CVE-2026-74904

SiYuan before v3.7.4 is missing authorization checks in 17 block metadata/content endpoints in kernel/api/block.go (including getRefText, checkBlockExist, and getBlockBreadcrumb). These handlers are gated only by basic authentication (model.CheckAuth) and lack publish-access filtering, allowing anonymous publish-mode readers to disclose private block content-derived text, structural metadata, and existence information for arbitrary block IDs across the workspace.

SiYuan before v3.7.4 is missing authorization checks in 17 block metadata/content endpoints in kernel/api/block.go (including getRefText, checkBlockExist, and getBlockBreadcrumb). These handlers are gated only by basic authentication (model.CheckAuth) and lack publish-access filtering, allowing anonymous publish-mode readers to disclose private block content-derived text, structural metadata, and existence information for arbitrary block IDs across the workspace.

Same CWE-862 family, found via an automated bulk sweep of every /api/block/* handler in kernel/api/block.go for the presence of any access-check reference (IsReadOnlyRoleContext, checkBlockPublishAccess, GetPublishAccess) anywhere in the function body. 17 of 28 candidate endpoints have none. Cross-checked against the file's own sibling functions (getBlockInfo, getBlockDOM, getRefIDs, etc.), which correctly implement the check, confirming this is a real, uneven gap rather than a deliberate design choice for the whole file.

Summary

17 handlers in kernel/api/block.go, all gated only by model.CheckAuth with no admin-role requirement, return block content-derived text, structural metadata, or existence information for any block ID supplied, with no access check anywhere in the handler or, for the ones checked in detail, the model functions they call. This is CWE-862 (Missing Authorization), the same class as the companion advisories from this review round, found in a different file via a systematic bulk check rather than manual inspection of each function individually.

Details

Confirmed via automated extraction of every function body between func NAME(c *gin.Context) { and the next such declaration, then searching each for any of IsReadOnlyRoleContext, checkBlockPublishAccess, GetPublishAccess, or PublishAccess. The following contain none of these, at all:

| Endpoint | What it discloses | |---|---| | getRefText | The block's actual reference-display text, derived from its content, for any ID (kernel/api/block.go:564) | | getBlockBreadcrumb | The block's breadcrumb/title path (:?) | | getBlockDefIDsByRefText | Which block IDs a given reference text resolves to | | getRefIDsByFileAnnotationID | Block IDs referencing a given PDF/file annotation | | getBlockIndex / getBlocksIndexes | A block's position/index within its document | | getTreeStat | Structural statistics for a document tree | | getBlocksWordCount / getContentWordCount | Word/character counts for arbitrary content | | checkBlockExist / checkBlocksExist | Existence oracle for any block ID | | getUnfoldedParentID | The nearest unfolded ancestor of a block | | checkBlockFold | Whether a block is currently folded | | getBlockSiblingID | A block's sibling in document order | | getBlockRelevantIDs | IDs of blocks related to a given block | | getBlockTreeInfos | Block tree metadata for a set of IDs | | checkBlockRef | Whether a block is referenced elsewhere |

The clearest, most severe example, getRefText (POST /api/block/getRefText, kernel/api/router.go:238):

func getRefText(c *gin.Context) {
    ...
    id := arg["id"].(string)
    if util.InvalidIDPattern(id, ret) {
        return
    }
    var refText string
    if notebook, ok := arg["notebook"].(string); ok && notebook != "" && model.IsEncryptedBox(notebook) {
        refText = model.GetBlockRefTextInBox(id, notebook)
    } else {
        refText = model.GetBlockRefText(id)
    }
    ...
    ret.Data = refText
}

model.GetBlockRefText(id) resolves the actual display text used wherever this block is referenced, ordinarily derived from the block's real content, for any id in the workspace, with no scoping.

For contrast, sibling functions in the same file correctly implement the check, e.g. getRefIDs (kernel/api/router.go:235) and getBlockInfo/getBlockDOM/getBlockKramdown all contain if model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) { ... } guards. This confirms the 17 above are an inconsistency within the file, not an intentional decision that the whole file is exempt from this control.

Step-by-step reproduction

# id: a block inside a document that was never published, or is
# Disable=true in publish access
curl -s -X POST http://<target>:6806/api/block/getRefText \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"id":"<private-block-id>"}'
# Returns the block's actual reference text with no session, no
# AccessAuthCode, no…

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-4vpg-gwqq-w44c. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

SiYuan before v3.7.4 is missing authorization checks in 17 block metadata/content endpoints in kernel/api/block.go (including getRefText, checkBlockExist, and getBlockBreadcrumb). These handlers are gated only by basic authentication (model.CheckAuth) and lack publish-access filtering, allowing anonymous publish-mode readers to disclose private block content-derived text, structural metadata, and existence information for arbitrary block IDs across the workspace.

