CVE-2026-69258

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the unauthenticated POST /api/v1/prediction/:id endpoint accepted an overrideConfig object and unconditionally spread it into internal flowConfig and flowData objects in packages/server/src/utils/buildChatflow.ts and packages/server/src/utils/index.ts without checking apiOverrideStatus. This allowed unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary properties into the flow execution context of any public chatflow, overwrite values such as chatId, sessionId, and chatHistory, and control values resolved through $flow.* template variables consumed by flow nodes. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the unauthenticated POST /api/v1/prediction/:id endpoint accepted an overrideConfig object and unconditionally spread it into internal flowConfig and flowData objects in packages/server/src/utils/buildChatflow.ts and packages/server/src/utils/index.ts without checking apiOverrideStatus. This allowed unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary properties into the flow execution context of any public chatflow, overwrite values such as chatId, sessionId, and chatHistory, and control values resolved through $flow.* template variables consumed by flow nodes. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

Summary

The POST /api/v1/prediction/:id endpoint — which is unauthenticated (whitelisted in WHITELIST_URLS) — accepts an overrideConfig object in the request body. This object is unconditionally spread into the internal flowConfig and flowData objects at two locations in the codebase without checking apiOverrideStatus. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject arbitrary properties into the flow execution context of any public chatflow, enabling session hijacking, cross-session data pollution, chat history manipulation, and injection of attacker-controlled values into $flow.* template variables consumed by flow nodes.

This is distinct from the previously reported overrideConfig vulnerability (GHSA-5cph-wvm9-45gj), which addressed overrideConfig's ability to modify node input parameters via replaceInputsWithConfig(). That function is properly gated behind apiOverrideStatus. The vulnerability reported here is in two separate, ungated spread operations that were not addressed by the GHSA-5cph fix.

Root Cause

In packages/server/src/utils/buildChatflow.ts at lines 557–564, the incomingInput.overrideConfig object is spread directly into flowConfig with no gating:

// File: packages/server/src/utils/buildChatflow.ts, lines 557-564
const flowConfig: IFlowConfig = {
    chatflowid,
    chatflowId: chatflow.id,
    chatId,
    sessionId,
    chatHistory,
    apiMessageId,
    ...incomingInput.overrideConfig  // <-- UNGATED: always applied, no apiOverrideStatus check
}

A second ungated spread exists in packages/server/src/utils/index.ts at lines 569–574:

// File: packages/server/src/utils/index.ts, lines 569-574
const flowData: ICommonObject = {
    chatflowid,
    chatId,
    sessionId,
    chatHistory,
    ...overrideConfig  // <-- UNGATED: always applied, no apiOverrideStatus check
}

Internal inconsistency: The node parameter override mechanism at buildChatflow.ts:180 and index.ts:589 IS correctly gated:

// File: packages/server/src/utils/buildChatflow.ts, line 180
if (incomingInput.overrideConfig && apiOverrideStatus) {  // <-- Properly gated
    nodeToExecute.data = replaceInputsWithConfig(...)
}

This demonstrates that the developers intended for overrideConfig processing to be gated behind apiOverrideStatus, but the flowConfig and flowData spreads were missed.

Exploitation

The flowConfig object is consumed by the $flow.* template variable resolution system at packages/server/src/utils/index.ts:932-936:

// File: packages/server/src/utils/index.ts, lines 932-936
if (variableFullPath.startsWith('$flow.') && flowConfig) {
    const variableValue = get(flowConfig, variableFullPath.replace('$flow.', ''))
    if (variableValue != null) {
        variableDict[`{{${variableFullPath}}}`] = variableValue
        returnVal = returnVal.split(`{{${variableFullPath}}}`).join(variableValue)
    }
}

And identically in packages/server/src/utils/buildAgentflow.ts:346-351.

This means any attacker-injected property in overrideConfig becomes accessible as a $flow.* variable and will be substituted into any node template that references it. The get() function (lodash get) supports nested property access, so deep object injection is possible.

