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CVE-2026-55784

free5GC AUSF authentication contexts can be overwritten by concurrent requests for the same SUPI

7.5 High

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In version 1.4.4 and earlier, the AUSF component stores per-subscriber authentication state in a global sync.Map named AUSFContext.UePool in internal/context/context.go, keyed only by SUPI. Every request handled by internal/sbi/processor/ue_authentication.go creates an AusfUeContext, and AddAusfUeContextToPool executes ausfContext.UePool.Store(ausfUeContext.Supi, ausfUeContext), unconditionally replacing the active context for that SUPI. An attacker with access to the AUSF SBI/N12 interface can send concurrent POST /nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications requests for the same target SUPI, causing all attempts to share one logical authentication context URL while K_aut, XRES, and EapID are repeatedly overwritten. A valid EAP-AKA' response for an earlier challenge is then checked against the latest context, causing AT_MAC verification to fail and denying authentication to the selected subscriber while the request flood continues. No fixed version is available as of this review.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.42%Up 0.2 points since Aug 29, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 7.5

free5GC AUSF authentication contexts can be overwritten by concurrent requests for the same SUPI

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In version 1.4.4 and earlier, the AUSF component stores per-subscriber authentication state in a global sync.Map named AUSFContext.UePool in internal/context/context.go, keyed only by SUPI. Every request handled by internal/sbi/processor/ue_authentication.go creates an AusfUeContext, and AddAusfUeContextToPool executes ausfContext.UePool.Store(ausfUeContext.Supi, ausfUeContext), unconditionally replacing the active context for that SUPI. An attacker with access to the AUSF SBI/N12 interface can send concurrent POST /nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications requests for the same target SUPI, causing all attempts to share one logical authentication context URL while K_aut, XRES, and EapID are repeatedly overwritten. A valid EAP-AKA' response for an earlier challenge is then checked against the latest context, causing AT_MAC verification to fail and denying authentication to the selected subscriber while the request flood continues. No fixed version is available as of this review.

Record
CVE-2026-55784
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-362
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-68016 7.5

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In version 1.4.4 and earlier, the AUSF component stores per-subscriber authentication state in a global sync.Map named AUSFContext.UePool in internal/context/context.go, keyed only by SUPI. Every request handled by internal/sbi/processor/ue_authentication.go creates an AusfUeContext, and AddAusfUeContextToPool executes ausfContext.UePool.Store(ausfUeContext.Supi, ausfUeContext), unconditionally replacing the active context for that SUPI. An attacker with access to the AUSF SBI/N12 interface can send concurrent POST /nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications requests for the same target SUPI, causing all attempts to share one logical authentication context URL while K_aut, XRES, and EapID are repeatedly overwritten. A valid EAP-AKA' response for an earlier challenge is then checked against the latest context, causing AT_MAC verification to fail and denying authentication to the selected subscriber while the request flood continues. No fixed version is available as of this review.

Record
EUVD-2026-68016
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv 7.5

free5GC AUSF authentication contexts can be overwritten by concurrent requests for the same SUPI

Summary

The AUSF component of free5GC stores per-subscriber authentication state in a global sync.Map keyed only by SUPI. Every incoming authentication request creates a new AusfUeContext and stores it under that SUPI key without checking whether an authentication procedure is already in progress and without generating a per-session unique identifier.

An attacker with access to the AUSF SBI/N12 interface can send concurrent POST /nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications requests for the same target SUPI. Each request is accepted and overwrites the previous authentication context. A valid EAP-AKA' response for an earlier challenge is then verified against the latest overwritten context, whose K_aut, XRES, and EapID no longer match the challenge. The result is a targeted authentication denial of service for that SUPI while the request flood is maintained.

This issue was confirmed on github.com/free5gc/ausf v1.4.4 and current main as of June 2026.

Details

The vulnerable context pool is defined in internal/context/context.go.

UePool is a sync.Map, which makes individual map operations safe, but it does not make the authentication procedure state safe. The problem is the session design: the key is only the SUPI, and Store() unconditionally replaces any active context for that SUPI.

type AUSFContext struct {
    suciSupiMap sync.Map
    UePool      sync.Map
    // ...
}

type AusfUeContext struct {
    Supi string
    // ...

    // for EAP-AKA'
    K_aut    string
    XRES     string
    Rand     string
    EapID    uint8
    Resynced bool
}

func NewAusfUeContext(identifier string) (ausfUeContext *AusfUeContext) {
    ausfUeContext = new(AusfUeContext)
    ausfUeContext.Supi = identifier
    return ausfUeContext
}

func AddAusfUeContextToPool(ausfUeContext *AusfUeContext) {
    ausfContext.UePool.Store(ausfUeContext.Supi, ausfUeContext)
}

The vulnerable sequence is executed for every authentication request in internal/sbi/processor/ue_authentication.go:

ueid := authInfoResult.Supi
ausfUeContext := ausf_context.NewAusfUeContext(ueid)
ausfUeContext.ServingNetworkName = snName
ausfUeContext.AuthStatus = models.AusfUeAuthenticationAuthResult_ONGOING
ausfUeContext.UdmUeauUrl = udmUrl
ausf_context.AddAusfUeContextToPool(ausfUeContext)

There is no guard such as LoadOrStore, no AUTHENTICATION_IN_PROGRESS response, no rate limit per SUPI, and no unique authentication-session ID in the context URL. For EAP-AKA', the returned context URL is derived directly from the SUCI/SUPI path:

/nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications/{suci}/eap-session

All concurrent authentication attempts for the same subscriber therefore point to the same logical context URL, while the backing AusfUeContext in UePool is repeatedly replaced.

When the EAP response is later processed, the AUSF looks up the current context by SUPI:

currentSupi := ausf_context.GetSupiFromSuciSupiMap(eapSessionID)
ausfCurrentContext := ausf_context.GetAusfUeContext(currentSupi)

The EAP-AKA' response is then verified against the current context's K_aut and XRES:

K_autStr := ausfCurrentContext.K_aut
XMAC := CalculateAtMAC(K_aut, decodeEapAkaPrimePkt.MACInput)
MAC := decodeEapAkaPrimePkt.Attributes[ausf_context.AT_MAC_ATTRIBUTE].Value
XRES := ausfCurrentContext.XRES
RES := hex.EncodeToString(decodeEapAkaPrimePkt.Attributes[ausf_context.AT_RES_ATTRIBUTE].Value)

if !bytes.Equal(MAC, XMAC) {
    eapOK = false
    eapErrStr = "EAP-AKA' integrity check fail"
} else if XRES == RES {
    logger.AuthELog.Infoln("Correct RES value, EAP-AKA' auth succeed")
    // ...
}

If another request has overwritten the context between challenge issuance and response processing, the legitimate response is checked against the wrong K_aut and fails the AT_MAC verification.

Attack flow

The attack is selective for a target SUPI:

  1. The legitimate procedure starts and the AUSF stores ctx_LEGIT under…
Record
GHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-362
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 7.5

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In version 1.4.4 and earlier, the AUSF component stores per-subscriber authentication state in a global sync.Map named AUSFContext.UePool in internal/context/context.go, keyed only by SUPI. Every request handled by internal/sbi/processor/ue_authentication.go creates an AusfUeContext, and AddAusfUeContextToPool executes ausfContext.UePool.Store(ausfUeContext.Supi, ausfUeContext), unconditionally replacing the active context for that SUPI. An attacker with access to the AUSF SBI/N12 interface can send concurrent POST /nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications requests for the same target SUPI, causing all attempts to share one logical authentication context URL while K_aut, XRES, and EapID are repeatedly overwritten. A valid EAP-AKA' response for an earlier challenge is then checked against the latest context, causing AT_MAC verification to fail and denying authentication to the selected subscriber while the request flood continues. No fixed version is available as of this review.

