CVE-2026-73561
Hub: Unauthenticated WebSocket RPC Waiter Resource Exhaustion
Hub is a Node.js WebSocket server and client with added features. Prior to 0.2.16, every incoming unauthenticated WebSocket connection triggers loadDefaultConnectionEventListeners to call requestClientId, which calls rpc.send for the get-client-id action and pushes a request into RPC.requests. The RPC.waitForReply function starts a setInterval polling loop every 10 milliseconds that is cleared only after a matching reply; if the client remains silent and closes, the timer and pending request stay allocated because the socket close path does not cancel them. Repeated connections therefore cause unbounded timers and heap entries, exhausting CPU and memory and making the server unavailable. This issue is fixed in version 0.2.16.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
7.5
Hub: Unauthenticated WebSocket RPC Waiter Resource Exhaustion
Hub is a Node.js WebSocket server and client with added features. Prior to 0.2.16, every incoming unauthenticated WebSocket connection triggers loadDefaultConnectionEventListeners to call requestClientId, which calls rpc.send for the get-client-id action and pushes a request into RPC.requests. The RPC.waitForReply function starts a setInterval polling loop every 10 milliseconds that is cleared only after a matching reply; if the client remains silent and closes, the timer and pending request stay allocated because the socket close path does not cancel them. Repeated connections therefore cause unbounded timers and heap entries, exhausting CPU and memory and making the server unavailable. This issue is fixed in version 0.2.16.
- Record
CVE-2026-73561- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-400
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-58175
7.5
Hub is a Node.js WebSocket server and client with added features. Prior to 0.2.16, every incoming unauthenticated WebSocket connection triggers loadDefaultConnectionEventListeners to call requestClientId, which calls rpc.send for the get-client-id action and pushes a request into RPC.requests. The RPC.waitForReply function starts a setInterval polling loop every 10 milliseconds that is cleared only after a matching reply; if the client remains silent and closes, the timer and pending request stay allocated because the socket close path does not cancel them. Repeated connections therefore cause unbounded timers and heap entries, exhausting CPU and memory and making the server unavailable. This issue is fixed in version 0.2.16.
- Record
EUVD-2026-58175- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-g5vv-q72c-7j78
7.5
@anephenix/hub: Unauthenticated WebSocket RPC Waiter Resource Exhaustion
Summary
@anephenix/hub starts a setInterval polling loop for every incoming WebSocket connection to request a client ID via RPC. If the remote client never replies — which requires no authentication or special configuration — the interval and the pending request object are never cleaned up, even after the socket is closed. An unauthenticated attacker who opens many WebSocket connections and ignores all server RPC messages will therefore cause the server to accumulate unbounded timers and heap entries, leading to CPU and memory exhaustion (DoS).
Details
When a client connects, loadDefaultConnectionEventListeners (registered in src/lib/index.ts:128) adds a connection listener that calls requestClientId({ ws, rpc }) for every new WebSocket (src/lib/index.ts:262). requestClientId issues an RPC send for the get-client-id action (src/lib/clientId.ts:112), which internally calls rpc.send.
Inside rpc.send, the payload is pushed onto this.requests (src/lib/rpc.ts:282) and waitForReply is invoked. waitForReply starts a setInterval that polls responses[] every 10 ms for a matching reply (src/lib/rpc.ts:250):
// src/lib/rpc.ts:250–267
interval = setInterval(() => {
const response = responses.find(
(r) => r.id === id && r.action === action,
);
if (response) {
if (interval) clearInterval(interval);
// ... resolve and cleanup
this.cleanupRPCCall(response);
}
}, 10);
clearInterval is only called when a matching response arrives. There is no timeout path and no socket-close handler that clears either the interval or the this.requests entry. The close handler registered in loadDefaultConnectionEventListeners (src/lib/index.ts:128–134) only calls pubsub.unsubscribeClientFromAllChannels; it does not cancel pending RPC requests for that socket.
