CVE-2026-72210

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks

In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record:

attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr->length);

The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (>), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:

b = *buf & 0xf; if (b) { if (unlikely(buf + b > attr_end)) // off-by-one goto io_error; for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--) deltaxcn = (deltaxcn << 8) + buf[b]; }

When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check.

Fix both checks to use >= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks

In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record:

attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr->length);

The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (>), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:

b = *buf & 0xf; if (b) { if (unlikely(buf + b > attr_end)) // off-by-one goto io_error; for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--) deltaxcn = (deltaxcn << 8) + buf[b]; }

When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check.

Fix both checks to use >= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks

In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record:

attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr->length);

The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (>), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:

b = *buf & 0xf; if (b) { if (unlikely(buf + b > attr_end)) // off-by-one goto io_error; for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--) deltaxcn = (deltaxcn << 8) + buf[b]; }

When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check.

Fix both checks to use >= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks

In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record:

attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr->length);

The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (>), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:

b = *buf & 0xf; if (b) { if (unlikely(buf + b > attr_end)) // off-by-one goto io_error; for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--) deltaxcn = (deltaxcn << 8) + buf[b]; }

When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check.

Fix both checks to use >= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks

In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record:

attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr->length);

The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (>), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:

b = *buf & 0xf; if (b) { if (unlikely(buf + b > attr_end)) // off-by-one goto io_error; for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--) deltaxcn = (deltaxcn << 8) + buf[b]; }

When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check.

Fix both checks to use >= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record: attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr->length); The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (>), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end: b = *buf & 0xf; if (b) { if (unlikely(buf + b > attr_end)) // off-by-one goto io_error; for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--) deltaxcn = (deltaxcn << 8) + buf[b]; } When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check. Fix both checks to use >= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds.

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: esd_usb: kill anchored URBs before freeing netdevs

esd_usb_disconnect() frees each CAN netdev with free_candev() inside its per-netdev loop and only calls unlink_all_urbs(dev) afterwards. The per-netdev private data (struct esd_usb_net_priv) is embedded in the net_device allocation returned by alloc_candev(), so once free_candev() has run, dev->nets[i] points to freed memory. unlink_all_urbs() then dereferences the freed dev->nets[i] to kill the per-netdev TX anchor (usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->tx_submitted)), clear active_tx_jobs, and reset priv->tx_contexts[].

Reorder the teardown so the anchored URBs are killed before the netdevs are freed, matching other CAN/USB drivers in the same directory such as ems_usb, usb_8dev and mcba_usb, which unregister, then unlink, then free: unregister the netdevs first (which stops their TX queues), call unlink_all_urbs(dev) once, then free the netdevs.

This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.(CVE-2026-64585)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: avoid moving extents to occupied clusters

For non-auto OCFS2_IOC_MOVE_EXT operations, userspace supplies a physical me_goal. ocfs2_move_extent() initializes new_phys_cpos from that goal and expects ocfs2_probe_alloc_group() to replace it with a free run in the target block group.

The probe currently leaves *phys_cpos unchanged if the scan reaches the end of the group without finding a free run. An occupied goal at the last bit can therefore survive the probe and be passed to __ocfs2_move_extent(), which copies file data into a cluster still owned by another inode before the bitmap is updated.

When the probe does find a free run, it also subtracts move_len from the ending bit. The start of an N-bit run ending at i is i - N + 1, so the current calculation can report the bit immediately before the free run.

Clear *phys_cpos before scanning and use the correct free-run start. Callers already treat a zero result as -ENOSPC, so failed probes no longer continue with an occupied caller-controlled goal.(CVE-2026-72164)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks

In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record:

attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr->length);

The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (>), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:

b = *buf & 0xf; if (b) { if (unlikely(buf + b > attr_end)) // off-by-one goto io_error; for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--) deltaxcn = (deltaxcn << 8) + buf[b]; }

When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check.

Fix both checks to use >= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds.(CVE-2026-72210)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ASoC: codecs: hdac_hdmi: Validate written enum value

hdac_hdmi_set_pin_port_mux() uses the written enum value to index the texts array before calling snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double(), which validates that the value is within the enum item range.

An out-of-range value can therefore make the driver read past the texts array before the helper rejects the write. Move the lookup after the helper has accepted the value.(CVE-2026-74295)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/smc: fix qentry overwrite for CONFIRM_LINK and ADD_LINK_CONT in smc_llc_event_handler()

The SMC_LLC_CONFIRM_LINK / SMC_LLC_ADD_LINK_CONT branch in…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record: attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr->length); The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (>), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end: b = *buf & 0xf; if (b) { if (unlikely(buf + b > attr_end)) // off-by-one goto io_error; for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--) deltaxcn = (deltaxcn << 8) + buf[b]; } When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check. Fix both checks to use >= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds.