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CVE-2026-61729

SOCFortress CoPilot: Hardcoded Default Header Secret - Unauthenticated Active-Response Invocation and Alert Injection

9.4 Critical

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, verify_graylog_header in backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py and verify_velociraptor_header in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py authenticate webhooks against GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE and VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in .env.example. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. POST /api/graylog/invoke forwards attacker-selected COMMAND, ACTION, VALUE and AGENT_ID to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma accept forged alerts for arbitrary customer_code values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.38%Unchanged since Oct 31, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 9.4

SOCFortress CoPilot: Hardcoded Default Header Secret - Unauthenticated Active-Response Invocation and Alert Injection

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, verify_graylog_header in backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py and verify_velociraptor_header in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py authenticate webhooks against GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE and VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in .env.example. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. POST /api/graylog/invoke forwards attacker-selected COMMAND, ACTION, VALUE and AGENT_ID to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma accept forged alerts for arbitrary customer_code values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.

Record
CVE-2026-61729
CVSS 3.1
9.4 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-306, CWE-798
Updated
2026-11-05
EUVDEUVD-2026-113994 9.4

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, verify_graylog_header in backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py and verify_velociraptor_header in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py authenticate webhooks against GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE and VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in .env.example. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. POST /api/graylog/invoke forwards attacker-selected COMMAND, ACTION, VALUE and AGENT_ID to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma accept forged alerts for arbitrary customer_code values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.

Record
EUVD-2026-113994
CVSS 3.1
9.4 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
Updated
2026-11-05
NVD 9.4

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, verify_graylog_header in backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py and verify_velociraptor_header in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py authenticate webhooks against GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE and VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in .env.example. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. POST /api/graylog/invoke forwards attacker-selected COMMAND, ACTION, VALUE and AGENT_ID to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma accept forged alerts for arbitrary customer_code values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.

Record
CVE-2026-61729
CVSS 3.1
9.4 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-306, CWE-798
Updated
2026-11-05
OSV 9.4

SOCFortress CoPilot: Hardcoded Default Header Secret - Unauthenticated Active-Response Invocation and Alert Injection

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, verify_graylog_header in backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py and verify_velociraptor_header in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py authenticate webhooks against GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE and VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in .env.example. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. POST /api/graylog/invoke forwards attacker-selected COMMAND, ACTION, VALUE and AGENT_ID to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma accept forged alerts for arbitrary customer_code values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.

Record
CVE-2026-61729
CVSS 3.1
9.4 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-306, CWE-798
Updated
2026-11-07

Affected products

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
facts, referencesCVE List
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-61729 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.4) in Socfortress Copilot, published October 30, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.38%, the 31st percentile. No source names a fixed version.

References

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