CVE-2026-68495

The CBOR parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. CBORParser._decodeLongerName() decodes a definite-length property name with no length check, and CBORParser._decodeChunkedName() delegates to the value-oriented _finishChunkedText() routine, which validates maxStringLength rather than maxNameLength. An attacker who can have a CBOR document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach CBORFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the CBOR module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the Smile parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The CBOR parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #725) is CVE-2026-68495; the Smile parser defect (issue #726) is assigned CVE-2026-68496.

The CBOR parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. CBORParser._decodeLongerName() decodes a definite-length property name with no length check, and CBORParser._decodeChunkedName() delegates to the value-oriented _finishChunkedText() routine, which validates maxStringLength rather than maxNameLength. An attacker who can have a CBOR document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach CBORFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the CBOR module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the Smile parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The CBOR parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #725) is CVE-2026-68495; the Smile parser defect (issue #726) is assigned CVE-2026-68496.

The CBOR parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. CBORParser._decodeLongerName() decodes a definite-length property name with no length check, and CBORParser._decodeChunkedName() delegates to the value-oriented _finishChunkedText() routine, which validates maxStringLength rather than maxNameLength. An attacker who can have a CBOR document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach CBORFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the CBOR module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the Smile parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The CBOR parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #725) is CVE-2026-68495; the Smile parser defect (issue #726) is assigned CVE-2026-68496.

The CBOR parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. CBORParser._decodeLongerName() decodes a definite-length property name with no length check, and CBORParser._decodeChunkedName() delegates to the value-oriented _finishChunkedText() routine, which validates maxStringLength rather than maxNameLength. An attacker who can have a CBOR document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach CBORFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the CBOR module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the Smile parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The CBOR parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #725) is CVE-2026-68495; the Smile parser defect (issue #726) is assigned CVE-2026-68496.

The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. SmileParser._handleLongFieldName() grows its internal name buffer through an unconstrained _growArrayTo() call and performs no length validation. An attacker who can have a Smile document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach SmileFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the Smile module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the CBOR parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The Smile parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #726) is CVE-2026-68496; the CBOR parser defect (issue #725) is assigned CVE-2026-68495.

The CBOR parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. CBORParser._decodeLongerName() decodes a definite-length property name with no length check, and CBORParser._decodeChunkedName() delegates to the value-oriented _finishChunkedText() routine, which validates maxStringLength rather than maxNameLength. An attacker who can have a CBOR document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach CBORFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the CBOR module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the Smile parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The CBOR parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #725) is CVE-2026-68495; the Smile parser defect (issue #726) is assigned CVE-2026-68496.

The CBOR parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. CBORParser._decodeLongerName() decodes a definite-length property name with no length check, and CBORParser._decodeChunkedName() delegates to the value-oriented _finishChunkedText() routine, which validates maxStringLength rather than maxNameLength. An attacker who can have a CBOR document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach CBORFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the CBOR module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the Smile parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The CBOR parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #725) is CVE-2026-68495; the Smile parser defect (issue #726) is assigned CVE-2026-68496.

These are all security issues fixed in the jackson-dataformat-cbor-2.18.11-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.

This update for jackson-annotations, jackson-bom, jackson-core, jackson-databind, jackson-dataformat-xml, jackson-dataformats-binary, jackson-modules-base fixes the following issues:

• CVE-2026-18401: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Can Lead to Potential Processing Time Issues (bsc#1273856).
• CVE-2026-68494: Async parser maxNumberLength bypass via chunked digit accumulation (bsc#1273857).
• CVE-2026-68495: Ensure maxNameLength limit enforced for CBOR parser (bsc#1282639).
• CVE-2026-68496: Ensure maxNameLength limit enforced for Smile parser (bsc#1282640).
• CVE-2026-68498: Enforce maxNameLength incrementally in ReaderBasedJsonParser (bsc#1282641).
• CVE-2026-89407: Optimize NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber (bsc#1282645).
• CVE-2026-89425: UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken()lacks maxErrorTokenLength limit, which allows for unbounded StringBuilder growth and can lead to a DoS when malformed tokens are processed (bsc#1282505).

Changes for jackson-annotations:

• Update to 2.18.11

Changes for jackson-bom:

• Update to 2.18.11

Changes for jackson-core:

• Update to 2.18.11

• #1649: Optimize NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber (bsc#1282645, CVE-2026-89407)
• #1698: UTF8DataInputJsonParser does not honor maxErrorTokenLength when reporting an unrecognized token (bsc#1282505, CVE-2026-89425)
• #1642: Fix maxDocumentLength bypass in async parser single-feedInput() case [GHSA-2c4j-63jj-9fqr]
• #1643: Enforce maxNameLength incrementally in ReaderBasedJsonParser (bsc#1282641, CVE-2026-68498) of async parser (bsc#1273857, CVE-2026-68494) non-blocking (async) parser (bsc#1273856, CVE-2026-18401)

Changes for jackson-databind:

• Update to 2.18.11

• #6185: Bracket unresolved IPv6 host name in InetSocketAddress serialization
• #6203: Prevent unbounded growth of type id cache in TypeDeserializer (bsc#1282491, CVE-2026-91776)
• #6204: Avoid quadratic forward-reference resolution in Collection/Map deserializers (bsc#1282492, CVE-2026-91777)
• #6099: Resolve classes without initialization in TypeFactory.findClass()
• #6116: Reject non-ASCII digits in InetAddress literal validation
• #6127: Add StreamReadConstraints number len constraint to javax.xml.datatype.XMLGregorianCalendar and javax.xml.datatype.Duration (bsc#1280125, CVE-2026-68497)
• #6129: Limit the supported URL schemes for java.nio.file.Path deserialization (bsc#1277883, CVE-2026-19032)
• #6156: Add java.lang.Comparable in set of unsafe polymorphic base types (bsc#1278008, CVE-2026-83557)
• #6165: Apply number length limits to BigDecimal/BigInteger/ /Double/Float Map keys

Changes for jackson-dataformat-xml:

• Update to 2.18.11

• Fix build to avoid past-JDK-8 bytecode generation
• #891: Enforce StreamReadConstraints.maxNestingDepth in FromXmlParser

Changes for jackson-dataformats-binary:

• Update to 2.18.11

• #783: (protobuf) Support StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength in ProtobufParser
• #785: (avro) Support StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength and maxTokenCount in Avro parser
• #803: (ion) Support StreamReadConstraints.maxNestingDepth in Ion parser (partial fix for #358)
• #805: (ion) Support StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength in Ion parser (partial fix for #358)
• #725: (cbor) Ensure maxNameLength limit enforced for CBOR parser (bsc#1282639, CVE-2026-68495)
• #726: (smile) Ensure maxNameLength limit enforced for Smile parser (bsc#1282640, CVE-2026-68496)
• #727: (cbor) CBORParser.nextFieldName(SerializableString) confuses 5-bit length marker 23 with 24 ('1-byte length suffix follows')
• #728: (cbor) CBORParser.nextFieldName(SerializableString) consumes Object entry slot twice on fast-path miss, truncating definite-length Objects
• #733: (cbor) Long Strings not added to 'stringref' reference table, breaking following references
• #735: (cbor) 'stringref' property-name paths pass 5-bit length marker instead of actual length to shouldReferenceString()
• #736: (cbor) Long…