CVE-2026-75508
GraphQL-core: Denial of service via comment tokens bypassing the parser's max_tokens limit
GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser's max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
7.5
GraphQL-core: Denial of service via comment tokens bypassing the parser's max_tokens limit
GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser's max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.
- Record
CVE-2026-75508- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-400, CWE-770
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-108225
7.5
GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser's max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.
- Record
EUVD-2026-108225- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-r77w-qph3-7vf8
7.5
GraphQL-core: Denial of service via comment tokens bypassing the parser's max_tokens limit
Summary
The parser's max_tokens limit — the documented defence against oversized GraphQL
documents — did not count comment tokens. A document padded with comments could
therefore pass a max_tokens check of any size while still allocating one Token
object per comment, all of which stay reachable for the lifetime of the parsed
document. A 38 MB comment-padded payload allocated roughly 92 MB of additional
resident memory with max_tokens=5 in force.
Details
Lexer.lookahead() reads tokens one at a time and skips over comments, returning only
the first non-comment token. Each skipped comment is nevertheless fully tokenized,
allocated as a Token object, and linked into the persistent token list via
token.next / token.prev — the chain that powers source-location reporting, and
which is retained as long as the document is.
Parser.advance_lexer() incremented the token counter only for the tokens the lexer
actually returned. Comments were therefore invisible to the accounting, and
max_tokens bounded only the non-comment tokens.
The practical consequence is a gap between what users reasonably believe max_tokens
protects and what it did protect. The limit was not broken for ordinary documents —
real tokens were still capped correctly — so the shortfall was not observable without
specifically testing comment padding.
As with the companion issue, the payload compresses extremely well (# c\n repeated),
so body-size limits and WAF inspection applied to the compressed request do not see
its true size, while the framework decompresses it in memory before the parser is
reached.
Proof of concept
import gc
import resource
from graphql import parse
# 100,000 comments, a 5-token query, and max_tokens=5 — accepted.
query = "# c\n" * 100_000 + "{ a }"
parse(query, max_tokens=5) # no error raised
# Memory amplification.
big = "# padding comment used to amplify memory per token\n" * 500_000 + "{ a }"
gc.collect()
before = resource.getrusage(resource.RUSAGE_SELF).ru_maxrss
parse(big, max_tokens=5) # ~38 MB source
after = resource.getrusage(resource.RUSAGE_SELF).ru_maxrss
print(f"RSS delta: +{(after - before) / 1024:.0f} MB")
Measured on GraphQL-core 3.2.8 / CPython 3.12 / Linux x86_64: the 391 KB payload parsed in 127 ms, and the 38.1 MB payload produced an RSS delta of +92 MB — about 2.4× the source size, on top of the source string itself.
Impact
Denial of service through memory exhaustion. A modest number of concurrent requests can push a worker past a typical 256 MB or 512 MB container limit and trigger an OOM kill. No authentication is required, and no data is disclosed or modified.
Depth limiters and complexity analyzers do not help: they run on the AST after parsing has already succeeded, and the document contains only five real tokens.
Patches
Fixed in 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.
Parser.advance_lexer now counts every token consumed, including the comment tokens
the lexer skips between the previously focused token and the new one, and including
the advance onto EOF so that trailing comments are covered. max_tokens therefore now
bounds every Token the parser allocates.
Note the behaviour change: comments now count toward max_tokens. A
comment-heavy document that was previously accepted may now be rejected. If you parse
documents containing substantial comments — SDL files with documentation comments, for
instance — and you set max_tokens, you may need to raise the limit. The
token_count attribute of a parsed document likewise now includes comments.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, apply a request body-size limit to the decompressed body
before the document reaches parse().
Such a limit is worth keeping after upgrading as well: max_tokens is one guard among
several and bounds the token count, not the overall cost of a request.
References
- GraphQL specification § 2.1.4 — Comments
###…
- Record
GHSA-r77w-qph3-7vf8- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-400, CWE-770
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
7.5
GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser's max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.
