Every CVE Search/ Get API key

CVE-2026-61429

PraisonAI before 1.6.78 SSRF via Crawl4AI Chromium backend

8.4 HighFix available

PraisonAI versions before 1.6.78 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend that allows attackers to bypass SSRF validation by exploiting DNS rebinding and HTTP redirects. Attackers can craft URLs that resolve to internal services after the initial validation check, enabling the headless browser to follow redirects and read internal responses including sensitive canary values.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.27%Unchanged since Jul 12, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 8.4

PraisonAI before 1.6.78 SSRF via Crawl4AI Chromium backend

PraisonAI versions before 1.6.78 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend that allows attackers to bypass SSRF validation by exploiting DNS rebinding and HTTP redirects. Attackers can craft URLs that resolve to internal services after the initial validation check, enabling the headless browser to follow redirects and read internal responses including sensitive canary values.

Record
CVE-2026-61429
CVSS 4.0
8.4 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-43178 8.4

PraisonAI versions before 1.6.78 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend that allows attackers to bypass SSRF validation by exploiting DNS rebinding and HTTP redirects. Attackers can craft URLs that resolve to internal services after the initial validation check, enabling the headless browser to follow redirects and read internal responses including sensitive canary values.

Record
EUVD-2026-43178
CVSS 4.0
8.4 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-6g59-gm2v-qhvq 8.5

PraisonAI: Crawl4AI/Chromium backend is also affected by the `web_crawl` SSRF validation bypass

Summary

The DNS-rebinding / redirect SSRF bypass in PRAI-05 is not limited to the httpx/urllib backend. When crawl4ai (headless Chromium via Playwright) is installed, web_crawl auto-selects provider=crawl4ai, and the headless browser re-resolves DNS and follows redirects on its own — with no per-connection SSRF guard. Runtime-confirmed read-back of the internal canary via both DNS rebinding and redirect (provider: "crawl4ai"). Status: runtime-confirmed addendum to PRAI-05.

Details

Affected component

  • Package praisonaiagents 4.6.63. Backend selected when crawl4ai+Playwright are installed.
  • Files: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py (_crawl_with_crawl4ai) and src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py (standalone crawl wrappers).

Vulnerable code / root cause

Path: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py

Function: _crawl_with_crawl4ai

Snippet:

async with AsyncWebCrawler() as crawler:
    for url in urls:
        result = await crawler.arun(url=url)   # headless browser: re-resolves DNS, follows redirects

Path: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py

Function: Crawl4AITools.crawl / crawl4ai

Snippet:

result = await crawler.arun(url=url, config=config)   # no _is_safe_crawl_url / no per-connect validation

Issue: the only SSRF check is the single pre-fetch _is_safe_crawl_url() on the initial URL string in web_crawl() (see PRAI-05). The headless browser then resolves and connects independently and follows redirects in-browser — no resolved-IP pinning, no per-hop/per-connect validation. Input (urls) is attacker/agent-controlled; the sink is crawler.arun(url=...); the guard is bypassed by DNS rebinding (TOCTOU) and by redirects (followed in-browser).

Attack flow / Why bypassed / Security boundary

Identical to PRAI-05: TOCTOU between the guard's resolution and the browser's connection; redirects followed in-browser; internal response returned as crawl content. See PRAI-05.

Proof of Concept

Environment

crawl4ai + Playwright Chromium installed in a dedicated runtime container (127.0.0.1:18081), same controlled internal canary + rebinding DNS. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\ (docker-compose.crawl.yml).

Steps to reproduce

  1. SSRF-04-01-Crawl4AI-DNS-Rebind-Trigger → 127.0.0.1:18081:
POST /tool/web_crawl HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:18081
Content-Type: application/json

{"url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"}
  1. Redirect variant SSRF-04-03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback: {"url":"http://redirector:8082/redirect-to-internal"}.

Expected result

The crawl backend refuses internal destinations regardless of DNS timing/redirects.

Actual result

HTTP 200, "provider":"crawl4ai", response content contains PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91 + FAKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN_DO_NOT_USE_7f3a91 for both the DNS-rebinding and the redirect payload.

Screenshots

Crawl4AI DNS rebinding read-back

The attacker-controlled rebind.lab URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed web_crawl endpoint. PraisonAI returns the internal canary response body containing PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91.

<img width="1542" height="763" alt="01-Crawl4AI-Burp-Readback" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a03b3a1c-e382-4f67-8ea6-b766dceb4a69" />

Crawl4AI DNS rebinding runtime evidence

The runtime log shows the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend resolving rebind.lab to an internal Docker IP during the fetch phase. The internal canary receives GET /secret from a headless Chrome user agent.

