CVE-2026-55451

gettext-converter provides gettext resource conversion utilities for JavaScript. Prior to 1.3.3, js2i18next() in lib/js2i18next.js splits nested translation keys using options.keyseparator, whose default value consists of two number signs, and uses each segment as a dynamic object key without rejecting proto, constructor, or prototype. When an application converts untrusted PO or i18next translation data, a proto segment resolves Object.prototype as the nested write target and Object.assign writes attacker-controlled translated properties onto the process-wide prototype. The resulting prototype pollution can cause denial of service and may enable application-dependent follow-on attacks. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.3.

gettext-converter provides gettext resource conversion utilities for JavaScript. Prior to 1.3.3, js2i18next() in lib/js2i18next.js splits nested translation keys using options.keyseparator, whose default value consists of two number signs, and uses each segment as a dynamic object key without rejecting proto, constructor, or prototype. When an application converts untrusted PO or i18next translation data, a proto segment resolves Object.prototype as the nested write target and Object.assign writes attacker-controlled translated properties onto the process-wide prototype. The resulting prototype pollution can cause denial of service and may enable application-dependent follow-on attacks. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.3.

Impact

js2i18next() is vulnerable to prototype pollution. When converting translations, it splits nested keys on the key separator (default ##) and uses each segment as a dynamic object key while building the output object. A key whose segment is __proto__ (e.g. __proto__##gcPolluted) causes the converter to resolve Object.prototype as the nested write target and assign the translated value onto it, polluting Object.prototype for the whole runtime.

Any application that converts translation data (PO / i18next JS objects) originating from an untrusted or user-controlled source is affected. Prototype pollution can lead to denial of service and, depending on the surrounding application, may enable further attacks.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected]. Key segments equal to __proto__, constructor, or prototype are now rejected before being used as dynamic object keys.

Workarounds

Upgrade to 1.3.3. If upgrading is not immediately possible, sanitize/validate translation keys before passing them to js2i18next() and reject any key whose ##-separated segments include __proto__, constructor, or prototype.

gettext-converter provides gettext resource conversion utilities for JavaScript. Prior to 1.3.3, js2i18next() in lib/js2i18next.js splits nested translation keys using options.keyseparator, whose default value consists of two number signs, and uses each segment as a dynamic object key without rejecting proto, constructor, or prototype. When an application converts untrusted PO or i18next translation data, a proto segment resolves Object.prototype as the nested write target and Object.assign writes attacker-controlled translated properties onto the process-wide prototype. The resulting prototype pollution can cause denial of service and may enable application-dependent follow-on attacks. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.3.

gettext-converter provides gettext resource conversion utilities for JavaScript. Prior to 1.3.3, js2i18next() in lib/js2i18next.js splits nested translation keys using options.keyseparator, whose default value consists of two number signs, and uses each segment as a dynamic object key without rejecting proto, constructor, or prototype. When an application converts untrusted PO or i18next translation data, a proto segment resolves Object.prototype as the nested write target and Object.assign writes attacker-controlled translated properties onto the process-wide prototype. The resulting prototype pollution can cause denial of service and may enable application-dependent follow-on attacks. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.3.

Impact

js2i18next() is vulnerable to prototype pollution. When converting translations, it splits nested keys on the key separator (default ##) and uses each segment as a dynamic object key while building the output object. A key whose segment is __proto__ (e.g. __proto__##gcPolluted) causes the converter to resolve Object.prototype as the nested write target and assign the translated value onto it, polluting Object.prototype for the whole runtime.

Any application that converts translation data (PO / i18next JS objects) originating from an untrusted or user-controlled source is affected. Prototype pollution can lead to denial of service and, depending on the surrounding application, may enable further attacks.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected]. Key segments equal to __proto__, constructor, or prototype are now rejected before being used as dynamic object keys.

Workarounds

Upgrade to 1.3.3. If upgrading is not immediately possible, sanitize/validate translation keys before passing them to js2i18next() and reject any key whose ##-separated segments include __proto__, constructor, or prototype.