- Record
CVE-2026-75508- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-400, CWE-770
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
7.5
GraphQL-core: Denial of service via comment tokens bypassing the parser's max_tokens limit
GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser's max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.
- Record
CVE-2026-75508- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-400, CWE-770
- Updated
- 2026-11-07
OSVDEBIAN-CVE-2026-75508
7.5
GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser's max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.
- Record
DEBIAN-CVE-2026-75508- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
Show 4 moreShow less
OSVGHSA-r77w-qph3-7vf8
7.5
GraphQL-core: Denial of service via comment tokens bypassing the parser's max_tokens limit
Summary
The parser's max_tokens limit — the documented defence against oversized GraphQL
documents — did not count comment tokens. A document padded with comments could
therefore pass a max_tokens check of any size while still allocating one Token
object per comment, all of which stay reachable for the lifetime of the parsed
document. A 38 MB comment-padded payload allocated roughly 92 MB of additional
resident memory with max_tokens=5 in force.
Details
Lexer.lookahead() reads tokens one at a time and skips over comments, returning only
the first non-comment token. Each skipped comment is nevertheless fully tokenized,
allocated as a Token object, and linked into the persistent token list via
token.next / token.prev — the chain that powers source-location reporting, and
which is retained as long as the document is.
Parser.advance_lexer() incremented the token counter only for the tokens the lexer
actually returned. Comments were therefore invisible to the accounting, and
max_tokens bounded only the non-comment tokens.
The practical consequence is a gap between what users reasonably believe max_tokens
protects and what it did protect. The limit was not broken for ordinary documents —
real tokens were still capped correctly — so the shortfall was not observable without
specifically testing comment padding.
As with the companion issue, the payload compresses extremely well (# c\n repeated),
so body-size limits and WAF inspection applied to the compressed request do not see
its true size, while the framework decompresses it in memory before the parser is
reached.
Proof of concept
import gc
import resource
from graphql import parse
# 100,000 comments, a 5-token query, and max_tokens=5 — accepted.
query = "# c\n" * 100_000 + "{ a }"
parse(query, max_tokens=5) # no error raised
# Memory amplification.
big = "# padding comment used to amplify memory per token\n" * 500_000 + "{ a }"
gc.collect()
before = resource.getrusage(resource.RUSAGE_SELF).ru_maxrss
parse(big, max_tokens=5) # ~38 MB source
after = resource.getrusage(resource.RUSAGE_SELF).ru_maxrss
print(f"RSS delta: +{(after - before) / 1024:.0f} MB")
Measured on GraphQL-core 3.2.8 / CPython 3.12 / Linux x86_64: the 391 KB payload parsed in 127 ms, and the 38.1 MB payload produced an RSS delta of +92 MB — about 2.4× the source size, on top of the source string itself.
Impact
Denial of service through memory exhaustion. A modest number of concurrent requests can push a worker past a typical 256 MB or 512 MB container limit and trigger an OOM kill. No authentication is required, and no data is disclosed or modified.
Depth limiters and complexity analyzers do not help: they run on the AST after parsing has already succeeded, and the document contains only five real tokens.
Patches
Fixed in 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.
Parser.advance_lexer now counts every token consumed, including the comment tokens
the lexer skips between the previously focused token and the new one, and including
the advance onto EOF so that trailing comments are covered. max_tokens therefore now
bounds every Token the parser allocates.
Note the behaviour change: comments now count toward max_tokens. A
comment-heavy document that was previously accepted may now be rejected. If you parse
documents containing substantial comments — SDL files with documentation comments, for
instance — and you set max_tokens, you may need to raise the limit. The
token_count attribute of a parsed document likewise now includes comments.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, apply a request body-size limit to the decompressed body
before the document reaches parse().
Such a limit is worth keeping after upgrading as well: max_tokens is one guard among
several and bounds the token count, not the overall cost of a request.
