CVE-2026-70405

Erlang is a general-purpose programming language and runtime environment. Erlang has built-in support for concurrency, distribution and fault tolerance. Erlang is used in several large telecommunication systems from Ericsson.

Security Fix(es):

The Erlang/OTP httpc HTTP client does not enforce a limit on the total size of response headers received from a server. The max_header_size option defaults to nolimit, and httpc_response:parse_headers/6 accumulates every header into a list before the length check runs (which only fires after the terminating CRLF CRLF is received).

A malicious or compromised HTTP server can send an arbitrarily large number of headers, or headers with very large values, causing the client process to allocate unbounded memory until the system runs out of memory or the BEAM VM crashes. A proof-of-concept server sending 100,000 headers of roughly 4000 bytes each caused the client VM to allocate over 13 GB of memory in under 30 seconds.

Any application using httpc:request/4,5 to connect to untrusted servers is affected. No authentication is required: any server the client connects to (including via a redirect or man-in-the-middle) can trigger the exhaustion.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, from 9.4 before 9.6.2.3, and from 9.7 before 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.(CVE-2026-55951)

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP stdlib allows a remote attacker to degrade availability by supplying a URI whose port component is a very long run of digits.

uri_string:get_port/1 passes the port substring to binary_to_integer/1 with no length bound, catching only error:badarg, so a syntactically valid port of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the calling process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic. The conversion is reached from every authority-parsing path in uri_string:parse/1, including the host, registered-name, and IPv4 and IPv6 forms. parse/1 is the documented interface for parsing URIs, so any application that parses an attacker-supplied URI is exposed without further configuration. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 21.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to stdlib from 3.5 before 6.2.2.5, from 7.0 before 7.3.0.2, and from 8.0 before 8.0.4.(CVE-2026-59696)

httpd has never implemented obs-fold (RFC 2616 §2.2 / RFC 7230 §3.2.4 header continuation lines). Every CRLF followed by a non-CRLF octet unconditionally starts a new header. This missing feature became a security concern as the understanding of HTTP request smuggling attacks evolved.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, from 9.4 before 9.6.2.3, and from 9.7 before 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.(CVE-2026-66357)

Path Equivalence vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpd allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to read files inside a mod_auth protected directory by prefixing the request path with an extra slash.

httpd_request:validate_uri/1 normalises the request URI with uri_string:normalize/1, which performs RFC 3986 dot-segment removal but does not collapse empty path segments, so a doubled slash survives. mod_alias:real_name/3 concatenates the document root with that URI, and mod_auth:secret_path/3 then decides whether the result lies inside a protected directory block by running the configured directory path as an unanchored…

Erlang is a general-purpose programming language and runtime environment. Erlang has built-in support for concurrency, distribution and fault tolerance. Erlang is used in several large telecommunication systems from Ericsson.

Security Fix(es):

The Erlang/OTP httpc HTTP client does not enforce a limit on the total size of response headers received from a server. The max_header_size option defaults to nolimit, and httpc_response:parse_headers/6 accumulates every header into a list before the length check runs (which only fires after the terminating CRLF CRLF is received).

A malicious or compromised HTTP server can send an arbitrarily large number of headers, or headers with very large values, causing the client process to allocate unbounded memory until the system runs out of memory or the BEAM VM crashes. A proof-of-concept server sending 100,000 headers of roughly 4000 bytes each caused the client VM to allocate over 13 GB of memory in under 30 seconds.

Any application using httpc:request/4,5 to connect to untrusted servers is affected. No authentication is required: any server the client connects to (including via a redirect or man-in-the-middle) can trigger the exhaustion.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, from 9.4 before 9.6.2.3, and from 9.7 before 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.(CVE-2026-55951)

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP stdlib allows a remote attacker to degrade availability by supplying a URI whose port component is a very long run of digits.

uri_string:get_port/1 passes the port substring to binary_to_integer/1 with no length bound, catching only error:badarg, so a syntactically valid port of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the calling process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic. The conversion is reached from every authority-parsing path in uri_string:parse/1, including the host, registered-name, and IPv4 and IPv6 forms. parse/1 is the documented interface for parsing URIs, so any application that parses an attacker-supplied URI is exposed without further configuration. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 21.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to stdlib from 3.5 before 6.2.2.5, from 7.0 before 7.3.0.2, and from 8.0 before 8.0.4.(CVE-2026-59696)

httpd has never implemented obs-fold (RFC 2616 §2.2 / RFC 7230 §3.2.4 header continuation lines). Every CRLF followed by a non-CRLF octet unconditionally starts a new header. This missing feature became a security concern as the understanding of HTTP request smuggling attacks evolved.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, from 9.4 before 9.6.2.3, and from 9.7 before 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.(CVE-2026-66357)

Path Equivalence vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpd allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to read files inside a mod_auth protected directory by prefixing the request path with an extra slash.

httpd_request:validate_uri/1 normalises the request URI with uri_string:normalize/1, which performs RFC 3986 dot-segment removal but does not collapse empty path segments, so a doubled slash survives. mod_alias:real_name/3 concatenates the document root with that URI, and mod_auth:secret_path/3 then decides whether the result lies inside a protected directory block by running the configured directory path as an unanchored…

Erlang is a general-purpose programming language and runtime environment. Erlang has built-in support for concurrency, distribution and fault tolerance. Erlang is used in several large telecommunication systems from Ericsson.

