CVE-2026-63223

CodeIgniter is a PHP full-stack web framework. Prior to 4.7.4, the is_image and mime_in upload validation rules do not independently enforce a safe client filename extension, allowing a remote attacker to upload executable content when an application preserves the client filename and stores uploads in a web-accessible script-enabled directory. Applications are impacted when they validate uploads using is_image or mime_in without an independent safe extension check (such as ext_in on patched versions), save uploaded files using the client-supplied filename, and place uploads in a web-accessible directory where PHP files can execute. This issue is fixed in version 4.7.4.

CodeIgniter is a PHP full-stack web framework. Prior to 4.7.4, the is_image and mime_in upload validation rules do not independently enforce a safe client filename extension, allowing a remote attacker to upload executable content when an application preserves the client filename and stores uploads in a web-accessible script-enabled directory. Applications are impacted when they validate uploads using is_image or mime_in without an independent safe extension check (such as ext_in on patched versions), save uploaded files using the client-supplied filename, and place uploads in a web-accessible directory where PHP files can execute. This issue is fixed in version 4.7.4.

Impact

This is an unsafe file upload validation vulnerability that can lead to remote code execution in vulnerable application configurations.

Applications are impacted when they:

• validate uploads using is_image or mime_in without an independent safe extension check, such as ext_in on patched versions
• save uploaded files using the client-supplied filename
• place uploads in a web-accessible directory where PHP files can execute

Patches

Upgrade to v4.7.4 or later.

Workarounds

• Save uploads outside the public web root, preferably under writable/uploads.
• Use $file->store() or $file->move($path, $file->getRandomName()) instead of preserving the original client filename.
• Disable script execution in any public upload directory.
• Manually verify the client filename extension before moving the file.
• For image uploads, reject files when $file->getClientExtension() is not an allowed image extension.
• For exact MIME-type validation, reject files when $file->getClientExtension() does not match $file->guessExtension().

CodeIgniter is a PHP full-stack web framework. Prior to 4.7.4, the is_image and mime_in upload validation rules do not independently enforce a safe client filename extension, allowing a remote attacker to upload executable content when an application preserves the client filename and stores uploads in a web-accessible script-enabled directory. Applications are impacted when they validate uploads using is_image or mime_in without an independent safe extension check (such as ext_in on patched versions), save uploaded files using the client-supplied filename, and place uploads in a web-accessible directory where PHP files can execute. This issue is fixed in version 4.7.4.

CodeIgniter is a PHP full-stack web framework. Prior to 4.7.4, the is_image and mime_in upload validation rules do not independently enforce a safe client filename extension, allowing a remote attacker to upload executable content when an application preserves the client filename and stores uploads in a web-accessible script-enabled directory. Applications are impacted when they validate uploads using is_image or mime_in without an independent safe extension check (such as ext_in on patched versions), save uploaded files using the client-supplied filename, and place uploads in a web-accessible directory where PHP files can execute. This issue is fixed in version 4.7.4.

Impact

This is an unsafe file upload validation vulnerability that can lead to remote code execution in vulnerable application configurations.

Applications are impacted when they:

• validate uploads using is_image or mime_in without an independent safe extension check, such as ext_in on patched versions
• save uploaded files using the client-supplied filename
• place uploads in a web-accessible directory where PHP files can execute

Patches

Upgrade to v4.7.4 or later.

Workarounds

• Save uploads outside the public web root, preferably under writable/uploads.
• Use $file->store() or $file->move($path, $file->getRandomName()) instead of preserving the original client filename.
• Disable script execution in any public upload directory.
• Manually verify the client filename extension before moving the file.
• For image uploads, reject files when $file->getClientExtension() is not an allowed image extension.
• For exact MIME-type validation, reject files when $file->getClientExtension() does not match $file->guessExtension().

CodeIgniter is a PHP full-stack web framework. Prior to 4.7.4, the is_image and mime_in upload validation rules do not independently enforce a safe client filename extension, allowing a remote attacker to upload executable content when an application preserves the client filename and stores uploads in a web-accessible script-enabled directory. Applications are impacted when they validate uploads using is_image or mime_in without an independent safe extension check (such as ext_in on patched versions), save uploaded files using the client-supplied filename, and place uploads in a web-accessible directory where PHP files can execute. This issue is fixed in version 4.7.4.