CVE-2026-59801

9Router through version 0.4.41 contains an unauthenticated access vulnerability that allows remote attackers to interact with provider management API endpoints by sending requests without any credentials due to missing authentication middleware in the Next.js API routes under src/app/api/providers/*. Attackers can enumerate, create, modify, or delete provider connections to expose partial credentials, OAuth tokens, and API keys, redirect AI traffic to attacker-controlled servers, or cause complete denial of service by deleting all provider connections.

9Router through version 0.4.41 contains an unauthenticated access vulnerability that allows remote attackers to interact with provider management API endpoints by sending requests without any credentials due to missing authentication middleware in the Next.js API routes under src/app/api/providers/*. Attackers can enumerate, create, modify, or delete provider connections to expose partial credentials, OAuth tokens, and API keys, redirect AI traffic to attacker-controlled servers, or cause complete denial of service by deleting all provider connections.

9Router through version 0.4.41 contains an unauthenticated access vulnerability that allows remote attackers to interact with provider management API endpoints by sending requests without any credentials due to missing authentication middleware in the Next.js API routes under src/app/api/providers/*. Attackers can enumerate, create, modify, or delete provider connections to expose partial credentials, OAuth tokens, and API keys, redirect AI traffic to attacker-controlled servers, or cause complete denial of service by deleting all provider connections.

title: Unauthenticated CRUD on /api/providers and Full API Key Leak via /api/usage/stats product: 9Router version: <= 0.4.41 severity: critical cve_request: true

Summary

Multiple critical API security vulnerabilities were discovered in 9Router's Next.js dashboard. The /api/providers endpoints lack authentication entirely, allowing anyone to create, read, update, and delete provider connections. Additionally, /api/usage/stats exposes full plaintext API keys, and /api/usage/request-logs + /api/usage/request-details expose all users' request history and full conversation contents (including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses) without authentication.

Affected Endpoints

| Endpoint | Method | Issue | |---|---|---| | /api/providers | GET | Lists all provider connections with partial credentials, OAuth tokens, account IDs | | /api/providers/:id | GET | Read any single provider detail (IDOR) | | /api/providers | POST | Create arbitrary provider connections with attacker-controlled API keys | | /api/providers/:id | PUT | Modify any existing provider connection | | /api/providers/:id | DELETE | Delete any provider connection | | /api/usage/stats | GET | Exposes full plaintext API keys, per-account usage breakdown, cost data | | /api/usage/request-logs | GET | Exposes all users' request logs (model, tokens, cost, timestamp, provider) | | /api/usage/request-details/:id | GET | Exposes full conversation turns including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses | | /api/version | GET | Exposes current version info | | /api/models | GET | Exposes full model routing catalog | | /api/v1/models | GET | Exposes model list |

Impact

Critical: Provider CRUD without authentication

An attacker can:

1. Add a malicious provider — inject a provider that proxies through their server, capturing all prompts, responses, and API keys routed through 9Router
2. Modify existing providers — replace API keys with attacker-controlled ones, redirect traffic
3. Delete all providers — cause complete denial of service
4. Read all provider configurations — harvest partial credentials, GitHub Copilot OAuth tokens, Cloudflare account IDs, email addresses

Critical: Full API key leak via /api/usage/stats

The endpoint returns complete API key strings (e.g., sk-...) in plaintext alongside usage data per key, enabling unauthorized use of connected AI provider accounts.

Critical: Conversation history leak

/api/usage/request-details returns the full conversation history of other users' AI sessions, including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses, tool calls, and reasoning traces.

Steps to Reproduce

1. Unauthenticated read of all providers

curl -s https://<host>/api/providers

Returns all provider connections with email addresses, auth type, account IDs, and partial API key prefixes.

2. Create a provider without authentication

curl -X POST https://<host>/api/providers \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"provider":"openai","authType":"apikey","name":"rogue","apiKey":"sk-attacker-controlled"}'

Returns the created connection object with a new UUID and isActive: true.

3. Modify an existing provider without authentication

curl -X PUT https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid> \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"modified","apiKey":"sk-attacker-key"}'

Returns the updated connection object.

4. Delete a provider without authentication

curl -X DELETE https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid>

Returns {"message":"Connection deleted successfully"}.

5. Read full usage stats with API keys

curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/stats

Returns full API key strings, per-account token/cost breakdown, recent requests.

