CVE-2026-69247

Summary

pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key.

Introduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.

Details

Decryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey → build an AES cipher from the result → AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed differently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:

1. invalid RSA padding → Decryption failed
2. valid padding, bad key length → Invalid key size (N) for AES., disclosing N
3. correct length, wrong key → Invalid padding bytes.
4. the real key → plaintext

Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels, invalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of pseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming ciphertexts.

Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter.

Fix

Per RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the private key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA decryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the expected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path. All failures now report identically and perform the same work.

Not addressed by this fix

EnvelopedData does not authenticate its content. Tampering with encryptedContent alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at roughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This is a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in the library, and is now documented.

Credit

Reported by @X1AOxiang.

Summary

pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key.

Introduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.

Details

Decryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey → build an AES cipher from the result → AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed differently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:

1. invalid RSA padding → Decryption failed
2. valid padding, bad key length → Invalid key size (N) for AES., disclosing N
3. correct length, wrong key → Invalid padding bytes.
4. the real key → plaintext

Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels, invalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of pseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming ciphertexts.

Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter.

Fix

Per RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the private key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA decryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the expected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path. All failures now report identically and perform the same work.

Not addressed by this fix

EnvelopedData does not authenticate its content. Tampering with encryptedContent alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at roughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This is a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in the library, and is now documented.

Credit

Reported by @X1AOxiang.

cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers. From 44.0.0 until 50.0.0, pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key. Decryption ran as RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey, build an AES cipher from the result, then AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Invalid RSA padding, a valid padding with a bad key length, a correct length with a wrong key, and the real key each failed or succeeded differently. Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter. This issue is fixed in 50.0.0.

TuxCare rebuilt cryptography to address 2 CVEs. Fixed in 46.0.7.post2+tuxcare.

TuxCare rebuilt cryptography to address 2 CVEs. Fixed in 45.0.7.post4+tuxcare.

TuxCare rebuilt cryptography to address 2 CVEs. Fixed in 44.0.3.post4+tuxcare.

These are all security issues fixed in the python313-cryptography-50.0.0-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.

This update for python-cryptography fixes the following issues:

• CVE-2026-69247: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing (bsc#1273551).
• CVE-2026-69248: verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape from permittedSubtrees (bsc#1273549).
• CVE-2026-69249: duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential path-building (bsc#1273516).

Root has patched CVE-2026-69247 in the cryptography package for Root:PyPI. Multiple fixed versions available.

This update for python-cryptography fixes the following issues:

• CVE-2026-69247: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing (bsc#1273551).
• CVE-2026-69248: verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape from permittedSubtrees (bsc#1273549).
• CVE-2026-69249: duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential path-building (bsc#1273516).

This update for python-cryptography fixes the following issues:

• CVE-2026-69247: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing (bsc#1273551).
• CVE-2026-69248: verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape from permittedSubtrees (bsc#1273549).
• CVE-2026-69249: duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential path-building (bsc#1273516).

It was discovered that python-cryptography incorrectly accepted objects with immutable buffers when performing certain cipher operations. This would result in corrupted output, contrary to expectations. This issue only affected Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. (CVE-2023-23931)

It was discovered that python-cryptography reported the outcome of decrypting PKCS#7 enveloped data in distinguishable ways, and with observable timing differences. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to recover the key used to encrypt the message contents, and obtain sensitive information. This issue only affected Ubuntu 26.04 LTS. (CVE-2026-69247)

Jack Lloyd discovered that python-cryptography incorrectly handled wildcard DNS names when enforcing the name constraints of a certificate authority. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to have an invalid certificate chain accepted, and use names outside of the permitted ones. This issue only affected Ubuntu 26.04 LTS. (CVE-2026-69248)

Samuel Judson discovered that python-cryptography incorrectly handled certificate chains that contained duplicate certificates. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to cause python-cryptography to use excessive resources, leading to a denial of service. This issue only affected Ubuntu 26.04 LTS. (CVE-2026-69249)