CVE-2026-57449
Actual Sync Server: CORS Proxy GitHub API Allowlist Prefix Bypass Leaks Private Repositories Through the Server GitHub Token
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to 26.7.0, Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests. The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw startsWith() prefix test for /repos/{owner}/{repo} without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is https://github.com/acme/plugin, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs. Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with /repos/acme/plugin. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token. Version 26.7.0 fixes the issue.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
7.1
Actual Sync Server: CORS Proxy GitHub API Allowlist Prefix Bypass Leaks Private Repositories Through the Server GitHub Token
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to 26.7.0, Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests. The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw startsWith() prefix test for /repos/{owner}/{repo} without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is https://github.com/acme/plugin, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs. Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with /repos/acme/plugin. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token. Version 26.7.0 fixes the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-57449- CVSS 4.0
- 7.1 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-284, CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-87369
7.1
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to 26.7.0, Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests. The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw startsWith() prefix test for /repos/{owner}/{repo} without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is https://github.com/acme/plugin, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs. Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with /repos/acme/plugin. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token. Version 26.7.0 fixes the issue.
- Record
EUVD-2026-87369- CVSS 4.0
- 7.1 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-m62c-5q34-f3cf
7.1
Actual Sync Server: CORS Proxy GitHub API Allowlist Prefix Bypass Leaks Private Repositories Through the Server GitHub Token
Summary
Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests.
The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw startsWith() prefix test for /repos/{owner}/{repo} without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is https://github.com/acme/plugin, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs such as:
https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-private/contents/.env
https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-secrets/actions/secrets
https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-internal/releases
Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with /repos/acme/plugin. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token.
Affected Endpoint
GET /cors-proxy?url=...
This endpoint is mounted only when:
if (config.get('corsProxy.enabled')) {
app.use('/cors-proxy', corsApp.handlers);
}
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app.ts:68-70
Details
The CORS proxy is disabled by default but can be enabled through ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED. The GitHub token is configured through ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN:
github: {
token: {
doc: 'GitHub Personal Access Token for API authentication.',
format: String,
default: '',
env: 'ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN',
},
},
corsProxy: {
enabled: {
doc: 'Enable the CORS proxy endpoint.',
format: Boolean,
default: false,
env: 'ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED',
},
},
Source: packages/sync-server/src/load-config.js:280-296
The proxy fetches the plugin allowlist and stores repository URLs:
const response = await fetch(
'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/actualbudget/plugin-store/refs/heads/main/plugins.json',
);
...
const plugins = await response.json();
allowlistedRepos = plugins.map(plugin => plugin.url);
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:43-50
The GitHub API check accepts any path that starts with /repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}:
for (const repoUrl of allowlistedRepos) {
const { pathname } = new URL(repoUrl);
const [, repoOwner, repoName] = pathname.split('/');
if (
targetUrl === repoUrl ||
targetUrl.startsWith(repoUrl + '/') ||
(hostname === 'api.github.com' &&
url.pathname.startsWith(`/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}`)) ||
...
) {
return true;
}
}
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:84-99
For api.github.com, there is no delimiter after repoName. This means an allowlisted repo named plugin authorizes API requests for plugin-private, plugin-secrets, plugin-internal, and any other repository under the same owner whose name starts with plugin.
After this incorrect allowlist decision, the proxy attaches the server's GitHub token:
const githubToken = config.get('github.token');
if (
githubToken &&
(url.hostname === 'api.github.com' ||
url.hostname === 'raw.githubusercontent.com' ||
(url.hostname === 'github.com' && url.pathname.includes('/releases/')))
) {
requestHeaders['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${githubToken}`;
requestHeaders['User-Agent'] = 'Actual-Budget-Plugin-System';
}
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:192-201
Therefore the vulnerable flow is:
- A public plugin repository is allowlisted, for example
https://github.com/acme/plugin. - The same owner has a private repository with a prefix-matching name, for example
acme/plugin-private. - The Actual server has
ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED=true. - The Actual server has
ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKENwith access toacme/plugin-private. - Any authenticated Actual user calls:
- Record
GHSA-m62c-5q34-f3cf- CVSS 4.0
- 7.1 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-284, CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
7.1
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to 26.7.0, Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests. The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw startsWith() prefix test for /repos/{owner}/{repo} without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is https://github.com/acme/plugin, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs. Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with /repos/acme/plugin. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token. Version 26.7.0 fixes the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-57449- CVSS 4.0
- 7.1 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-284, CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
7.1
Actual Sync Server: CORS Proxy GitHub API Allowlist Prefix Bypass Leaks Private Repositories Through the Server GitHub Token
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to 26.7.0, Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests. The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw startsWith() prefix test for /repos/{owner}/{repo} without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is https://github.com/acme/plugin, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs. Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with /repos/acme/plugin. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token. Version 26.7.0 fixes the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-57449- CVSS 4.0
- 7.1 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-284, CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-m62c-5q34-f3cf
7.1
Actual Sync Server: CORS Proxy GitHub API Allowlist Prefix Bypass Leaks Private Repositories Through the Server GitHub Token
Summary
Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests.