6. Read request logs

curl -s "https://<host>/api/usage/request-logs?page=1&pageSize=50"

Returns…

9Router through version 0.4.41 contains an unauthenticated access vulnerability that allows remote attackers to interact with provider management API endpoints by sending requests without any credentials due to missing authentication middleware in the Next.js API routes under src/app/api/providers/*. Attackers can enumerate, create, modify, or delete provider connections to expose partial credentials, OAuth tokens, and API keys, redirect AI traffic to attacker-controlled servers, or cause complete denial of service by deleting all provider connections.

9Router through version 0.4.41 contains an unauthenticated access vulnerability that allows remote attackers to interact with provider management API endpoints by sending requests without any credentials due to missing authentication middleware in the Next.js API routes under src/app/api/providers/*. Attackers can enumerate, create, modify, or delete provider connections to expose partial credentials, OAuth tokens, and API keys, redirect AI traffic to attacker-controlled servers, or cause complete denial of service by deleting all provider connections.

9Router through version 0.4.41 contains an unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability that allows remote attackers to retrieve plaintext API keys for all connected AI provider accounts by sending a single unauthenticated request to the /api/usage/stats endpoint. Attackers can exploit the missing authentication middleware on the Next.js API route to obtain full API key strings alongside token counts, cost breakdowns, and request metadata, enabling unauthorized use of connected AI provider accounts, billing fraud, and quota exhaustion.

9Router through version 0.4.41 contain an unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability that allows remote attackers to access sensitive user data by sending requests to unprotected API endpoints. Attackers can enumerate paginated request logs and retrieve complete AI conversation histories including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses, tool calls, and user email addresses by querying the request-logs and request-details API routes which lack authentication middleware.

title: Unauthenticated CRUD on /api/providers and Full API Key Leak via /api/usage/stats product: 9Router version: <= 0.4.41 severity: critical cve_request: true

Summary

Multiple critical API security vulnerabilities were discovered in 9Router's Next.js dashboard. The /api/providers endpoints lack authentication entirely, allowing anyone to create, read, update, and delete provider connections. Additionally, /api/usage/stats exposes full plaintext API keys, and /api/usage/request-logs + /api/usage/request-details expose all users' request history and full conversation contents (including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses) without authentication.

Affected Endpoints

| Endpoint | Method | Issue | |---|---|---| | /api/providers | GET | Lists all provider connections with partial credentials, OAuth tokens, account IDs | | /api/providers/:id | GET | Read any single provider detail (IDOR) | | /api/providers | POST | Create arbitrary provider connections with attacker-controlled API keys | | /api/providers/:id | PUT | Modify any existing provider connection | | /api/providers/:id | DELETE | Delete any provider connection | | /api/usage/stats | GET | Exposes full plaintext API keys, per-account usage breakdown, cost data | | /api/usage/request-logs | GET | Exposes all users' request logs (model, tokens, cost, timestamp, provider) | | /api/usage/request-details/:id | GET | Exposes full conversation turns including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses | | /api/version | GET | Exposes current version info | | /api/models | GET | Exposes full model routing catalog | | /api/v1/models | GET | Exposes model list |

Impact

Critical: Provider CRUD without authentication

An attacker can:

1. Add a malicious provider — inject a provider that proxies through their server, capturing all prompts, responses, and API keys routed through 9Router
2. Modify existing providers — replace API keys with attacker-controlled ones, redirect traffic
3. Delete all providers — cause complete denial of service
4. Read all provider configurations — harvest partial credentials, GitHub Copilot OAuth tokens, Cloudflare account IDs, email addresses

Critical: Full API key leak via /api/usage/stats

The endpoint returns complete API key strings (e.g., sk-...) in plaintext alongside usage data per key, enabling unauthorized use of connected AI provider accounts.

Critical: Conversation history leak

/api/usage/request-details returns the full conversation history of other users' AI sessions, including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses, tool calls, and reasoning traces.

Steps to Reproduce

1. Unauthenticated read of all providers

curl -s https://<host>/api/providers

Returns all provider connections with email addresses, auth type, account IDs, and partial API key prefixes.

2. Create a provider without authentication

curl -X POST https://<host>/api/providers \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"provider":"openai","authType":"apikey","name":"rogue","apiKey":"sk-attacker-controlled"}'

Returns the created connection object with a new UUID and isActive: true.

3. Modify an existing provider without authentication

curl -X PUT https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid> \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"modified","apiKey":"sk-attacker-key"}'

Returns the updated connection object.

4. Delete a provider without authentication

curl -X DELETE https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid>

Returns {"message":"Connection deleted successfully"}.

5. Read full usage stats with API keys

curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/stats

Returns full API key strings, per-account token/cost breakdown, recent requests.

6. Read request logs

curl -s "https://<host>/api/usage/request-logs?page=1&pageSize=50"

Returns…