CVE-2026-77775
Headroom Proxy Sends Upstream Requests to a Client-Supplied Base URL Without Address Validation
Headroom's LLM proxy lets a client choose the upstream destination with the x-headroom-base-url request header. _resolve_openai_upstream_base in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py accepts the header value, requires only that it parse with an http or https scheme and a hostname, and returns it for use as the upstream base; _select_passthrough_base_url in headroom/providers/proxy_routes.py reads the same header for the passthrough routes. No check rejects loopback, link-local, or RFC 1918 destinations, and because the component is a proxy the upstream response is returned to the caller, so the request reaches internal services and cloud metadata addresses and their responses are disclosed. The Authorization header accompanying the request is forwarded unchanged to the caller-designated host. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
7.7
Headroom Proxy Sends Upstream Requests to a Client-Supplied Base URL Without Address Validation
Headroom's LLM proxy lets a client choose the upstream destination with the x-headroom-base-url request header. _resolve_openai_upstream_base in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py accepts the header value, requires only that it parse with an http or https scheme and a hostname, and returns it for use as the upstream base; _select_passthrough_base_url in headroom/providers/proxy_routes.py reads the same header for the passthrough routes. No check rejects loopback, link-local, or RFC 1918 destinations, and because the component is a proxy the upstream response is returned to the caller, so the request reaches internal services and cloud metadata addresses and their responses are disclosed. The Authorization header accompanying the request is forwarded unchanged to the caller-designated host. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
- Record
CVE-2026-77775- CVSS 4.0
- 7.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N - CVSS 3.1
- 8.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-08
EUVDEUVD-2026-63904
7.7
Headroom's LLM proxy lets a client choose the upstream destination with the x-headroom-base-url request header. _resolve_openai_upstream_base in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py accepts the header value, requires only that it parse with an http or https scheme and a hostname, and returns it for use as the upstream base; _select_passthrough_base_url in headroom/providers/proxy_routes.py reads the same header for the passthrough routes. No check rejects loopback, link-local, or RFC 1918 destinations, and because the component is a proxy the upstream response is returned to the caller, so the request reaches internal services and cloud metadata addresses and their responses are disclosed. The Authorization header accompanying the request is forwarded unchanged to the caller-designated host. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
- Record
EUVD-2026-63904- CVSS 4.0
- 7.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N - Updated
- 2026-11-08
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-4j5r-9p93-j2px
7.7
Headroom's LLM proxy lets a client choose the upstream destination with the x-headroom-base-url...
Headroom's LLM proxy lets a client choose the upstream destination with the x-headroom-base-url request header. _resolve_openai_upstream_base in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py accepts the header value, requires only that it parse with an http or https scheme and a hostname, and returns it for use as the upstream base; _select_passthrough_base_url in headroom/providers/proxy_routes.py reads the same header for the passthrough routes. No check rejects loopback, link-local, or RFC 1918 destinations, and because the component is a proxy the upstream response is returned to the caller, so the request reaches internal services and cloud metadata addresses and their responses are disclosed. The Authorization header accompanying the request is forwarded unchanged to the caller-designated host. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
- Record
GHSA-4j5r-9p93-j2px- CVSS 4.0
- 7.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - CVSS 3.1
- 8.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
7.7
Headroom's LLM proxy lets a client choose the upstream destination with the x-headroom-base-url request header. _resolve_openai_upstream_base in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py accepts the header value, requires only that it parse with an http or https scheme and a hostname, and returns it for use as the upstream base; _select_passthrough_base_url in headroom/providers/proxy_routes.py reads the same header for the passthrough routes. No check rejects loopback, link-local, or RFC 1918 destinations, and because the component is a proxy the upstream response is returned to the caller, so the request reaches internal services and cloud metadata addresses and their responses are disclosed. The Authorization header accompanying the request is forwarded unchanged to the caller-designated host. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
- Record
CVE-2026-77775- CVSS 4.0
- 7.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - CVSS 3.1
- 8.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
7.7
Headroom Proxy Sends Upstream Requests to a Client-Supplied Base URL Without Address Validation
Headroom's LLM proxy lets a client choose the upstream destination with the x-headroom-base-url request header. _resolve_openai_upstream_base in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py accepts the header value, requires only that it parse with an http or https scheme and a hostname, and returns it for use as the upstream base; _select_passthrough_base_url in headroom/providers/proxy_routes.py reads the same header for the passthrough routes. No check rejects loopback, link-local, or RFC 1918 destinations, and because the component is a proxy the upstream response is returned to the caller, so the request reaches internal services and cloud metadata addresses and their responses are disclosed. The Authorization header accompanying the request is forwarded unchanged to the caller-designated host. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
- Record
CVE-2026-77775- CVSS 4.0
- 7.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-918
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| references | CVE List | |
| facts | EUVD | |
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-77775 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.7) in Headroom Labs Headroom, published August 21, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.59%, the 48th percentile. No source names a fixed version.
References
github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/pull/2207
github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.29.0/headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py
github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.36.1/headroom/proxy/upstream_guard.py
github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom
vulncheck.com/advisories/headroom-proxy-sends-upstream-requests-to-a-client-supplied-base-url-without-address-validation
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77775
github.com/advisories/GHSA-4j5r-9p93-j2px
pypi.org
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/77xxx/CVE-2026-77775.json