References
- GraphQL specification § 2.1.4 — Comments
###…
- Record
GHSA-r77w-qph3-7vf8- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-400, CWE-770
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2026-75508
7.5
GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.2.3 until 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1, the parser's max_tokens limit in Parser.advance_lexer counts only non-comment tokens returned after Lexer.lookahead skips comments. Each skipped comment is still allocated as a Token and retained through token.next and token.prev, allowing a highly compressible comment-padded GraphQL document to pass a low token limit while consuming memory. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust worker memory before AST-based depth or complexity controls run. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.
- Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2026-75508- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:12474-1 No score
python313-graphql-core-3.3.1-1.1 on GA media
These are all security issues fixed in the python313-graphql-core-3.3.1-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.
- Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:12474-1- Updated
- 2026-11-07
OSVROOT-APP-PYPI-CVE-2026-75508 No score
CVE-2026-75508 in graphql-core - Patched by Root
Root has patched CVE-2026-75508 in the graphql-core package for Root:PyPI. Multiple fixed versions available.
- Record
ROOT-APP-PYPI-CVE-2026-75508- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
graphql-corePyPI |
3.2.3 up to 3.2.12 | 3.2.12 |
graphql-corePyPI |
3.3.0a3 up to 3.3.0rc1 | 3.3.0rc1 |
graphql-coreDebian:12 |
All versions, plus listed versions 2.3.2-13.1.7-13.2.0-13.2.1-13.2.11-1 Show 9 moreShow less3.2.12-13.2.3-13.2.3-23.2.4-13.2.5-13.2.6-13.2.6-23.2.7-13.2.8-1 |
None known |
graphql-coreDebian:13 |
All versions, plus listed versions 3.2.11-13.2.12-13.2.6-13.2.6-23.2.7-13.2.8-1 |
None known |
graphql-coreDebian:14 |
before 3.2.12-1, plus listed versions 3.2.11-13.2.6-13.2.6-23.2.7-13.2.8-1 |
3.2.12-1 |
graphql-corePyPI |
3.2.3 up to 3.2.12, plus listed versions 3.2.103.2.113.2.43.2.53.2.63.2.73.2.83.2.9 |
3.2.12 |
graphql-corePyPI |
3.3.0a3 up to 3.3.0rc1, plus listed versions 3.3.0a103.3.0a113.3.0a123.3.0a133.3.0a14 Show 10 moreShow less3.3.0a43.3.0a53.3.0a63.3.0a73.3.0a83.3.0a93.3.0b03.3.0b13.3.0b23.3.0rc0 |
3.3.0rc1 |
graphql-coreRoot:PyPI |
before 3.2.11+aikido.1 | 3.2.11+aikido.13.2.6+aikido.1 |
graphql-coreUbuntu:22.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 2.3.2-1 |
None known |
graphql-coreUbuntu:24.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 3.2.3-2 |
None known |
graphql-coreUbuntu:26.10 |
All versions, plus listed versions 3.2.7-13.2.8-13.2.11-1 |
None known |
graphql-coreUbuntu:26.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 3.2.6-13.2.6-23.2.7-1 |
None known |
python-graphql-coreopenSUSE:Tumbleweed From an advisory covering 3 CVEs |
before 3.3.1-1.1 | 3.3.1-1.1 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| affected, aliases, references | ||
| facts | OSV | |
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-75508 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) in Graphql-python Graphql-core, published October 22, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.57%, the 47th percentile. Fixed in graphql-core 3.2.12.
References
github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core/security/advisories/GHSA-r77w-qph3-7vf8
github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core/commit/437dea102e92fdf05a2971ca76787c5a5bad875a
github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core/commit/80ef435a1808fbbcc4aaac63ae76771a1c91002d
github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core/releases/tag/v3.2.12
github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core/releases/tag/v3.3.0rc1
github.com/advisories/GHSA-r77w-qph3-7vf8
Show 9 moreShow less
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/75xxx/CVE-2026-75508.json
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75508
security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-75508
github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core
ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-75508
cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-75508
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-119286
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-75507
suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-75508
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.