The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw startsWith() prefix test for /repos/{owner}/{repo} without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is https://github.com/acme/plugin, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs such as:
https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-private/contents/.env
https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-secrets/actions/secrets
https://api.github.com/repos/acme/plugin-internal/releases
Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with /repos/acme/plugin. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token.
Affected Endpoint
GET /cors-proxy?url=...
This endpoint is mounted only when:
if (config.get('corsProxy.enabled')) {
app.use('/cors-proxy', corsApp.handlers);
}
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app.ts:68-70
Details
The CORS proxy is disabled by default but can be enabled through ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED. The GitHub token is configured through ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN:
github: {
token: {
doc: 'GitHub Personal Access Token for API authentication.',
format: String,
default: '',
env: 'ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN',
},
},
corsProxy: {
enabled: {
doc: 'Enable the CORS proxy endpoint.',
format: Boolean,
default: false,
env: 'ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED',
},
},
Source: packages/sync-server/src/load-config.js:280-296
The proxy fetches the plugin allowlist and stores repository URLs:
const response = await fetch(
'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/actualbudget/plugin-store/refs/heads/main/plugins.json',
);
...
const plugins = await response.json();
allowlistedRepos = plugins.map(plugin => plugin.url);
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:43-50
The GitHub API check accepts any path that starts with /repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}:
for (const repoUrl of allowlistedRepos) {
const { pathname } = new URL(repoUrl);
const [, repoOwner, repoName] = pathname.split('/');
if (
targetUrl === repoUrl ||
targetUrl.startsWith(repoUrl + '/') ||
(hostname === 'api.github.com' &&
url.pathname.startsWith(`/repos/${repoOwner}/${repoName}`)) ||
...
) {
return true;
}
}
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:84-99
For api.github.com, there is no delimiter after repoName. This means an allowlisted repo named plugin authorizes API requests for plugin-private, plugin-secrets, plugin-internal, and any other repository under the same owner whose name starts with plugin.
After this incorrect allowlist decision, the proxy attaches the server's GitHub token:
const githubToken = config.get('github.token');
if (
githubToken &&
(url.hostname === 'api.github.com' ||
url.hostname === 'raw.githubusercontent.com' ||
(url.hostname === 'github.com' && url.pathname.includes('/releases/')))
) {
requestHeaders['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${githubToken}`;
requestHeaders['User-Agent'] = 'Actual-Budget-Plugin-System';
}
Source: packages/sync-server/src/app-cors-proxy.js:192-201
Therefore the vulnerable flow is:
- A public plugin repository is allowlisted, for example
https://github.com/acme/plugin. - The same owner has a private repository with a prefix-matching name, for example
acme/plugin-private. - The Actual server has
ACTUAL_CORS_PROXY_ENABLED=true. - The Actual server has
ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKENwith access toacme/plugin-private. - Any authenticated Actual user calls:
- Record
GHSA-m62c-5q34-f3cf- CVSS 4.0
- 7.1 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-284, CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
@actual-app/sync-servernpm |
through 26.6.0 | 26.7.0 |
@actual-app/sync-servernpm |
before 26.7.0 | 26.7.0 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-57449 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.1) in Actualbudget Actual, published September 25, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.26%, the 17th percentile. Fixed in @actual-app/sync-server 26.7.0.
References
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.