CVE-2026-61729
SOCFortress CoPilot: Hardcoded Default Header Secret - Unauthenticated Active-Response Invocation and Alert Injection
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, verify_graylog_header in backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py and verify_velociraptor_header in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py authenticate webhooks against GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE and VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in .env.example. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. POST /api/graylog/invoke forwards attacker-selected COMMAND, ACTION, VALUE and AGENT_ID to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma accept forged alerts for arbitrary customer_code values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
9.4
SOCFortress CoPilot: Hardcoded Default Header Secret - Unauthenticated Active-Response Invocation and Alert Injection
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, verify_graylog_header in backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py and verify_velociraptor_header in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py authenticate webhooks against GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE and VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in .env.example. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. POST /api/graylog/invoke forwards attacker-selected COMMAND, ACTION, VALUE and AGENT_ID to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma accept forged alerts for arbitrary customer_code values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
- Record
CVE-2026-61729- CVSS 3.1
- 9.4 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-306, CWE-798
- Updated
- 2026-11-05
EUVDEUVD-2026-113994
9.4
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, verify_graylog_header in backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py and verify_velociraptor_header in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py authenticate webhooks against GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE and VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in .env.example. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. POST /api/graylog/invoke forwards attacker-selected COMMAND, ACTION, VALUE and AGENT_ID to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma accept forged alerts for arbitrary customer_code values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
- Record
EUVD-2026-113994- CVSS 3.1
- 9.4 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-05
NVD
9.4
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, verify_graylog_header in backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py and verify_velociraptor_header in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py authenticate webhooks against GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE and VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in .env.example. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. POST /api/graylog/invoke forwards attacker-selected COMMAND, ACTION, VALUE and AGENT_ID to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma accept forged alerts for arbitrary customer_code values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
- Record
CVE-2026-61729- CVSS 3.1
- 9.4 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-306, CWE-798
- Updated
- 2026-11-05
OSV
9.4
SOCFortress CoPilot: Hardcoded Default Header Secret - Unauthenticated Active-Response Invocation and Alert Injection
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, verify_graylog_header in backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py and verify_velociraptor_header in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py authenticate webhooks against GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE and VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in .env.example. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. POST /api/graylog/invoke forwards attacker-selected COMMAND, ACTION, VALUE and AGENT_ID to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma accept forged alerts for arbitrary customer_code values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
- Record
CVE-2026-61729- CVSS 3.1
- 9.4 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-306, CWE-798
- Updated
- 2026-11-07
Affected products
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| facts, references | CVE List | |
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-61729 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.4) in Socfortress Copilot, published October 30, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.38%, the 31st percentile. No source names a fixed version.
References
github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/security/advisories/GHSA-x8gc-f8p4-frc2
github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/pull/939
github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/commit/1b2c3f97243988301285b395ce4239769c66bd9e
github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/tree/v0.1.76
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/61xxx/CVE-2026-61729.json
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61729