Security Fix(es):

The Erlang/OTP httpc HTTP client does not enforce a limit on the total size of response headers received from a server. The max_header_size option defaults to nolimit, and httpc_response:parse_headers/6 accumulates every header into a list before the length check runs (which only fires after the terminating CRLF CRLF is received).

A malicious or compromised HTTP server can send an arbitrarily large number of headers, or headers with very large values, causing the client process to allocate unbounded memory until the system runs out of memory or the BEAM VM crashes. A proof-of-concept server sending 100,000 headers of roughly 4000 bytes each caused the client VM to allocate over 13 GB of memory in under 30 seconds.

Any application using httpc:request/4,5 to connect to untrusted servers is affected. No authentication is required: any server the client connects to (including via a redirect or man-in-the-middle) can trigger the exhaustion.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, from 9.4 before 9.6.2.3, and from 9.7 before 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.(CVE-2026-55951)

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP stdlib allows a remote attacker to degrade availability by supplying a URI whose port component is a very long run of digits.

uri_string:get_port/1 passes the port substring to binary_to_integer/1 with no length bound, catching only error:badarg, so a syntactically valid port of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the calling process hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic. The conversion is reached from every authority-parsing path in uri_string:parse/1, including the host, registered-name, and IPv4 and IPv6 forms. parse/1 is the documented interface for parsing URIs, so any application that parses an attacker-supplied URI is exposed without further configuration. The conversion function is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 21.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to stdlib from 3.5 before 6.2.2.5, from 7.0 before 7.3.0.2, and from 8.0 before 8.0.4.(CVE-2026-59696)

httpd has never implemented obs-fold (RFC 2616 §2.2 / RFC 7230 §3.2.4 header continuation lines). Every CRLF followed by a non-CRLF octet unconditionally starts a new header. This missing feature became a security concern as the understanding of HTTP request smuggling attacks evolved.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.3.2.7, from 9.4 before 9.6.2.3, and from 9.7 before 9.7.2. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.(CVE-2026-66357)

Path Equivalence vulnerability in Erlang/OTP inets httpd allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to read files inside a mod_auth protected directory by prefixing the request path with an extra slash.

httpd_request:validate_uri/1 normalises the request URI with uri_string:normalize/1, which performs RFC 3986 dot-segment removal but does not collapse empty path segments, so a doubled slash survives. mod_alias:real_name/3 concatenates the document root with that URI, and mod_auth:secret_path/3 then decides whether the result lies inside a protected directory block by running the configured directory path as an unanchored…

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP snmp allows a remote attacker to degrade availability by sending an SNMP message containing a BER INTEGER whose length field is arbitrarily large. snmp_pdus:dec_integer_notag/1 defaults its size limit to infinity, and do_dec_integer_notag/2 then accumulates the value across every declared byte with a recursive shift and bitwise or. Work grows superlinearly in the declared length because each operation acts on a progressively larger bignum. The size-limited variant dec_integer_notag/2 exists but is reached from only one call site, dec_snmp_version/1, which bounds the version field to ten bytes; the request identifier, error status and index, generic and specific trap fields, engine boots and time, and every varbind value decoded by dec_value/1 all use the unbounded form. The decode runs before the PDU is processed, so no valid request is required beyond what the deployment demands to accept the message at all. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to snmp from 4.25.1 before 5.18.2.1, from 5.19 before 5.20.2.2, and from 5.20.3 before 5.20.5. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to snmp before 4.25.1, is affected is unknown.

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP snmp allows a remote attacker to degrade availability by sending an SNMP message containing a BER INTEGER whose length field is arbitrarily large.

snmp_pdus:dec_integer_notag/1 defaults its size limit to infinity, and do_dec_integer_notag/2 then accumulates the value across every declared byte with a recursive shift and bitwise or. Work grows superlinearly in the declared length because each operation acts on a progressively larger bignum. The size-limited variant dec_integer_notag/2 exists but is reached from only one call site, dec_snmp_version/1, which bounds the version field to ten bytes; the request identifier, error status and index, generic and specific trap fields, engine boots and time, and every varbind value decoded by dec_value/1 all use the unbounded form. The decode runs before the PDU is processed, so no valid request is required beyond what the deployment demands to accept the message at all.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to snmp from 4.25.1 before 5.18.2.1, from 5.19 before 5.20.2.2, and from 5.20.3 before 5.20.5. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to snmp before 4.25.1, is affected is unknown.