SiYuan before v3.7.4 is missing authorization checks in 17 block metadata/content endpoints in kernel/api/block.go (including getRefText, checkBlockExist, and getBlockBreadcrumb). These handlers are gated only by basic authentication (model.CheckAuth) and lack publish-access filtering, allowing anonymous publish-mode readers to disclose private block content-derived text, structural metadata, and existence information for arbitrary block IDs across the workspace.

Same CWE-862 family, found via an automated bulk sweep of every /api/block/* handler in kernel/api/block.go for the presence of any access-check reference (IsReadOnlyRoleContext, checkBlockPublishAccess, GetPublishAccess) anywhere in the function body. 17 of 28 candidate endpoints have none. Cross-checked against the file's own sibling functions (getBlockInfo, getBlockDOM, getRefIDs, etc.), which correctly implement the check, confirming this is a real, uneven gap rather than a deliberate design choice for the whole file.

Summary

17 handlers in kernel/api/block.go, all gated only by model.CheckAuth with no admin-role requirement, return block content-derived text, structural metadata, or existence information for any block ID supplied, with no access check anywhere in the handler or, for the ones checked in detail, the model functions they call. This is CWE-862 (Missing Authorization), the same class as the companion advisories from this review round, found in a different file via a systematic bulk check rather than manual inspection of each function individually.

Details

Confirmed via automated extraction of every function body between func NAME(c *gin.Context) { and the next such declaration, then searching each for any of IsReadOnlyRoleContext, checkBlockPublishAccess, GetPublishAccess, or PublishAccess. The following contain none of these, at all:

| Endpoint | What it discloses | |---|---| | getRefText | The block's actual reference-display text, derived from its content, for any ID (kernel/api/block.go:564) | | getBlockBreadcrumb | The block's breadcrumb/title path (:?) | | getBlockDefIDsByRefText | Which block IDs a given reference text resolves to | | getRefIDsByFileAnnotationID | Block IDs referencing a given PDF/file annotation | | getBlockIndex / getBlocksIndexes | A block's position/index within its document | | getTreeStat | Structural statistics for a document tree | | getBlocksWordCount / getContentWordCount | Word/character counts for arbitrary content | | checkBlockExist / checkBlocksExist | Existence oracle for any block ID | | getUnfoldedParentID | The nearest unfolded ancestor of a block | | checkBlockFold | Whether a block is currently folded | | getBlockSiblingID | A block's sibling in document order | | getBlockRelevantIDs | IDs of blocks related to a given block | | getBlockTreeInfos | Block tree metadata for a set of IDs | | checkBlockRef | Whether a block is referenced elsewhere |

The clearest, most severe example, getRefText (POST /api/block/getRefText, kernel/api/router.go:238):

func getRefText(c *gin.Context) {
    ...
    id := arg["id"].(string)
    if util.InvalidIDPattern(id, ret) {
        return
    }
    var refText string
    if notebook, ok := arg["notebook"].(string); ok && notebook != "" && model.IsEncryptedBox(notebook) {
        refText = model.GetBlockRefTextInBox(id, notebook)
    } else {
        refText = model.GetBlockRefText(id)
    }
    ...
    ret.Data = refText
}

model.GetBlockRefText(id) resolves the actual display text used wherever this block is referenced, ordinarily derived from the block's real content, for any id in the workspace, with no scoping.

For contrast, sibling functions in the same file correctly implement the check, e.g. getRefIDs (kernel/api/router.go:235) and getBlockInfo/getBlockDOM/getBlockKramdown all contain if model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) { ... } guards. This confirms the 17 above are an inconsistency within the file, not an intentional decision that the whole file is exempt from this control.

Step-by-step reproduction

# id: a block inside a document that was never published, or is
# Disable=true in publish access
curl -s -X POST http://<target>:6806/api/block/getRefText \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"id":"<private-block-id>"}'
# Returns the block's actual reference text with no session, no
# AccessAuthCode, no…

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-4vpg-gwqq-w44c. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

SiYuan before v3.7.4 is missing authorization checks in 17 block metadata/content endpoints in kernel/api/block.go (including getRefText, checkBlockExist, and getBlockBreadcrumb). These handlers are gated only by basic authentication (model.CheckAuth) and lack publish-access filtering, allowing anonymous publish-mode readers to disclose private block content-derived text, structural metadata, and existence information for arbitrary block IDs across the workspace.

SiYuan: 17 block metadata/content endpoints in kernel/api/block.go have zero publish-access filtering, reachable by anonymous publish-mode readers in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel