Every CVE Search/ Get API key

CVE-2026-55496

Cloudreve: Inactive/banned account emails leaked via GET /api/v4/user/search because SearchActive() omits the active-status predicate

4.3 MediumFix available

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enumerate email addresses and profile metadata for inactive or banned accounts. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.36%Unchanged since Jul 31, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 4.3

Cloudreve: Inactive/banned account emails leaked via GET /api/v4/user/search because SearchActive() omits the active-status predicate

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enumerate email addresses and profile metadata for inactive or banned accounts. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Record
CVE-2026-55496
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-200, CWE-359
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-51391 4.3

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enumerate email addresses and profile metadata for inactive or banned accounts. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Record
EUVD-2026-51391
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv 4.3

Cloudreve: Information Exposure in `GET /api/v4/user/search`: `SearchActive` omits the active-status predicate, leaking inactive/banned account emails

Summary

GET /api/v4/user/search is available to any logged-in user. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address.

A normal logged-in user can therefore enumerate and retrieve the email (plus nickname, avatar, creation time, redacted group, profile share-visibility) of inactive and banned accounts that an active-user directory is supposed to suppress. No global status interceptor compensates — the only User query interceptor is soft-delete, and inactive/banned rows are not soft-deleted.

Details

Root cause (verified at 26b6b10)

1. Route — logged-in + UserInfo.Read scope (routers/router.go):

user := v4.Group("user")            // protected user group (login required)
user.GET("search",
    middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeUserInfoRead),
    controllers.FromQuery[usersvc.SearchUserService](...), controllers.UserSearch)

The RequiredScopes check applies to scoped OAuth tokens; plain session requests are not gated by it — so any logged-in user reaches the search.

2. Service — 2-char keyword to SearchActive (service/user/info.go):

type SearchUserService struct { Keyword string `form:"keyword" binding:"required,min=2"` }
const resultLimit = 10
func (s *SearchUserService) Search(c *gin.Context) ([]*ent.User, error) {
    return dep.UserClient().SearchActive(c, resultLimit, s.Keyword)
}

3. The bug — SearchActive has no status predicate (inventory/user.go):

func (c *userClient) SearchActive(ctx context.Context, limit int, keyword string) ([]*ent.User, error) {
    ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, LoadUserGroup{}, true)
    return withUserEagerLoading(ctx,
        c.client.User.Query().
            Where(user.Or(user.EmailContainsFold(keyword), user.NickContainsFold(keyword))).
            Limit(limit),                       // <-- no user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)
    ).All(ctx)
}

Contrast the siblings immediately above:

func (c *userClient) GetActiveByID(...)        { ... Where(user.ID(id)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }
func (c *userClient) GetActiveByDavAccount(...) { ... Where(user.EmailEqualFold(email)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }

withUserEagerLoading only eager-loads the group/passkey edges; it adds no status filter. Status values are active/inactive/manual_banned/sys_banned (ent/user/user.go).

4. No global status interceptor — User.Mixin() is CommonMixin{} (ent/schema/user.go), whose Interceptors() returns only softDeleteInterceptors (ent/schema/common.go). Inactive/banned users are not soft-deleted, so nothing filters them out at query time.

5. Results serialized with email (routers/controllers/user.go → service/user/response.go):

// UserSearch:
return user.BuildUserRedacted(item, user.RedactLevelUser, hasher)
// BuildUserRedacted:
if level == RedactLevelUser { user.Email = userRaw.Email }   // email included

Secondary path: GET /api/v4/user/info/:id → GetUser uses GetByID (no status filter), and the controller picks RedactLevelUser for any non-anonymous caller (RedactLevelAnonymous only for anonymous). So a logged-in caller with an inactive/banned user's hashed ID also receives the email-bearing profile. (Less practical than search, since it needs the hashed ID rather than a 2-char keyword.)

