CVE-2026-61826
Bazarr: Plex OAuth API namespace is entirely unauthenticated, allowing config tampering, integration takeover and server-side request forgery
Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the api_ns_plex namespace in bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py omits @authenticate on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke POST /api/plex/oauth/logout to clear credentials and disable the integration, or POST /api/plex/apikey to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. POST /api/plex/oauth/pin and GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. PlexPinCheck skips state validation when state_param is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. POST /api/plex/select-server, POST /api/plex/oauth/servers, POST /api/plex/webhook/create, POST /api/plex/webhook/delete and POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey expose further write_config() operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in X-Plex-Token, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
10.0
Bazarr: Plex OAuth API namespace is entirely unauthenticated, allowing config tampering, integration takeover and server-side request forgery
Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the api_ns_plex namespace in bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py omits @authenticate on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke POST /api/plex/oauth/logout to clear credentials and disable the integration, or POST /api/plex/apikey to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. POST /api/plex/oauth/pin and GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. PlexPinCheck skips state validation when state_param is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. POST /api/plex/select-server, POST /api/plex/oauth/servers, POST /api/plex/webhook/create, POST /api/plex/webhook/delete and POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey expose further write_config() operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in X-Plex-Token, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.
- Record
CVE-2026-61826- CVSS 3.1
- 10.0 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-352, CWE-862
- Updated
- 2026-11-05
EUVDEUVD-2026-114256
10.0
Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the api_ns_plex namespace in bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py omits @authenticate on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke POST /api/plex/oauth/logout to clear credentials and disable the integration, or POST /api/plex/apikey to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. POST /api/plex/oauth/pin and GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. PlexPinCheck skips state validation when state_param is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. POST /api/plex/select-server, POST /api/plex/oauth/servers, POST /api/plex/webhook/create, POST /api/plex/webhook/delete and POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey expose further write_config() operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in X-Plex-Token, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.
- Record
EUVD-2026-114256- CVSS 3.1
- 10.0 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-05
NVD
10.0
Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the api_ns_plex namespace in bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py omits @authenticate on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke POST /api/plex/oauth/logout to clear credentials and disable the integration, or POST /api/plex/apikey to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. POST /api/plex/oauth/pin and GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. PlexPinCheck skips state validation when state_param is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. POST /api/plex/select-server, POST /api/plex/oauth/servers, POST /api/plex/webhook/create, POST /api/plex/webhook/delete and POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey expose further write_config() operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in X-Plex-Token, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.
- Record
CVE-2026-61826- CVSS 3.1
- 10.0 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-352, CWE-862
- Updated
- 2026-11-05
OSV
10.0
Bazarr: Plex OAuth API namespace is entirely unauthenticated, allowing config tampering, integration takeover and server-side request forgery
Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the api_ns_plex namespace in bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py omits @authenticate on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke POST /api/plex/oauth/logout to clear credentials and disable the integration, or POST /api/plex/apikey to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. POST /api/plex/oauth/pin and GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. PlexPinCheck skips state validation when state_param is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. POST /api/plex/select-server, POST /api/plex/oauth/servers, POST /api/plex/webhook/create, POST /api/plex/webhook/delete and POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey expose further write_config() operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in X-Plex-Token, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.
- Record
CVE-2026-61826- CVSS 3.1
- 10.0 Critical
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-352, CWE-862
- Updated
- 2026-11-05
Affected products
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| facts | EUVD | |
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-61826 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 10.0) in Morpheus65535 Bazarr, published October 30, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.26%, the 18th percentile. No source names a fixed version.
References
github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/security/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-hh55-x3r4
github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/4bd29252feebd0803e84cc3ce1bdd24c3a076ed4
github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/f9a8a9514944be0e7b826e67cde042cebfe9c97e
github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/tree/v1.5.7-beta.14
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/61xxx/CVE-2026-61826.json
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61826