Record
CVE-2026-55784
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-362
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv 7.5

free5GC AUSF authentication contexts can be overwritten by concurrent requests for the same SUPI

Summary

The AUSF component of free5GC stores per-subscriber authentication state in a global sync.Map keyed only by SUPI. Every incoming authentication request creates a new AusfUeContext and stores it under that SUPI key without checking whether an authentication procedure is already in progress and without generating a per-session unique identifier.

An attacker with access to the AUSF SBI/N12 interface can send concurrent POST /nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications requests for the same target SUPI. Each request is accepted and overwrites the previous authentication context. A valid EAP-AKA' response for an earlier challenge is then verified against the latest overwritten context, whose K_aut, XRES, and EapID no longer match the challenge. The result is a targeted authentication denial of service for that SUPI while the request flood is maintained.

This issue was confirmed on github.com/free5gc/ausf v1.4.4 and current main as of June 2026.

Details

The vulnerable context pool is defined in internal/context/context.go.

UePool is a sync.Map, which makes individual map operations safe, but it does not make the authentication procedure state safe. The problem is the session design: the key is only the SUPI, and Store() unconditionally replaces any active context for that SUPI.

type AUSFContext struct {
    suciSupiMap sync.Map
    UePool      sync.Map
    // ...
}

type AusfUeContext struct {
    Supi string
    // ...

    // for EAP-AKA'
    K_aut    string
    XRES     string
    Rand     string
    EapID    uint8
    Resynced bool
}

func NewAusfUeContext(identifier string) (ausfUeContext *AusfUeContext) {
    ausfUeContext = new(AusfUeContext)
    ausfUeContext.Supi = identifier
    return ausfUeContext
}

func AddAusfUeContextToPool(ausfUeContext *AusfUeContext) {
    ausfContext.UePool.Store(ausfUeContext.Supi, ausfUeContext)
}

The vulnerable sequence is executed for every authentication request in internal/sbi/processor/ue_authentication.go:

ueid := authInfoResult.Supi
ausfUeContext := ausf_context.NewAusfUeContext(ueid)
ausfUeContext.ServingNetworkName = snName
ausfUeContext.AuthStatus = models.AusfUeAuthenticationAuthResult_ONGOING
ausfUeContext.UdmUeauUrl = udmUrl
ausf_context.AddAusfUeContextToPool(ausfUeContext)

There is no guard such as LoadOrStore, no AUTHENTICATION_IN_PROGRESS response, no rate limit per SUPI, and no unique authentication-session ID in the context URL. For EAP-AKA', the returned context URL is derived directly from the SUCI/SUPI path:

/nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications/{suci}/eap-session

All concurrent authentication attempts for the same subscriber therefore point to the same logical context URL, while the backing AusfUeContext in UePool is repeatedly replaced.

When the EAP response is later processed, the AUSF looks up the current context by SUPI:

currentSupi := ausf_context.GetSupiFromSuciSupiMap(eapSessionID)
ausfCurrentContext := ausf_context.GetAusfUeContext(currentSupi)

The EAP-AKA' response is then verified against the current context's K_aut and XRES:

K_autStr := ausfCurrentContext.K_aut
XMAC := CalculateAtMAC(K_aut, decodeEapAkaPrimePkt.MACInput)
MAC := decodeEapAkaPrimePkt.Attributes[ausf_context.AT_MAC_ATTRIBUTE].Value
XRES := ausfCurrentContext.XRES
RES := hex.EncodeToString(decodeEapAkaPrimePkt.Attributes[ausf_context.AT_RES_ATTRIBUTE].Value)

if !bytes.Equal(MAC, XMAC) {
    eapOK = false
    eapErrStr = "EAP-AKA' integrity check fail"
} else if XRES == RES {
    logger.AuthELog.Infoln("Correct RES value, EAP-AKA' auth succeed")
    // ...
}

If another request has overwritten the context between challenge issuance and response processing, the legitimate response is checked against the wrong K_aut and fails the AT_MAC verification.