Steps to reproduce (requires a live instance)

  1. Ensure a target account exists in inactive or manual_banned/sys_banned status (e.g., an unconfirmed registration or a banned user).
  2. As any logged-in user: 
    GET /api/v4/user/search?keyword=<>=2 chars of the target email/nick>
Cookie:…
Record
GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-200, CWE-359
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 4.3

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enumerate email addresses and profile metadata for inactive or banned accounts. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Record
CVE-2026-55496
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-200, CWE-359
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 4.3

Cloudreve: Inactive/banned account emails leaked via GET /api/v4/user/search because SearchActive() omits the active-status predicate

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, GET /api/v4/user/search calls SearchActive without adding a StatusActive predicate and serializes matches at RedactLevelUser, allowing any logged-in user to enumerate email addresses and profile metadata for inactive or banned accounts. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Record
CVE-2026-55496
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-200, CWE-359
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv 4.3

Cloudreve: Information Exposure in `GET /api/v4/user/search`: `SearchActive` omits the active-status predicate, leaking inactive/banned account emails

Summary

GET /api/v4/user/search is available to any logged-in user. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address.

A normal logged-in user can therefore enumerate and retrieve the email (plus nickname, avatar, creation time, redacted group, profile share-visibility) of inactive and banned accounts that an active-user directory is supposed to suppress. No global status interceptor compensates — the only User query interceptor is soft-delete, and inactive/banned rows are not soft-deleted.

Details

Root cause (verified at 26b6b10)

1. Route — logged-in + UserInfo.Read scope (routers/router.go):

user := v4.Group("user")            // protected user group (login required)
user.GET("search",
    middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeUserInfoRead),
    controllers.FromQuery[usersvc.SearchUserService](...), controllers.UserSearch)

The RequiredScopes check applies to scoped OAuth tokens; plain session requests are not gated by it — so any logged-in user reaches the search.

2. Service — 2-char keyword to SearchActive (service/user/info.go):

type SearchUserService struct { Keyword string `form:"keyword" binding:"required,min=2"` }
const resultLimit = 10
func (s *SearchUserService) Search(c *gin.Context) ([]*ent.User, error) {
    return dep.UserClient().SearchActive(c, resultLimit, s.Keyword)
}

3. The bug — SearchActive has no status predicate (inventory/user.go):

func (c *userClient) SearchActive(ctx context.Context, limit int, keyword string) ([]*ent.User, error) {
    ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, LoadUserGroup{}, true)
    return withUserEagerLoading(ctx,
        c.client.User.Query().
            Where(user.Or(user.EmailContainsFold(keyword), user.NickContainsFold(keyword))).
            Limit(limit),                       // <-- no user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)
    ).All(ctx)
}

Contrast the siblings immediately above:

func (c *userClient) GetActiveByID(...)        { ... Where(user.ID(id)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }
func (c *userClient) GetActiveByDavAccount(...) { ... Where(user.EmailEqualFold(email)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }

withUserEagerLoading only eager-loads the group/passkey edges; it adds no status filter. Status values are active/inactive/manual_banned/sys_banned (ent/user/user.go).

4. No global status interceptor — User.Mixin() is CommonMixin{} (ent/schema/user.go), whose Interceptors() returns only softDeleteInterceptors (ent/schema/common.go). Inactive/banned users are not soft-deleted, so nothing filters them out at query time.

5. Results serialized with email (routers/controllers/user.go → service/user/response.go):

// UserSearch:
return user.BuildUserRedacted(item, user.RedactLevelUser, hasher)
// BuildUserRedacted:
if level == RedactLevelUser { user.Email = userRaw.Email }   // email included

Secondary path: GET /api/v4/user/info/:id → GetUser uses GetByID (no status filter), and the controller picks RedactLevelUser for any non-anonymous caller (RedactLevelAnonymous only for anonymous). So a logged-in caller with an inactive/banned user's hashed ID also receives the email-bearing profile. (Less practical than search, since it needs the hashed ID rather than a 2-char keyword.)