Data flow (source → sink):
src/lib/index.ts:269—wss.on("connection")accepts any remote WebSocket (no authentication).src/lib/index.ts:272— connection listeners are iterated and invoked.src/lib/index.ts:262—requestClientId({ ws, rpc: this.rpc })is called for every connection by default.src/lib/clientId.ts:112—rpc.send({ ws, action: 'get-client-id' })creates an RPC request.src/lib/rpc.ts:282—this.requests.push(payload)registers the pending request.src/lib/rpc.ts:250—setInterval(..., 10)begins infinite polling; cleanup only happens on a matching response. Socket close does not trigger cleanup.
PoC
Prerequisites: Docker must be available on the host.
Step 1 — Build the verification image:
docker build --no-cache \
-f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
-t hub-vuln-001:latest \
reports/npm_web_272_anephenix__hub
Step 2 — Run the container:
docker run --rm --network none hub-vuln-001:latest
The container runs verify.mjs, which:
- Starts a
Hubserver on a local port. - Opens a WebSocket and waits for the server's
get-client-idRPC message without replying. - Closes the socket and waits 300 ms.
- Inspects
hub.rpc.requests.length— it must remain1even thoughhub.wss.clients.sizeis0. - Opens five more sockets the same way (batch), then verifies that
pendingRpcRequestsequals6.
Step 3 — Alternatively, run the Python orchestrator directly:
python3 vuln-001/poc.py
Expected output (confirmed):
{
"snapshotAfterClose": {"clientState": 3, "serverClients": 0, "pendingRpcRequests": 1},
"snapshotAfterBatch": {"serverClients": 0, "pendingRpcRequests": 6, "expectedPendingRpcRequests": 6}
}
pendingRpcRequests grows linearly with the number of unanswered connections and never decreases, confirming the unbounded resource leak.
Minimal inline reproduction (without Docker, inside the repository after npm ci && npm run build):
node --input-type=module - <<'EOF'
import Hub from…
- Record
GHSA-g5vv-q72c-7j78- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-400
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
7.5
Hub is a Node.js WebSocket server and client with added features. Prior to 0.2.16, every incoming unauthenticated WebSocket connection triggers loadDefaultConnectionEventListeners to call requestClientId, which calls rpc.send for the get-client-id action and pushes a request into RPC.requests. The RPC.waitForReply function starts a setInterval polling loop every 10 milliseconds that is cleared only after a matching reply; if the client remains silent and closes, the timer and pending request stay allocated because the socket close path does not cancel them. Repeated connections therefore cause unbounded timers and heap entries, exhausting CPU and memory and making the server unavailable. This issue is fixed in version 0.2.16.
- Record
CVE-2026-73561- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-400
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
7.5
Hub: Unauthenticated WebSocket RPC Waiter Resource Exhaustion
Hub is a Node.js WebSocket server and client with added features. Prior to 0.2.16, every incoming unauthenticated WebSocket connection triggers loadDefaultConnectionEventListeners to call requestClientId, which calls rpc.send for the get-client-id action and pushes a request into RPC.requests. The RPC.waitForReply function starts a setInterval polling loop every 10 milliseconds that is cleared only after a matching reply; if the client remains silent and closes, the timer and pending request stay allocated because the socket close path does not cancel them. Repeated connections therefore cause unbounded timers and heap entries, exhausting CPU and memory and making the server unavailable. This issue is fixed in version 0.2.16.
- Record
CVE-2026-73561- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-400
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-g5vv-q72c-7j78
7.5
@anephenix/hub: Unauthenticated WebSocket RPC Waiter Resource Exhaustion
Summary
@anephenix/hub starts a setInterval polling loop for every incoming WebSocket connection to request a client ID via RPC. If the remote client never replies — which requires no authentication or special configuration — the interval and the pending request object are never cleaned up, even after the socket is closed. An unauthenticated attacker who opens many WebSocket connections and ignores all server RPC messages will therefore cause the server to accumulate unbounded timers and heap entries, leading to CPU and memory exhaustion (DoS).