<img width="1659" height="946" alt="02-Crawl4AI-DNS-Log-And-Internal-Hit" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d93db090-3e39-43d0-af3b-5d1d8f614db8" />

Crawl4AI redirect read-back

The attacker-controlled redirector URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed endpoint. PraisonAI follows the…

Record
GHSA-6g59-gm2v-qhvq
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-200, CWE-367, CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-rc3q-9pxg-3jhr 8.4

Duplicate Advisory: PraisonAI: Crawl4AI/Chromium backend is also affected by the `web_crawl` SSRF validation bypass

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-6g59-gm2v-qhvq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

PraisonAI versions before 1.6.78 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend that allows attackers to bypass SSRF validation by exploiting DNS rebinding and HTTP redirects. Attackers can craft URLs that resolve to internal services after the initial validation check, enabling the headless browser to follow redirects and read internal responses including sensitive canary values.

Record
GHSA-rc3q-9pxg-3jhr
CVSS 4.0
8.4 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 8.4

PraisonAI versions before 1.6.78 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend that allows attackers to bypass SSRF validation by exploiting DNS rebinding and HTTP redirects. Attackers can craft URLs that resolve to internal services after the initial validation check, enabling the headless browser to follow redirects and read internal responses including sensitive canary values.

Record
CVE-2026-61429
CVSS 4.0
8.4 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-6g59-gm2v-qhvq 8.5

PraisonAI: Crawl4AI/Chromium backend is also affected by the `web_crawl` SSRF validation bypass

Summary

The DNS-rebinding / redirect SSRF bypass in PRAI-05 is not limited to the httpx/urllib backend. When crawl4ai (headless Chromium via Playwright) is installed, web_crawl auto-selects provider=crawl4ai, and the headless browser re-resolves DNS and follows redirects on its own — with no per-connection SSRF guard. Runtime-confirmed read-back of the internal canary via both DNS rebinding and redirect (provider: "crawl4ai"). Status: runtime-confirmed addendum to PRAI-05.

Details

Affected component

  • Package praisonaiagents 4.6.63. Backend selected when crawl4ai+Playwright are installed.
  • Files: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py (_crawl_with_crawl4ai) and src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py (standalone crawl wrappers).

Vulnerable code / root cause

Path: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py

Function: _crawl_with_crawl4ai

Snippet:

async with AsyncWebCrawler() as crawler:
    for url in urls:
        result = await crawler.arun(url=url)   # headless browser: re-resolves DNS, follows redirects

Path: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py

Function: Crawl4AITools.crawl / crawl4ai

Snippet:

result = await crawler.arun(url=url, config=config)   # no _is_safe_crawl_url / no per-connect validation

Issue: the only SSRF check is the single pre-fetch _is_safe_crawl_url() on the initial URL string in web_crawl() (see PRAI-05). The headless browser then resolves and connects independently and follows redirects in-browser — no resolved-IP pinning, no per-hop/per-connect validation. Input (urls) is attacker/agent-controlled; the sink is crawler.arun(url=...); the guard is bypassed by DNS rebinding (TOCTOU) and by redirects (followed in-browser).

Attack flow / Why bypassed / Security boundary

Identical to PRAI-05: TOCTOU between the guard's resolution and the browser's connection; redirects followed in-browser; internal response returned as crawl content. See PRAI-05.

Proof of Concept

Environment

crawl4ai + Playwright Chromium installed in a dedicated runtime container (127.0.0.1:18081), same controlled internal canary + rebinding DNS. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\ (docker-compose.crawl.yml).

Steps to reproduce

  1. SSRF-04-01-Crawl4AI-DNS-Rebind-Trigger → 127.0.0.1:18081:
POST /tool/web_crawl HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:18081
Content-Type: application/json

{"url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"}
  1. Redirect variant SSRF-04-03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback: {"url":"http://redirector:8082/redirect-to-internal"}.

Expected result

The crawl backend refuses internal destinations regardless of DNS timing/redirects.

Actual result

HTTP 200, "provider":"crawl4ai", response content contains PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91 + FAKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN_DO_NOT_USE_7f3a91 for both the DNS-rebinding and the redirect payload.

Screenshots

Crawl4AI DNS rebinding read-back

The attacker-controlled rebind.lab URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed web_crawl endpoint. PraisonAI returns the internal canary response body containing PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91.

<img width="1542" height="763" alt="01-Crawl4AI-Burp-Readback" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a03b3a1c-e382-4f67-8ea6-b766dceb4a69" />

Crawl4AI DNS rebinding runtime evidence

The runtime log shows the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend resolving rebind.lab to an internal Docker IP during the fetch phase. The internal canary receives GET /secret from a headless Chrome user agent.

<img width="1659" height="946" alt="02-Crawl4AI-DNS-Log-And-Internal-Hit" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d93db090-3e39-43d0-af3b-5d1d8f614db8" />

Crawl4AI redirect read-back

The attacker-controlled redirector URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed endpoint. PraisonAI follows the…

Record
GHSA-6g59-gm2v-qhvq
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-200, CWE-367, CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-rc3q-9pxg-3jhr 8.4

Duplicate Advisory: PraisonAI: Crawl4AI/Chromium backend is also affected by the `web_crawl` SSRF validation bypass

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-6g59-gm2v-qhvq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

PraisonAI versions before 1.6.78 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend that allows attackers to bypass SSRF validation by exploiting DNS rebinding and HTTP redirects. Attackers can craft URLs that resolve to internal services after the initial validation check, enabling the headless browser to follow redirects and read internal responses including sensitive canary values.

Record
GHSA-rc3q-9pxg-3jhr
CVSS 4.0
8.4 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVPYSEC-2026-4269 8.5

PraisonAI: Crawl4AI/Chromium backend is also affected by the `web_crawl` SSRF validation bypass

Summary

The DNS-rebinding / redirect SSRF bypass in PRAI-05 is not limited to the httpx/urllib backend. When crawl4ai (headless Chromium via Playwright) is installed, web_crawl auto-selects provider=crawl4ai, and the headless browser re-resolves DNS and follows redirects on its own — with no per-connection SSRF guard. Runtime-confirmed read-back of the internal canary via both DNS rebinding and redirect (provider: "crawl4ai"). Status: runtime-confirmed addendum to PRAI-05.

Details

Affected component

  • Package praisonaiagents 4.6.63. Backend selected when crawl4ai+Playwright are installed.
  • Files: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py (_crawl_with_crawl4ai) and src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py (standalone crawl wrappers).

Vulnerable code / root cause

Path: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py

Function: _crawl_with_crawl4ai

Snippet:

async with AsyncWebCrawler() as crawler:
    for url in urls:
        result = await crawler.arun(url=url)   # headless browser: re-resolves DNS, follows redirects

Path: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py

Function: Crawl4AITools.crawl / crawl4ai

Snippet:

result = await crawler.arun(url=url, config=config)   # no _is_safe_crawl_url / no per-connect validation

Issue: the only SSRF check is the single pre-fetch _is_safe_crawl_url() on the initial URL string in web_crawl() (see PRAI-05). The headless browser then resolves and connects independently and follows redirects in-browser — no resolved-IP pinning, no per-hop/per-connect validation. Input (urls) is attacker/agent-controlled; the sink is crawler.arun(url=...); the guard is bypassed by DNS rebinding (TOCTOU) and by redirects (followed in-browser).

Attack flow / Why bypassed / Security boundary

Identical to PRAI-05: TOCTOU between the guard's resolution and the browser's connection; redirects followed in-browser; internal response returned as crawl content. See PRAI-05.

Proof of Concept

Environment

crawl4ai + Playwright Chromium installed in a dedicated runtime container (127.0.0.1:18081), same controlled internal canary + rebinding DNS. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\ (docker-compose.crawl.yml).

Steps to reproduce

  1. SSRF-04-01-Crawl4AI-DNS-Rebind-Trigger → 127.0.0.1:18081:
POST /tool/web_crawl HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:18081
Content-Type: application/json

{"url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"}
  1. Redirect variant SSRF-04-03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback: {"url":"http://redirector:8082/redirect-to-internal"}.

Expected result

The crawl backend refuses internal destinations regardless of DNS timing/redirects.

Actual result

HTTP 200, "provider":"crawl4ai", response content contains PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91 + FAKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN_DO_NOT_USE_7f3a91 for both the DNS-rebinding and the redirect payload.

Screenshots

Crawl4AI DNS rebinding read-back

The attacker-controlled rebind.lab URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed web_crawl endpoint. PraisonAI returns the internal canary response body containing PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91.

<img width="1542" height="763" alt="01-Crawl4AI-Burp-Readback" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a03b3a1c-e382-4f67-8ea6-b766dceb4a69" />

Crawl4AI DNS rebinding runtime evidence

The runtime log shows the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend resolving rebind.lab to an internal Docker IP during the fetch phase. The internal canary receives GET /secret from a headless Chrome user agent.

<img width="1659" height="946" alt="02-Crawl4AI-DNS-Log-And-Internal-Hit" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d93db090-3e39-43d0-af3b-5d1d8f614db8" />

Crawl4AI redirect read-back

The attacker-controlled redirector URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed endpoint. PraisonAI follows the…

Record
PYSEC-2026-4269
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
praisonaiagents
PyPI
through 1.6.77
1.6.78
praisonaiagents
PyPI
before 1.6.78, plus listed versions
0.0.10.0.100.0.1000.0.1010.0.102
Show 45 moreShow less
0.0.1030.0.1040.0.1050.0.1060.0.1070.0.1080.0.1090.0.110.0.1100.0.1110.0.1120.0.1130.0.1140.0.1150.0.1160.0.1170.0.1180.0.1190.0.120.0.1200.0.1210.0.1220.0.1230.0.1240.0.1250.0.1260.0.1270.0.1280.0.1290.0.130.0.1300.0.1310.0.1320.0.1330.0.1340.0.1350.0.1360.0.1370.0.1380.0.1390.0.140.0.1400.0.1410.0.1420.0.143
1.6.78

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-61429 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.4) in Mervinpraison Praisonai, published July 11, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.27%, the 18th percentile. Fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.78.

References

This page doesn't list everything

Left out here: 554 versions and the rest of 3 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.

MoveEnter Open