Attack flow

The attack is selective for a target SUPI:

  1. The legitimate procedure starts and the AUSF stores ctx_LEGIT under…
Record
GHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv
CVSS 3.1
7.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-362
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-6326 No score

free5GC AUSF authentication contexts can be overwritten by concurrent requests for the same SUPI in github.com/free5gc/ausf

free5GC AUSF authentication contexts can be overwritten by concurrent requests for the same SUPI in github.com/free5gc/ausf

Record
GO-2026-6326
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21812-1 No score

Security update for govulncheck-vulndb

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 0.0.20260902T191204 2026-09-02T19:12:04Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

  • GO-2026-6305 CVE-2026-55834 GHSA-2wvm-8mvp-22qv
  • GO-2026-6306 CVE-2026-55064 GHSA-44v6-7fxq-vgf4
  • GO-2026-6307 CVE-2026-55067 GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g
  • GO-2026-6308 CVE-2026-55066 GHSA-5pg6-m483-7vrg
  • GO-2026-6309 CVE-2026-54746 GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg
  • GO-2026-6310 CVE-2026-54755 GHSA-cgc5-v3f2-8m2v
  • GO-2026-6311 CVE-2026-54766 GHSA-f27p-pw2p-9pr4
  • GO-2026-6312 CVE-2026-55108 GHSA-fmgp-q6jx-gg3x
  • GO-2026-6313 CVE-2026-55065 GHSA-gg93-x632-9ccv
  • GO-2026-6314 CVE-2026-55569 GHSA-mf5c-hw34-4hpp
  • GO-2026-6315 CVE-2026-54754 GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8
  • GO-2026-6316 CVE-2026-55068 GHSA-x8mj-6p3q-g5pp
  • GO-2026-6317 CVE-2026-55588 GHSA-298f-872v-2rcx
  • GO-2026-6318 CVE-2026-55621 GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f
  • GO-2026-6319 CVE-2026-55622 GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
  • GO-2026-6320 CVE-2026-55245 GHSA-w98g-5w9p-p3rc
  • GO-2026-6321 CVE-2026-55484 GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj
  • GO-2026-6322 CVE-2026-55678 GHSA-p378-jp5r-gpgw
  • GO-2026-6323 CVE-2026-55763 GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv
  • GO-2026-6324 CVE-2026-55761 GHSA-x626-fcwx-f5pc
  • GO-2026-6325 CVE-2026-27878 GHSA-6xff-cpcq-vpw2
  • GO-2026-6326 CVE-2026-55784 GHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv
  • GO-2026-6327 CVE-2026-55874 GHSA-56wq-x3wv-3ff4
  • GO-2026-6328 CVE-2026-55785 GHSA-fp46-6vfw-gc9c
  • GO-2026-6329 CVE-2026-55873 GHSA-hgpf-8634-g44c
  • GO-2026-6330 CVE-2026-55764 GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x
  • GO-2026-6333 CVE-2026-25712 GHSA-37w2-86g3-h4qh
  • GO-2026-6334 CVE-2026-24690 GHSA-47rq-xp99-92mx
  • GO-2026-6335 CVE-2026-27657 GHSA-4c8f-3m6h-m56r
  • GO-2026-6336 CVE-2026-26232 GHSA-5v69-g2m3-3hq3
  • GO-2026-6337 CVE-2026-28705 GHSA-7jvx-g65v-r899
  • GO-2026-6338 CVE-2026-22547 GHSA-922f-hfwp-p56f
  • GO-2026-6339 CVE-2026-20909 GHSA-fhq3-p242-2qpf
  • GO-2026-6340 CVE-2026-25718 GHSA-h697-89cp-24q8
  • GO-2026-6341 CVE-2026-26307 GHSA-h9c5-x7g8-4q7f
  • GO-2026-6342 CVE-2026-26247 GHSA-m5ch-ppfx-xv3v
  • GO-2026-6354 CVE-2026-78662
  • GO-2026-6355 CVE-2026-56855
  • Update to version 0.0.20260828T144745 2026-08-28T14:47:45Z.
  • GO-2026-6303 CVE-2026-56854
Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21812-1
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVSUSE-SU-2026:23692-1 No score