Steps to reproduce (requires a live instance)

  1. Ensure a target account exists in inactive or manual_banned/sys_banned status (e.g., an unconfirmed registration or a banned user).
  2. As any logged-in user: 
    GET /api/v4/user/search?keyword=<>=2 chars of the target email/nick>
Cookie:…
Record
GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv
CVSS 3.1
4.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-200, CWE-359
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-6098 No score

Cloudreve: Information Exposure in `GET /api/v4/user/search`: `SearchActive` omits the active-status predicate, leaking inactive/banned account emails in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

Cloudreve: Information Exposure in GET /api/v4/user/search: SearchActive omits the active-status predicate, leaking inactive/banned account emails in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

Record
GO-2026-6098
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21761-1 No score

Security update for govulncheck-vulndb

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 0.0.20260827T195228 2026-08-27T19:52:28Z (jsc#PED-11136).

    Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

    • GO-2026-5026 CVE-2026-39821
    • GO-2026-6225
    • GO-2026-6250 CVE-2026-63328 GHSA-8rc5-4fr6-64pw
    • GO-2026-6253 CVE-2026-17106 GHSA-hfg8-hc9c-6c3h
    • GO-2026-6254 CVE-2026-53941 GHSA-vjhx-2cqw-3q6q
    • GO-2026-6255 CVE-2026-61711 GHSA-7236-3392-c5c6
    • GO-2026-6256 CVE-2026-61712 GHSA-72x6-4j93-7w86
    • GO-2026-6258 CVE-2026-45404 GHSA-42cj-99w8-cp2p
    • GO-2026-6259 CVE-2026-32637 GHSA-j2g6-362q-6qc6
    • GO-2026-6260 CVE-2026-55149 GHSA-qqff-5854-px68
    • GO-2026-6261 CVE-2026-54061 GHSA-rrwh-6jrq-wp5v
    • GO-2026-6262 GHSA-22w5-2fxg-vrwx
    • GO-2026-6263 CVE-2026-54168 GHSA-6f2p-296r-cc28
    • GO-2026-6264 CVE-2026-54245 GHSA-7q96-f8xw-jv5j
    • GO-2026-6265 GHSA-8fxq-53rx-ph5f
    • GO-2026-6266 CVE-2026-54167 GHSA-f5f4-3hh4-f54m
    • GO-2026-6267 GHSA-h58c-xccx-75m3
    • GO-2026-6268 GHSA-q9c5-pp7m-fm2g
    • GO-2026-6269 GHSA-rxhg-vcww-2mpw
    • GO-2026-6270 CVE-2026-54162 GHSA-x3g7-qrwc-f6c5
    • GO-2026-6271 CVE-2026-67448 GHSA-8r62-w5wh-fc5m
    • GO-2026-6272 CVE-2026-67447 GHSA-r553-m4fv-5v97
    • GO-2026-6273 CVE-2026-64679 GHSA-26w5-6g95-gj28
    • GO-2026-6274 CVE-2026-76905 GHSA-mmfr-pmjx-hw9w
    • GO-2026-6275 CVE-2026-77354 GHSA-xhj3-7xw9-vr34
    • GO-2026-6277 GHSA-4ph6-mjv7-3fq6
    • GO-2026-6278 GHSA-w67g-5rqw-f597
    • GO-2026-6279 CVE-2026-6046 GHSA-3vmp-whvv-5v9v
    • GO-2026-6280 CVE-2026-7387 GHSA-6hxm-w4hv-vgvw
    • GO-2026-6281 CVE-2026-6961 GHSA-8qq9-cqj8-82w4
    • GO-2026-6282 CVE-2026-7184 GHSA-9p44-r552-4wp9
    • GO-2026-6283 CVE-2026-6689 GHSA-c28q-m4gf-vg4q
    • GO-2026-6284 CVE-2026-55477 GHSA-jm48-m3rr-9hgg
    • GO-2026-6285 CVE-2026-6739 GHSA-m2w9-h2mm-79qr
    • GO-2026-6286 CVE-2026-3433 GHSA-rp4v-qc77-phm4
    • GO-2026-6287 GHSA-vx2m-jpxr-xv7w
    • GO-2026-6288 CVE-2026-11624 GHSA-76g7-m3xw-x9gr
    • GO-2026-6289 GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59
    • GO-2026-6290 CVE-2026-55581 GHSA-3x77-wg38-92r3
    • GO-2026-6291 CVE-2026-55582 GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58
    • GO-2026-6292 CVE-2026-55580 GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m
    • GO-2026-6293 CVE-2026-55677 GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq
    • GO-2026-6294 CVE-2026-55092 GHSA-mcj4-mphf-j9ff
    • GO-2026-6295 CVE-2026-55637 GHSA-cmwv-wf9p-p8wx
    • GO-2026-6296 CVE-2026-54523 GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9
    • GO-2026-6297 CVE-2026-50879 GHSA-g743-m6x3-v6wm
    • GO-2026-6298 CVE-2026-54563 GHSA-w5fv-7x5q-g8qp
    • GO-2026-6299 CVE-2026-50884 GHSA-5442-mh7f-72px
    • GO-2026-6300 CVE-2026-50891 GHSA-rcqf-cpv9-g5jf
    • GO-2026-6301 CVE-2026-42350 GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf

  • Update to version 0.0.20260819T170606 2026-08-19T17:06:06Z.

    Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

    • GO-2026-4720 GHSA-v3mg-9v85-fcm7
    • GO-2026-4942 CVE-2026-35172 GHSA-f2g3-hh2r-cwgc
    • GO-2026-4950
    • GO-2026-6093 GHSA-464c-974j-9xm6
    • GO-2026-6094 GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g
    • GO-2026-6095 GHSA-r277-6w6q-xmqw
    • GO-2026-6097 CVE-2026-55495 GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737
    • GO-2026-6098 CVE-2026-55496 GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv
    • GO-2026-6099 CVE-2026-57497 GHSA-g35j-m5xg-vh3q
    • GO-2026-6100 CVE-2026-55497 GHSA-g9j2-8w95-3vwv
    • GO-2026-6101 CVE-2026-55502 GHSA-hq88-5x99-x3gf
    • GO-2026-6102 CVE-2026-55499 GHSA-w8x7-h2px-xmq8
    • GO-2026-6103 CVE-2026-73564 GHSA-26gq-p25f-99cp
    • GO-2026-6104 CVE-2026-62323 GHSA-c3jm-gv5r-9wcp
    • GO-2026-6105 GHSA-c534-2w9c-x7fm
    • GO-2026-6106 GHSA-v6w6-358x-2433
    • GO-2026-6107 CVE-2026-73500 GHSA-6vch-q96h-7gc3
    • GO-2026-6108 CVE-2026-73505 GHSA-6xj8-qv9j-xcjq
    • GO-2026-6109 GHSA-86cx-wwf4-phq4
    • GO-2026-6110 CVE-2026-73509 GHSA-95cv-r8x4-vh75
    • GO-2026-6111 CVE-2026-73506 GHSA-fwjx-9p69-h25h
    • GO-2026-6112 CVE-2026-73502 GHSA-jpcw-4wr7-c3vq
    • GO-2026-6113 GHSA-p6ph-3jx2-3337
    • GO-2026-6114 CVE-2026-73499 GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8
    • GO-2026-6115 CVE-2026-56867
    • GO-2026-6117 GHSA-hp74-gm6m-2qm5
    • GO-2026-6118 CVE-2026-47427 GHSA-w4q6-qw23-4rg7
    • GO-2026-6119 CVE-2026-43983…
Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21761-1
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVSUSE-SU-2026:23625-1 No score

Security update for govulncheck-vulndb

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 0.0.20260827T195228 2026-08-27T19:52:28Z (jsc#PED-11136).

    Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

    • GO-2026-5026 CVE-2026-39821
    • GO-2026-6225
    • GO-2026-6250 CVE-2026-63328 GHSA-8rc5-4fr6-64pw
    • GO-2026-6253 CVE-2026-17106 GHSA-hfg8-hc9c-6c3h
    • GO-2026-6254 CVE-2026-53941 GHSA-vjhx-2cqw-3q6q
    • GO-2026-6255 CVE-2026-61711 GHSA-7236-3392-c5c6
    • GO-2026-6256 CVE-2026-61712 GHSA-72x6-4j93-7w86
    • GO-2026-6258 CVE-2026-45404 GHSA-42cj-99w8-cp2p
    • GO-2026-6259 CVE-2026-32637 GHSA-j2g6-362q-6qc6
    • GO-2026-6260 CVE-2026-55149 GHSA-qqff-5854-px68
    • GO-2026-6261 CVE-2026-54061 GHSA-rrwh-6jrq-wp5v
    • GO-2026-6262 GHSA-22w5-2fxg-vrwx
    • GO-2026-6263 CVE-2026-54168 GHSA-6f2p-296r-cc28
    • GO-2026-6264 CVE-2026-54245 GHSA-7q96-f8xw-jv5j
    • GO-2026-6265 GHSA-8fxq-53rx-ph5f
    • GO-2026-6266 CVE-2026-54167 GHSA-f5f4-3hh4-f54m
    • GO-2026-6267 GHSA-h58c-xccx-75m3
    • GO-2026-6268 GHSA-q9c5-pp7m-fm2g
    • GO-2026-6269 GHSA-rxhg-vcww-2mpw
    • GO-2026-6270 CVE-2026-54162 GHSA-x3g7-qrwc-f6c5
    • GO-2026-6271 CVE-2026-67448 GHSA-8r62-w5wh-fc5m
    • GO-2026-6272 CVE-2026-67447 GHSA-r553-m4fv-5v97
    • GO-2026-6273 CVE-2026-64679 GHSA-26w5-6g95-gj28
    • GO-2026-6274 CVE-2026-76905 GHSA-mmfr-pmjx-hw9w
    • GO-2026-6275 CVE-2026-77354 GHSA-xhj3-7xw9-vr34
    • GO-2026-6277 GHSA-4ph6-mjv7-3fq6
    • GO-2026-6278 GHSA-w67g-5rqw-f597
    • GO-2026-6279 CVE-2026-6046 GHSA-3vmp-whvv-5v9v
    • GO-2026-6280 CVE-2026-7387 GHSA-6hxm-w4hv-vgvw
    • GO-2026-6281 CVE-2026-6961 GHSA-8qq9-cqj8-82w4
    • GO-2026-6282 CVE-2026-7184 GHSA-9p44-r552-4wp9
    • GO-2026-6283 CVE-2026-6689 GHSA-c28q-m4gf-vg4q
    • GO-2026-6284 CVE-2026-55477 GHSA-jm48-m3rr-9hgg
    • GO-2026-6285 CVE-2026-6739 GHSA-m2w9-h2mm-79qr
    • GO-2026-6286 CVE-2026-3433 GHSA-rp4v-qc77-phm4
    • GO-2026-6287 GHSA-vx2m-jpxr-xv7w
    • GO-2026-6288 CVE-2026-11624 GHSA-76g7-m3xw-x9gr
    • GO-2026-6289 GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59
    • GO-2026-6290 CVE-2026-55581 GHSA-3x77-wg38-92r3
    • GO-2026-6291 CVE-2026-55582 GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58
    • GO-2026-6292 CVE-2026-55580 GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m
    • GO-2026-6293 CVE-2026-55677 GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq
    • GO-2026-6294 CVE-2026-55092 GHSA-mcj4-mphf-j9ff
    • GO-2026-6295 CVE-2026-55637 GHSA-cmwv-wf9p-p8wx
    • GO-2026-6296 CVE-2026-54523 GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9
    • GO-2026-6297 CVE-2026-50879 GHSA-g743-m6x3-v6wm
    • GO-2026-6298 CVE-2026-54563 GHSA-w5fv-7x5q-g8qp
    • GO-2026-6299 CVE-2026-50884 GHSA-5442-mh7f-72px
    • GO-2026-6300 CVE-2026-50891 GHSA-rcqf-cpv9-g5jf
    • GO-2026-6301 CVE-2026-42350 GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf

  • Update to version 0.0.20260819T170606 2026-08-19T17:06:06Z.

    Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

    • GO-2026-4720 GHSA-v3mg-9v85-fcm7
    • GO-2026-4942 CVE-2026-35172 GHSA-f2g3-hh2r-cwgc
    • GO-2026-4950
    • GO-2026-6093 GHSA-464c-974j-9xm6
    • GO-2026-6094 GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g
    • GO-2026-6095 GHSA-r277-6w6q-xmqw
    • GO-2026-6097 CVE-2026-55495 GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737
    • GO-2026-6098 CVE-2026-55496 GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv
    • GO-2026-6099 CVE-2026-57497 GHSA-g35j-m5xg-vh3q
    • GO-2026-6100 CVE-2026-55497 GHSA-g9j2-8w95-3vwv
    • GO-2026-6101 CVE-2026-55502 GHSA-hq88-5x99-x3gf
    • GO-2026-6102 CVE-2026-55499 GHSA-w8x7-h2px-xmq8
    • GO-2026-6103 CVE-2026-73564 GHSA-26gq-p25f-99cp
    • GO-2026-6104 CVE-2026-62323 GHSA-c3jm-gv5r-9wcp
    • GO-2026-6105 GHSA-c534-2w9c-x7fm
    • GO-2026-6106 GHSA-v6w6-358x-2433
    • GO-2026-6107 CVE-2026-73500 GHSA-6vch-q96h-7gc3
    • GO-2026-6108 CVE-2026-73505 GHSA-6xj8-qv9j-xcjq
    • GO-2026-6109 GHSA-86cx-wwf4-phq4
    • GO-2026-6110 CVE-2026-73509 GHSA-95cv-r8x4-vh75
    • GO-2026-6111 CVE-2026-73506 GHSA-fwjx-9p69-h25h
    • GO-2026-6112 CVE-2026-73502 GHSA-jpcw-4wr7-c3vq
    • GO-2026-6113 GHSA-p6ph-3jx2-3337
    • GO-2026-6114 CVE-2026-73499 GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8
    • GO-2026-6115 CVE-2026-56867
    • GO-2026-6117 GHSA-hp74-gm6m-2qm5
    • GO-2026-6118 CVE-2026-47427 GHSA-w4q6-qw23-4rg7
    • GO-2026-6119 CVE-2026-43983…
Record
SUSE-SU-2026:23625-1
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4
Go
 before 4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279
4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279
github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3
Go
 through 3.0.0-20250225100611-da4e44b77af4 None known
github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve
Go
 All versions None known
github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3
Go
 All versions None known
govulncheck-vulndb
SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server 16.0
From an advisory covering 181 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260827T195228-160000.1.1
0.0.20260827T195228-160000.1.1
govulncheck-vulndb
SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.0
From an advisory covering 181 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260827T195228-160000.1.1
0.0.20260827T195228-160000.1.1
govulncheck-vulndb
openSUSE:Leap 16.0
From an advisory covering 181 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260827T195228-160000.1.1
0.0.20260827T195228-160000.1.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, facts
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-55496 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 4.3) in Cloudreve, published July 24, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.36%, the 30th percentile. Fixed in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279.

References

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