Details
When a client connects, loadDefaultConnectionEventListeners (registered in src/lib/index.ts:128) adds a connection listener that calls requestClientId({ ws, rpc }) for every new WebSocket (src/lib/index.ts:262). requestClientId issues an RPC send for the get-client-id action (src/lib/clientId.ts:112), which internally calls rpc.send.
Inside rpc.send, the payload is pushed onto this.requests (src/lib/rpc.ts:282) and waitForReply is invoked. waitForReply starts a setInterval that polls responses[] every 10 ms for a matching reply (src/lib/rpc.ts:250):
// src/lib/rpc.ts:250–267
interval = setInterval(() => {
const response = responses.find(
(r) => r.id === id && r.action === action,
);
if (response) {
if (interval) clearInterval(interval);
// ... resolve and cleanup
this.cleanupRPCCall(response);
}
}, 10);
clearInterval is only called when a matching response arrives. There is no timeout path and no socket-close handler that clears either the interval or the this.requests entry. The close handler registered in loadDefaultConnectionEventListeners (src/lib/index.ts:128–134) only calls pubsub.unsubscribeClientFromAllChannels; it does not cancel pending RPC requests for that socket.
Data flow (source → sink):
src/lib/index.ts:269—wss.on("connection")accepts any remote WebSocket (no authentication).src/lib/index.ts:272— connection listeners are iterated and invoked.src/lib/index.ts:262—requestClientId({ ws, rpc: this.rpc })is called for every connection by default.src/lib/clientId.ts:112—rpc.send({ ws, action: 'get-client-id' })creates an RPC request.src/lib/rpc.ts:282—this.requests.push(payload)registers the pending request.src/lib/rpc.ts:250—setInterval(..., 10)begins infinite polling; cleanup only happens on a matching response. Socket close does not trigger cleanup.
PoC
Prerequisites: Docker must be available on the host.
Step 1 — Build the verification image:
docker build --no-cache \
-f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
-t hub-vuln-001:latest \
reports/npm_web_272_anephenix__hub
Step 2 — Run the container:
docker run --rm --network none hub-vuln-001:latest
The container runs verify.mjs, which:
- Starts a
Hubserver on a local port. - Opens a WebSocket and waits for the server's
get-client-idRPC message without replying. - Closes the socket and waits 300 ms.
- Inspects
hub.rpc.requests.length— it must remain1even thoughhub.wss.clients.sizeis0. - Opens five more sockets the same way (batch), then verifies that
pendingRpcRequestsequals6.
Step 3 — Alternatively, run the Python orchestrator directly:
python3 vuln-001/poc.py
Expected output (confirmed):
{
"snapshotAfterClose": {"clientState": 3, "serverClients": 0, "pendingRpcRequests": 1},
"snapshotAfterBatch": {"serverClients": 0, "pendingRpcRequests": 6, "expectedPendingRpcRequests": 6}
}
pendingRpcRequests grows linearly with the number of unanswered connections and never decreases, confirming the unbounded resource leak.
Minimal inline reproduction (without Docker, inside the repository after npm ci && npm run build):
node --input-type=module - <<'EOF'
import Hub from…
- Record
GHSA-g5vv-q72c-7j78- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-400
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
@anephenix/hubnpm |
before 0.2.16 | 0.2.16 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-73561 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) in Anephenix Hub, published July 24, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.61%, the 49th percentile. Fixed in @anephenix/hub 0.2.16.
References
github.com/anephenix/hub/security/advisories/GHSA-g5vv-q72c-7j78
github.com/anephenix/hub/commit/931576db3cdbf4f1583bd2c3c8759c4f4e032ab3
github.com/anephenix/hub/tree/v0.2.16
github.com/anephenix/hub/commit/67260d2a1407a77f082f02dc9e1f0891222c306d
github.com/advisories/GHSA-g5vv-q72c-7j78
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/73xxx/CVE-2026-73561.json
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73561
github.com/anephenix/hub
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.