6355 CVE-2026-56855
- Update to version 0.0.20260828T144745 2026-08-28T14:47:45Z.
- GO-2026-6303 CVE-2026-56854
- Record
SUSE-SU-2026:23692-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVSUSE-SU-2026:23712-1 No score
Security update for govulncheck-vulndb
This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:
- Update to version 0.0.20260902T191204 2026-09-02T19:12:04Z (jsc#PED-11136).
Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:
- GO-2026-6305 CVE-2026-55834 GHSA-2wvm-8mvp-22qv
- GO-2026-6306 CVE-2026-55064 GHSA-44v6-7fxq-vgf4
- GO-2026-6307 CVE-2026-55067 GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g
- GO-2026-6308 CVE-2026-55066 GHSA-5pg6-m483-7vrg
- GO-2026-6309 CVE-2026-54746 GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg
- GO-2026-6310 CVE-2026-54755 GHSA-cgc5-v3f2-8m2v
- GO-2026-6311 CVE-2026-54766 GHSA-f27p-pw2p-9pr4
- GO-2026-6312 CVE-2026-55108 GHSA-fmgp-q6jx-gg3x
- GO-2026-6313 CVE-2026-55065 GHSA-gg93-x632-9ccv
- GO-2026-6314 CVE-2026-55569 GHSA-mf5c-hw34-4hpp
- GO-2026-6315 CVE-2026-54754 GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8
- GO-2026-6316 CVE-2026-55068 GHSA-x8mj-6p3q-g5pp
- GO-2026-6317 CVE-2026-55588 GHSA-298f-872v-2rcx
- GO-2026-6318 CVE-2026-55621 GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f
- GO-2026-6319 CVE-2026-55622 GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
- GO-2026-6320 CVE-2026-55245 GHSA-w98g-5w9p-p3rc
- GO-2026-6321 CVE-2026-55484 GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj
- GO-2026-6322 CVE-2026-55678 GHSA-p378-jp5r-gpgw
- GO-2026-6323 CVE-2026-55763 GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv
- GO-2026-6324 CVE-2026-55761 GHSA-x626-fcwx-f5pc
- GO-2026-6325 CVE-2026-27878 GHSA-6xff-cpcq-vpw2
- GO-2026-6326 CVE-2026-55784 GHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv
- GO-2026-6327 CVE-2026-55874 GHSA-56wq-x3wv-3ff4
- GO-2026-6328 CVE-2026-55785 GHSA-fp46-6vfw-gc9c
- GO-2026-6329 CVE-2026-55873 GHSA-hgpf-8634-g44c
- GO-2026-6330 CVE-2026-55764 GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x
- GO-2026-6333 CVE-2026-25712 GHSA-37w2-86g3-h4qh
- GO-2026-6334 CVE-2026-24690 GHSA-47rq-xp99-92mx
- GO-2026-6335 CVE-2026-27657 GHSA-4c8f-3m6h-m56r
- GO-2026-6336 CVE-2026-26232 GHSA-5v69-g2m3-3hq3
- GO-2026-6337 CVE-2026-28705 GHSA-7jvx-g65v-r899
- GO-2026-6338 CVE-2026-22547 GHSA-922f-hfwp-p56f
- GO-2026-6339 CVE-2026-20909 GHSA-fhq3-p242-2qpf
- GO-2026-6340 CVE-2026-25718 GHSA-h697-89cp-24q8
- GO-2026-6341 CVE-2026-26307 GHSA-h9c5-x7g8-4q7f
- GO-2026-6342 CVE-2026-26247 GHSA-m5ch-ppfx-xv3v
- GO-2026-6354 CVE-2026-78662
- GO-2026-6355 CVE-2026-56855
- Update to version 0.0.20260828T144745 2026-08-28T14:47:45Z.
- GO-2026-6303 CVE-2026-56854
- Record
SUSE-SU-2026:23712-1- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
github.com/klever-io/klever-goGo |
before 1.7.19 | 1.7.19 |
govulncheck-vulndbSUSE:Linux Enterprise Server 16.0 From an advisory covering 39 CVEs |
before 0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1 | 0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1 |
govulncheck-vulndbSUSE:Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.0 From an advisory covering 39 CVEs |
before 0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1 | 0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1 |
govulncheck-vulndbopenSUSE:Leap 16.0 From an advisory covering 39 CVEs |
before 0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1 | 0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| affected, facts | ||
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-54754 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.6) in Klever-io Klever-go, published August 28, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.43%, the 37th percentile. Fixed in github.com/klever-io/klever-go 1.7.19.
References
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/8bcc600b0ac88070740c63c7ce1c8a968dd85251
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.19
github.com/advisories/GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/54xxx/CVE-2026-54754.json
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54754
Show 42 moreShow less
github.com/klever-io/klever-go
suse.com/support/update/announcement/2026/suse-su-202623692-1
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-20909
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-22547
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-24690
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-25712
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-25718
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-26232
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-26247
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-26307
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-27657
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-27878
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-28705
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54746
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54754
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54755
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54766
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55064
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55065
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55066
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55067
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55068
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55108
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55245
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55484
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55569
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55588
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55621
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55622
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55678
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55761
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55763
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55764
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55784
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55785
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55834
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55873
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55874
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56854
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56855
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78662
suse.com/support/update/announcement/2026/suse-su-202623712-1
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.