CVE-2026-56450

AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.

The patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.

AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.

The patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.

AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.

The patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.

AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.

The patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.

AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.

The patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.