CVE-2026-63733

SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 contain a permissions bypass vulnerability where data-modifying statements within PERMISSIONS clauses execute with enforcement disabled. Attackers with permission to perform a guarded operation can write to tables they lack permission for by embedding CREATE, UPDATE, DELETE, or UPSERT statements in the PERMISSIONS clause, causing unintended writes and data corruption.

SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 contain a permissions bypass vulnerability where data-modifying statements within PERMISSIONS clauses execute with enforcement disabled. Attackers with permission to perform a guarded operation can write to tables they lack permission for by embedding CREATE, UPDATE, DELETE, or UPSERT statements in the PERMISSIONS clause, causing unintended writes and data corruption.

A PERMISSIONS ... WHERE clause is evaluated with permission enforcement disabled, so it can't recurse into its own checks. But the clause could also contain data-modifying statements, and these ran with enforcement still off — so evaluating a permission check could write to tables the caller cannot write.

For example:

DEFINE TABLE post PERMISSIONS FOR update
    WHERE (CREATE log SET at = time::now()) OR true;

Any user allowed to update a post now also creates a log record, even with no permission on log. The clause is evaluated once per matched record, so one statement can cause several writes.

Impact

Only databases with a PERMISSIONS clause that contains a write are affected; FULL, NONE, and read-only clauses are not.

What an attacker can do:

• With permission to perform the guarded operation (a low-privileged or record user is enough), write to tables in their own database that their permissions would otherwise forbid, by triggering an operation the clause guards.
• Cause several writes from a single statement — the clause is evaluated once per matched record.
• Trigger unintended events, cascades, or data corruption on those tables.

What it can't do:

• Escape the caller's own namespace and database — a permission clause cannot switch namespace or database.
• Perform root- or namespace-level actions such as creating users; the caller's role still applies.
• Read hidden data — this is an integrity issue, not disclosure.

Patches

Permission clauses must now be read-only: defining or importing one that contains a write is rejected, and any write attempted while a clause is evaluated is blocked at runtime, including writes reached through a called function. Read-only clauses are unaffected.

• Versions 3.2.0 and later are not affected by this issue.

Workarounds

Users unable to patch should consider the following workarounds:

• Review your PERMISSIONS clauses and remove any containing CREATE, UPDATE, DELETE, RELATE, INSERT, or UPSERT.
• Limit who can define schema and vet imported data — such a clause must be defined before it can be triggered.

Resources

• DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS
• DEFINE FIELD
• fix(core): reject writes in PERMISSIONS clauses and block writes during permission evaluation (included in SurrealDB 3.2.0)

Acknowledgements

Thank you to sondt99 for reporting this issue.

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-66r2-5gwj-gxm2. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 contain a permissions bypass vulnerability where data-modifying statements within PERMISSIONS clauses execute with enforcement disabled. Attackers with permission to perform a guarded operation can write to tables they lack permission for by embedding CREATE, UPDATE, DELETE, or UPSERT statements in the PERMISSIONS clause, causing unintended writes and data corruption.

SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 contain a permissions bypass vulnerability where data-modifying statements within PERMISSIONS clauses execute with enforcement disabled. Attackers with permission to perform a guarded operation can write to tables they lack permission for by embedding CREATE, UPDATE, DELETE, or UPSERT statements in the PERMISSIONS clause, causing unintended writes and data corruption.

SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 contain a permissions bypass vulnerability where data-modifying statements within PERMISSIONS clauses execute with enforcement disabled. Attackers with permission to perform a guarded operation can write to tables they lack permission for by embedding CREATE, UPDATE, DELETE, or UPSERT statements in the PERMISSIONS clause, causing unintended writes and data corruption.

A PERMISSIONS ... WHERE clause is evaluated with permission enforcement disabled, so it can't recurse into its own checks. But the clause could also contain data-modifying statements, and these ran with enforcement still off — so evaluating a permission check could write to tables the caller cannot write.

For example:

DEFINE TABLE post PERMISSIONS FOR update
    WHERE (CREATE log SET at = time::now()) OR true;

Any user allowed to update a post now also creates a log record, even with no permission on log. The clause is evaluated once per matched record, so one statement can cause several writes.

Impact

Only databases with a PERMISSIONS clause that contains a write are affected; FULL, NONE, and read-only clauses are not.

What an attacker can do:

• With permission to perform the guarded operation (a low-privileged or record user is enough), write to tables in their own database that their permissions would otherwise forbid, by triggering an operation the clause guards.
• Cause several writes from a single statement — the clause is evaluated once per matched record.
• Trigger unintended events, cascades, or data corruption on those tables.

What it can't do:

• Escape the caller's own namespace and database — a permission clause cannot switch namespace or database.
• Perform root- or namespace-level actions such as creating users; the caller's role still applies.
• Read hidden data — this is an integrity issue, not disclosure.

Patches

Permission clauses must now be read-only: defining or importing one that contains a write is rejected, and any write attempted while a clause is evaluated is blocked at runtime, including writes reached through a called function. Read-only clauses are unaffected.

• Versions 3.2.0 and later are not affected by this issue.

Workarounds

Users unable to patch should consider the following workarounds:

• Review your PERMISSIONS clauses and remove any containing CREATE, UPDATE, DELETE, RELATE, INSERT, or UPSERT.
• Limit who can define schema and vet imported data — such a clause must be defined before it can be triggered.

Resources

• DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS
• DEFINE FIELD
• fix(core): reject writes in PERMISSIONS clauses and block writes during permission evaluation (included in SurrealDB 3.2.0)

Acknowledgements

Thank you to sondt99 for reporting this issue.

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-66r2-5gwj-gxm2. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 contain a permissions bypass vulnerability where data-modifying statements within PERMISSIONS clauses execute with enforcement disabled. Attackers with permission to perform a guarded operation can write to tables they lack permission for by embedding CREATE, UPDATE, DELETE, or UPSERT statements in the PERMISSIONS clause, causing unintended writes and data corruption.