CVE-2026-62303

Pistache is a high-performance REST toolkit written in C++. From 0.0.5 through 0.4.26, SegmentTreeNode::sanitizeResource() in src/server/router.cc uses std::regex_replace() with the //+ expression to collapse consecutive slashes. With libstdc++, a path containing tens of thousands of consecutive slash characters can recurse deeply enough to exhaust the stack and crash the process. Router::route(), Router::addRoute() and Router::removeRoute() reach this normalization. Unauthenticated remote exploitation is conditional on a deployment allowing sufficiently long request paths, such as by increasing Endpoint::Options::maxRequestSize() above the default 4096-byte limit or forwarding long paths through a front end. Direct router API use is also affected when attacker-controlled route or resource strings reach the normalizer. Native builds reproduced a crash around 24,000 consecutive slashes, although the exact threshold depends on the stack and standard library; the demonstrated failure is stack exhaustion rather than uninitialized-memory use. A source fix replaces recursive regular-expression normalization with an iterative pass, but no containing repository release was verified as of time of publication.

Pistache is a high-performance REST toolkit written in C++. From 0.0.5 through 0.4.26, SegmentTreeNode::sanitizeResource() in src/server/router.cc uses std::regex_replace() with the //+ expression to collapse consecutive slashes. With libstdc++, a path containing tens of thousands of consecutive slash characters can recurse deeply enough to exhaust the stack and crash the process. Router::route(), Router::addRoute() and Router::removeRoute() reach this normalization. Unauthenticated remote exploitation is conditional on a deployment allowing sufficiently long request paths, such as by increasing Endpoint::Options::maxRequestSize() above the default 4096-byte limit or forwarding long paths through a front end. Direct router API use is also affected when attacker-controlled route or resource strings reach the normalizer. Native builds reproduced a crash around 24,000 consecutive slashes, although the exact threshold depends on the stack and standard library; the demonstrated failure is stack exhaustion rather than uninitialized-memory use. A source fix replaces recursive regular-expression normalization with an iterative pass, but no containing repository release was verified as of time of publication.

Pistache is a high-performance REST toolkit written in C++. From 0.0.5 through 0.4.26, SegmentTreeNode::sanitizeResource() in src/server/router.cc uses std::regex_replace() with the //+ expression to collapse consecutive slashes. With libstdc++, a path containing tens of thousands of consecutive slash characters can recurse deeply enough to exhaust the stack and crash the process. Router::route(), Router::addRoute() and Router::removeRoute() reach this normalization. Unauthenticated remote exploitation is conditional on a deployment allowing sufficiently long request paths, such as by increasing Endpoint::Options::maxRequestSize() above the default 4096-byte limit or forwarding long paths through a front end. Direct router API use is also affected when attacker-controlled route or resource strings reach the normalizer. Native builds reproduced a crash around 24,000 consecutive slashes, although the exact threshold depends on the stack and standard library; the demonstrated failure is stack exhaustion rather than uninitialized-memory use. A source fix replaces recursive regular-expression normalization with an iterative pass, but no containing repository release was verified as of time of publication.

Pistache is a high-performance REST toolkit written in C++. From 0.0.5 through 0.4.26, SegmentTreeNode::sanitizeResource() in src/server/router.cc uses std::regex_replace() with the //+ expression to collapse consecutive slashes. With libstdc++, a path containing tens of thousands of consecutive slash characters can recurse deeply enough to exhaust the stack and crash the process. Router::route(), Router::addRoute() and Router::removeRoute() reach this normalization. Unauthenticated remote exploitation is conditional on a deployment allowing sufficiently long request paths, such as by increasing Endpoint::Options::maxRequestSize() above the default 4096-byte limit or forwarding long paths through a front end. Direct router API use is also affected when attacker-controlled route or resource strings reach the normalizer. Native builds reproduced a crash around 24,000 consecutive slashes, although the exact threshold depends on the stack and standard library; the demonstrated failure is stack exhaustion rather than uninitialized-memory use. A source fix replaces recursive regular-expression normalization with an iterative pass, but no containing repository release was verified as of time of publication.

Pistache is a high-performance REST toolkit written in C++. From 0.0.5 through 0.4.26, SegmentTreeNode::sanitizeResource() in src/server/router.cc uses std::regex_replace() with the //+ expression to collapse consecutive slashes. With libstdc++, a path containing tens of thousands of consecutive slash characters can recurse deeply enough to exhaust the stack and crash the process. Router::route(), Router::addRoute() and Router::removeRoute() reach this normalization. Unauthenticated remote exploitation is conditional on a deployment allowing sufficiently long request paths, such as by increasing Endpoint::Options::maxRequestSize() above the default 4096-byte limit or forwarding long paths through a front end. Direct router API use is also affected when attacker-controlled route or resource strings reach the normalizer. Native builds reproduced a crash around 24,000 consecutive slashes, although the exact threshold depends on the stack and standard library; the demonstrated failure is stack exhaustion rather than uninitialized-memory use. A source fix replaces recursive regular-expression normalization with an iterative pass, but no containing repository release was verified as of time of publication.

Pistache is a high-performance REST toolkit written in C++. From 0.0.5 through 0.4.26, SegmentTreeNode::sanitizeResource() in src/server/router.cc uses std::regex_replace() with the //+ expression to collapse consecutive slashes. With libstdc++, a path containing tens of thousands of consecutive slash characters can recurse deeply enough to exhaust the stack and crash the process. Router::route(), Router::addRoute() and Router::removeRoute() reach this normalization. Unauthenticated remote exploitation is conditional on a deployment allowing sufficiently long request paths, such as by increasing Endpoint::Options::maxRequestSize() above the default 4096-byte limit or forwarding long paths through a front end. Direct router API use is also affected when attacker-controlled route or resource strings reach the normalizer. Native builds reproduced a crash around 24,000 consecutive slashes, although the exact threshold depends on the stack and standard library; the demonstrated failure is stack exhaustion rather than uninitialized-memory use. A source fix replaces recursive regular-expression normalization with an iterative pass, but no containing repository release was verified as of time of publication.