Concrete Attack Scenarios

1. Session Hijacking via chatId Overwrite:

An attacker sends a prediction request with overrideConfig: { "chatId": "<victim-chat-id>" }. Since chatId in flowConfig controls which conversation session is used for memory retrieval and storage, the attacker's messages and responses will be written to the victim's session. If the chatflow uses conversation memory (e.g., BufferMemory, ZepMemory), the attacker can:

• Read the victim's prior conversation history (returned as context to the LLM)
• Inject messages into the victim's conversation that will appear in subsequent interactions

**2.…

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the unauthenticated POST /api/v1/prediction/:id endpoint accepted an overrideConfig object and unconditionally spread it into internal flowConfig and flowData objects in packages/server/src/utils/buildChatflow.ts and packages/server/src/utils/index.ts without checking apiOverrideStatus. This allowed unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary properties into the flow execution context of any public chatflow, overwrite values such as chatId, sessionId, and chatHistory, and control values resolved through $flow.* template variables consumed by flow nodes. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the unauthenticated POST /api/v1/prediction/:id endpoint accepted an overrideConfig object and unconditionally spread it into internal flowConfig and flowData objects in packages/server/src/utils/buildChatflow.ts and packages/server/src/utils/index.ts without checking apiOverrideStatus. This allowed unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary properties into the flow execution context of any public chatflow, overwrite values such as chatId, sessionId, and chatHistory, and control values resolved through $flow.* template variables consumed by flow nodes. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

Summary

The POST /api/v1/prediction/:id endpoint — which is unauthenticated (whitelisted in WHITELIST_URLS) — accepts an overrideConfig object in the request body. This object is unconditionally spread into the internal flowConfig and flowData objects at two locations in the codebase without checking apiOverrideStatus. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject arbitrary properties into the flow execution context of any public chatflow, enabling session hijacking, cross-session data pollution, chat history manipulation, and injection of attacker-controlled values into $flow.* template variables consumed by flow nodes.

This is distinct from the previously reported overrideConfig vulnerability (GHSA-5cph-wvm9-45gj), which addressed overrideConfig's ability to modify node input parameters via replaceInputsWithConfig(). That function is properly gated behind apiOverrideStatus. The vulnerability reported here is in two separate, ungated spread operations that were not addressed by the GHSA-5cph fix.

Root Cause

In packages/server/src/utils/buildChatflow.ts at lines 557–564, the incomingInput.overrideConfig object is spread directly into flowConfig with no gating:

// File: packages/server/src/utils/buildChatflow.ts, lines 557-564
const flowConfig: IFlowConfig = {
    chatflowid,
    chatflowId: chatflow.id,
    chatId,
    sessionId,
    chatHistory,
    apiMessageId,
    ...incomingInput.overrideConfig  // <-- UNGATED: always applied, no apiOverrideStatus check
}

A second ungated spread exists in packages/server/src/utils/index.ts at lines 569–574:

// File: packages/server/src/utils/index.ts, lines 569-574
const flowData: ICommonObject = {
    chatflowid,
    chatId,
    sessionId,
    chatHistory,
    ...overrideConfig  // <-- UNGATED: always applied, no apiOverrideStatus check
}

Internal inconsistency: The node parameter override mechanism at buildChatflow.ts:180 and index.ts:589 IS correctly gated:

// File: packages/server/src/utils/buildChatflow.ts, line 180
if (incomingInput.overrideConfig && apiOverrideStatus) {  // <-- Properly gated
    nodeToExecute.data = replaceInputsWithConfig(...)
}

This demonstrates that the developers intended for overrideConfig processing to be gated behind apiOverrideStatus, but the flowConfig and flowData spreads were missed.

Exploitation

The flowConfig object is consumed by the $flow.* template variable resolution system at packages/server/src/utils/index.ts:932-936:

// File: packages/server/src/utils/index.ts, lines 932-936
if (variableFullPath.startsWith('$flow.') && flowConfig) {
    const variableValue = get(flowConfig, variableFullPath.replace('$flow.', ''))
    if (variableValue != null) {
        variableDict[`{{${variableFullPath}}}`] = variableValue
        returnVal = returnVal.split(`{{${variableFullPath}}}`).join(variableValue)
    }
}

And identically in packages/server/src/utils/buildAgentflow.ts:346-351.

This means any attacker-injected property in overrideConfig becomes accessible as a $flow.* variable and will be substituted into any node template that references it. The get() function (lodash get) supports nested property access, so deep object injection is possible.

Concrete Attack Scenarios

1. Session Hijacking via chatId Overwrite:

An attacker sends a prediction request with overrideConfig: { "chatId": "<victim-chat-id>" }. Since chatId in flowConfig controls which conversation session is used for memory retrieval and storage, the attacker's messages and responses will be written to the victim's session. If the chatflow uses conversation memory (e.g., BufferMemory, ZepMemory), the attacker can:

• Read the victim's prior conversation history (returned as context to the LLM)
• Inject messages into the victim's conversation that will appear in subsequent interactions

**2.…