CVE-2026-68558
Wekan: SSRF filter bypass via DNS-resolving hostname in outgoing webhooks (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-53446)
Wekan is open source kanban built with Meteor. From 8.36 until 9.74, the outgoing webhook Integration URL validator in models/integrations.js checked only the literal URL.hostname against regular expressions, so DNS names such as 169-254-169-254.nip.io passed that first-line check. The delivery path's fetchSafe guard already blocked the reported IPv4 destination, but its separate IPv4-only resolver and duplicated blocklist created inconsistent all-address-family enforcement and drift risk between input-time and connection-time validation. Version 9.74 makes server/lib/ssrfGuard.js resolve all addresses with dns.lookup({ all: true }), validate every result through the shared isIpBlocked logic, pin the connection, and block redirects. This issue is fixed in version 9.74.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
8.5
Wekan: SSRF filter bypass via DNS-resolving hostname in outgoing webhooks (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-53446)
Wekan is open source kanban built with Meteor. From 8.36 until 9.74, the outgoing webhook Integration URL validator in models/integrations.js checked only the literal URL.hostname against regular expressions, so DNS names such as 169-254-169-254.nip.io passed that first-line check. The delivery path's fetchSafe guard already blocked the reported IPv4 destination, but its separate IPv4-only resolver and duplicated blocklist created inconsistent all-address-family enforcement and drift risk between input-time and connection-time validation. Version 9.74 makes server/lib/ssrfGuard.js resolve all addresses with dns.lookup({ all: true }), validate every result through the shared isIpBlocked logic, pin the connection, and block redirects. This issue is fixed in version 9.74.
- Record
CVE-2026-68558- CVSS 3.1
- 8.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-62701
8.5
Wekan is open source kanban built with Meteor. From 8.36 until 9.74, the outgoing webhook Integration URL validator in models/integrations.js checked only the literal URL.hostname against regular expressions, so DNS names such as 169-254-169-254.nip.io passed that first-line check. The delivery path's fetchSafe guard already blocked the reported IPv4 destination, but its separate IPv4-only resolver and duplicated blocklist created inconsistent all-address-family enforcement and drift risk between input-time and connection-time validation. Version 9.74 makes server/lib/ssrfGuard.js resolve all addresses with dns.lookup({ all: true }), validate every result through the shared isIpBlocked logic, pin the connection, and block redirects. This issue is fixed in version 9.74.
- Record
EUVD-2026-62701- CVSS 3.1
- 8.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
8.5
Wekan is open source kanban built with Meteor. From 8.36 until 9.74, the outgoing webhook Integration URL validator in models/integrations.js checked only the literal URL.hostname against regular expressions, so DNS names such as 169-254-169-254.nip.io passed that first-line check. The delivery path's fetchSafe guard already blocked the reported IPv4 destination, but its separate IPv4-only resolver and duplicated blocklist created inconsistent all-address-family enforcement and drift risk between input-time and connection-time validation. Version 9.74 makes server/lib/ssrfGuard.js resolve all addresses with dns.lookup({ all: true }), validate every result through the shared isIpBlocked logic, pin the connection, and block redirects. This issue is fixed in version 9.74.
- Record
CVE-2026-68558- CVSS 3.1
- 8.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
8.5
Wekan: SSRF filter bypass via DNS-resolving hostname in outgoing webhooks (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-53446)
Wekan is open source kanban built with Meteor. From 8.36 until 9.74, the outgoing webhook Integration URL validator in models/integrations.js checked only the literal URL.hostname against regular expressions, so DNS names such as 169-254-169-254.nip.io passed that first-line check. The delivery path's fetchSafe guard already blocked the reported IPv4 destination, but its separate IPv4-only resolver and duplicated blocklist created inconsistent all-address-family enforcement and drift risk between input-time and connection-time validation. Version 9.74 makes server/lib/ssrfGuard.js resolve all addresses with dns.lookup({ all: true }), validate every result through the shared isIpBlocked logic, pin the connection, and block redirects. This issue is fixed in version 9.74.
- Record
CVE-2026-68558- CVSS 3.1
- 8.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-68558 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.5) in Wekan, published August 19, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.39%, the 33rd percentile. No source names a fixed version.