CVE-2026-77611
SeaweedFS: Authenticated S3 object-scope bypass in PutObjectAcl allows overwriting a different object with the same basename
SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In versions prior to 4.40, an authenticated S3 principal with permissions scoped to a nested object key can overwrite a different object outside that scope by calling PutObjectAcl on the key it is allowed to access. The handler authorizes the request against the requested nested key but then writes the updated entry back to the bucket root rather than the key's actual parent directory, so an ACL change on allowed/protected.txt is instead applied to protected.txt at the bucket root. Because the update carries the full entry rather than only ACL metadata, an existing target object is overwritten with the content, metadata, owner information, and ACL of the scoped object, bypassing the object-level action scoping configured through the static S3 identity file. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- Low
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
7.1
SeaweedFS: Authenticated S3 object-scope bypass in PutObjectAcl allows overwriting a different object with the same basename
SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In versions prior to 4.40, an authenticated S3 principal with permissions scoped to a nested object key can overwrite a different object outside that scope by calling PutObjectAcl on the key it is allowed to access. The handler authorizes the request against the requested nested key but then writes the updated entry back to the bucket root rather than the key's actual parent directory, so an ACL change on allowed/protected.txt is instead applied to protected.txt at the bucket root. Because the update carries the full entry rather than only ACL metadata, an existing target object is overwritten with the content, metadata, owner information, and ACL of the scoped object, bypassing the object-level action scoping configured through the static S3 identity file. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.
- Record
CVE-2026-77611- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-66770
7.1
SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In versions prior to 4.40, an authenticated S3 principal with permissions scoped to a nested object key can overwrite a different object outside that scope by calling PutObjectAcl on the key it is allowed to access. The handler authorizes the request against the requested nested key but then writes the updated entry back to the bucket root rather than the key's actual parent directory, so an ACL change on allowed/protected.txt is instead applied to protected.txt at the bucket root. Because the update carries the full entry rather than only ACL metadata, an existing target object is overwritten with the content, metadata, owner information, and ACL of the scoped object, bypassing the object-level action scoping configured through the static S3 identity file. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.
- Record
EUVD-2026-66770- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
7.1
SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In versions prior to 4.40, an authenticated S3 principal with permissions scoped to a nested object key can overwrite a different object outside that scope by calling PutObjectAcl on the key it is allowed to access. The handler authorizes the request against the requested nested key but then writes the updated entry back to the bucket root rather than the key's actual parent directory, so an ACL change on allowed/protected.txt is instead applied to protected.txt at the bucket root. Because the update carries the full entry rather than only ACL metadata, an existing target object is overwritten with the content, metadata, owner information, and ACL of the scoped object, bypassing the object-level action scoping configured through the static S3 identity file. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.
- Record
CVE-2026-77611- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
7.1
SeaweedFS: Authenticated S3 object-scope bypass in PutObjectAcl allows overwriting a different object with the same basename
SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In versions prior to 4.40, an authenticated S3 principal with permissions scoped to a nested object key can overwrite a different object outside that scope by calling PutObjectAcl on the key it is allowed to access. The handler authorizes the request against the requested nested key but then writes the updated entry back to the bucket root rather than the key's actual parent directory, so an ACL change on allowed/protected.txt is instead applied to protected.txt at the bucket root. Because the update carries the full entry rather than only ACL metadata, an existing target object is overwritten with the content, metadata, owner information, and ACL of the scoped object, bypassing the object-level action scoping configured through the static S3 identity file. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.
- Record
CVE-2026-77611- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVBIT-seaweedfs-2026-77611 No score
SeaweedFS: Authenticated S3 object-scope bypass in PutObjectAcl allows overwriting a different object with the same basename
SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In versions prior to 4.40, an authenticated S3 principal with permissions scoped to a nested object key can overwrite a different object outside that scope by calling PutObjectAcl on the key it is allowed to access. The handler authorizes the request against the requested nested key but then writes the updated entry back to the bucket root rather than the key's actual parent directory, so an ACL change on allowed/protected.txt is instead applied to protected.txt at the bucket root. Because the update carries the full entry rather than only ACL metadata, an existing target object is overwritten with the content, metadata, owner information, and ACL of the scoped object, bypassing the object-level action scoping configured through the static S3 identity file. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.
- Record
BIT-seaweedfs-2026-77611- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
seaweedfsBitnami |
before 4.40.0 | 4.40.0 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-77611 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.1) in Seaweedfs, published August 26, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.38%, the 32nd percentile. Fixed in seaweedfs 4.40.0.