Security update for govulncheck-vulndb

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 0.0.20260902T191204 2026-09-02T19:12:04Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

  • GO-2026-6305 CVE-2026-55834 GHSA-2wvm-8mvp-22qv
  • GO-2026-6306 CVE-2026-55064 GHSA-44v6-7fxq-vgf4
  • GO-2026-6307 CVE-2026-55067 GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g
  • GO-2026-6308 CVE-2026-55066 GHSA-5pg6-m483-7vrg
  • GO-2026-6309 CVE-2026-54746 GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg
  • GO-2026-6310 CVE-2026-54755 GHSA-cgc5-v3f2-8m2v
  • GO-2026-6311 CVE-2026-54766 GHSA-f27p-pw2p-9pr4
  • GO-2026-6312 CVE-2026-55108 GHSA-fmgp-q6jx-gg3x
  • GO-2026-6313 CVE-2026-55065 GHSA-gg93-x632-9ccv
  • GO-2026-6314 CVE-2026-55569 GHSA-mf5c-hw34-4hpp
  • GO-2026-6315 CVE-2026-54754 GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8
  • GO-2026-6316 CVE-2026-55068 GHSA-x8mj-6p3q-g5pp
  • GO-2026-6317 CVE-2026-55588 GHSA-298f-872v-2rcx
  • GO-2026-6318 CVE-2026-55621 GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f
  • GO-2026-6319 CVE-2026-55622 GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
  • GO-2026-6320 CVE-2026-55245 GHSA-w98g-5w9p-p3rc
  • GO-2026-6321 CVE-2026-55484 GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj
  • GO-2026-6322 CVE-2026-55678 GHSA-p378-jp5r-gpgw
  • GO-2026-6323 CVE-2026-55763 GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv
  • GO-2026-6324 CVE-2026-55761 GHSA-x626-fcwx-f5pc
  • GO-2026-6325 CVE-2026-27878 GHSA-6xff-cpcq-vpw2
  • GO-2026-6326 CVE-2026-55784 GHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv
  • GO-2026-6327 CVE-2026-55874 GHSA-56wq-x3wv-3ff4
  • GO-2026-6328 CVE-2026-55785 GHSA-fp46-6vfw-gc9c
  • GO-2026-6329 CVE-2026-55873 GHSA-hgpf-8634-g44c
  • GO-2026-6330 CVE-2026-55764 GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x
  • GO-2026-6333 CVE-2026-25712 GHSA-37w2-86g3-h4qh
  • GO-2026-6334 CVE-2026-24690 GHSA-47rq-xp99-92mx
  • GO-2026-6335 CVE-2026-27657 GHSA-4c8f-3m6h-m56r
  • GO-2026-6336 CVE-2026-26232 GHSA-5v69-g2m3-3hq3
  • GO-2026-6337 CVE-2026-28705 GHSA-7jvx-g65v-r899
  • GO-2026-6338 CVE-2026-22547 GHSA-922f-hfwp-p56f
  • GO-2026-6339 CVE-2026-20909 GHSA-fhq3-p242-2qpf
  • GO-2026-6340 CVE-2026-25718 GHSA-h697-89cp-24q8
  • GO-2026-6341 CVE-2026-26307 GHSA-h9c5-x7g8-4q7f
  • GO-2026-6342 CVE-2026-26247 GHSA-m5ch-ppfx-xv3v
  • GO-2026-6354 CVE-2026-78662
  • GO-2026-6355 CVE-2026-56855
  • Update to version 0.0.20260828T144745 2026-08-28T14:47:45Z.
  • GO-2026-6303 CVE-2026-56854
Record
SUSE-SU-2026:23692-1
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVSUSE-SU-2026:23712-1 No score

Security update for govulncheck-vulndb

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 0.0.20260902T191204 2026-09-02T19:12:04Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

  • GO-2026-6305 CVE-2026-55834 GHSA-2wvm-8mvp-22qv
  • GO-2026-6306 CVE-2026-55064 GHSA-44v6-7fxq-vgf4
  • GO-2026-6307 CVE-2026-55067 GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g
  • GO-2026-6308 CVE-2026-55066 GHSA-5pg6-m483-7vrg
  • GO-2026-6309 CVE-2026-54746 GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg
  • GO-2026-6310 CVE-2026-54755 GHSA-cgc5-v3f2-8m2v
  • GO-2026-6311 CVE-2026-54766 GHSA-f27p-pw2p-9pr4
  • GO-2026-6312 CVE-2026-55108 GHSA-fmgp-q6jx-gg3x
  • GO-2026-6313 CVE-2026-55065 GHSA-gg93-x632-9ccv
  • GO-2026-6314 CVE-2026-55569 GHSA-mf5c-hw34-4hpp
  • GO-2026-6315 CVE-2026-54754 GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8
  • GO-2026-6316 CVE-2026-55068 GHSA-x8mj-6p3q-g5pp
  • GO-2026-6317 CVE-2026-55588 GHSA-298f-872v-2rcx
  • GO-2026-6318 CVE-2026-55621 GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f
  • GO-2026-6319 CVE-2026-55622 GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
  • GO-2026-6320 CVE-2026-55245 GHSA-w98g-5w9p-p3rc
  • GO-2026-6321 CVE-2026-55484 GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj
  • GO-2026-6322 CVE-2026-55678 GHSA-p378-jp5r-gpgw
  • GO-2026-6323 CVE-2026-55763 GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv
  • GO-2026-6324 CVE-2026-55761 GHSA-x626-fcwx-f5pc
  • GO-2026-6325 CVE-2026-27878 GHSA-6xff-cpcq-vpw2
  • GO-2026-6326 CVE-2026-55784 GHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv
  • GO-2026-6327 CVE-2026-55874 GHSA-56wq-x3wv-3ff4
  • GO-2026-6328 CVE-2026-55785 GHSA-fp46-6vfw-gc9c
  • GO-2026-6329 CVE-2026-55873 GHSA-hgpf-8634-g44c
  • GO-2026-6330 CVE-2026-55764 GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x
  • GO-2026-6333 CVE-2026-25712 GHSA-37w2-86g3-h4qh
  • GO-2026-6334 CVE-2026-24690 GHSA-47rq-xp99-92mx
  • GO-2026-6335 CVE-2026-27657 GHSA-4c8f-3m6h-m56r
  • GO-2026-6336 CVE-2026-26232 GHSA-5v69-g2m3-3hq3
  • GO-2026-6337 CVE-2026-28705 GHSA-7jvx-g65v-r899
  • GO-2026-6338 CVE-2026-22547 GHSA-922f-hfwp-p56f
  • GO-2026-6339 CVE-2026-20909 GHSA-fhq3-p242-2qpf
  • GO-2026-6340 CVE-2026-25718 GHSA-h697-89cp-24q8
  • GO-2026-6341 CVE-2026-26307 GHSA-h9c5-x7g8-4q7f
  • GO-2026-6342 CVE-2026-26247 GHSA-m5ch-ppfx-xv3v
  • GO-2026-6354 CVE-2026-78662
  • GO-2026-6355 CVE-2026-56855
  • Update to version 0.0.20260828T144745 2026-08-28T14:47:45Z.
  • GO-2026-6303 CVE-2026-56854
Record
SUSE-SU-2026:23712-1
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/free5gc/ausf
Go
 through 1.4.4 None known
github.com/free5gc/ausf
Go
 All versions None known
govulncheck-vulndb
SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server 16.0
From an advisory covering 39 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1
0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1
govulncheck-vulndb
SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.0
From an advisory covering 39 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1
0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1
govulncheck-vulndb
openSUSE:Leap 16.0
From an advisory covering 39 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1
0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, facts
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-55784 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) in Free5gc, published August 28, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.42%, the 36th percentile. No source names a fixed version.

References

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Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.

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