CVE-2026-80212

An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency.

An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency.

Ruby is a fast and easy interpreted scripting language for object-oriented programming. It has many functions for processing text Files and perform system management tasks (such as Perl).

Security Fix(es):

Net::IMAP implements Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) client functionality in Ruby. Prior to 0.6.5 and 0.5.15, several Net::IMAP commands accept a "raw data" argument that is sent verbatim after validation to prevent command injection. However, if a server does not support non-synchronizing literals, it may still be possible to inject arbitrary IMAP commands inside non-synchronizing literals. A server without support for non-synchronizing literals may interpret the "+}\r\n" as the end of a malformed command line and respond with a tagged BAD. In that case, the contents of the literal will be interpreted as one or more new pipelined commands, allowing a CRLF command injection attack to succeed. This affects criteria for #search and #uid_search; search_keys for #sort, #thread, #uid_sort, and #uid_thread; and attr for #fetch and #uid_fetch. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.5 and 0.5.15.(CVE-2026-47240)

Net::IMAP implements Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) client functionality in Ruby. Prior to 0.6.5 and 0.5.15, several Net::IMAP commands accept a raw string argument which is only validated to prevent CRLF injection and then sent verbatim. If this string is derived from user-controlled input, an attacker can force the next command to be absorbed as a continuation of the first command. This will cause the first command to eventually fail, but also prevents it from returning until another command is sent (from another thread). That other command will not return until the connection is closed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.5 and 0.5.15.(CVE-2026-47241)

Net::IMAP implements Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) client functionality in Ruby. Prior to 0.6.5 and 0.5.15, when Net::IMAP#id is called with a hash argument, although the ID field value strings are correctly quoted (escaping quoted specials), they were not validated to prohibit CRLF sequences. While Net::IMAP#enable does process its arguments for aliases, it does not validate them as valid atoms (or as a list of valid atoms). The #to_s value is sent verbatim. Arguments to either command could be used by an attacker to inject arbitrary IMAP commands. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.5 and 0.5.15.(CVE-2026-47242)

An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency.(CVE-2026-80212)

Ruby is a fast and easy interpreted scripting language for object-oriented programming. It has many functions for processing text Files and perform system management tasks (such as Perl).

Security Fix(es):

An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency.(CVE-2026-80212)

Ruby is a fast and easy interpreted scripting language for object-oriented programming. It has many functions for processing text Files and perform system management tasks (such as Perl).

Security Fix(es):

An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency.(CVE-2026-80212)

Ruby is a fast and easy interpreted scripting language for object-oriented programming. It has many functions for processing text Files and perform system management tasks (such as Perl).

Security Fix(es):

Net::IMAP implements Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) client functionality in Ruby. Prior to 0.6.5 and 0.5.15, several Net::IMAP commands accept a "raw data" argument that is sent verbatim after validation to prevent command injection. However, if a server does not support non-synchronizing literals, it may still be possible to inject arbitrary IMAP commands inside non-synchronizing literals. A server without support for non-synchronizing literals may interpret the "+}\r\n" as the end of a malformed command line and respond with a tagged BAD. In that case, the contents of the literal will be interpreted as one or more new pipelined commands, allowing a CRLF command injection attack to succeed. This affects criteria for #search and #uid_search; search_keys for #sort, #thread, #uid_sort, and #uid_thread; and attr for #fetch and #uid_fetch. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.5 and 0.5.15.(CVE-2026-47240)

Net::IMAP implements Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) client functionality in Ruby. Prior to 0.6.5 and 0.5.15, several Net::IMAP commands accept a raw string argument which is only validated to prevent CRLF injection and then sent verbatim. If this string is derived from user-controlled input, an attacker can force the next command to be absorbed as a continuation of the first command. This will cause the first command to eventually fail, but also prevents it from returning until another command is sent (from another thread). That other command will not return until the connection is closed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.5 and 0.5.15.(CVE-2026-47241)

Net::IMAP implements Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) client functionality in Ruby. Prior to 0.6.5 and 0.5.15, when Net::IMAP#id is called with a hash argument, although the ID field value strings are correctly quoted (escaping quoted specials), they were not validated to prohibit CRLF sequences. While Net::IMAP#enable does process its arguments for aliases, it does not validate them as valid atoms (or as a list of valid atoms). The #to_s value is sent verbatim. Arguments to either command could be used by an attacker to inject arbitrary IMAP commands. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.5 and 0.5.15.(CVE-2026-47242)

An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency.(CVE-2026-80212)

Ruby is a fast and easy interpreted scripting language for object-oriented programming. It has many functions for processing text Files and perform system management tasks (such as Perl).

Security Fix(es):

An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency.(CVE-2026-80212)

An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::MessageEncoder wrote a DNS label's length into a single octet without checking its range. A label longer than 255 octets had its length stored modulo 256 but the label data was written unchanged, and thus the bytes on the wire described a different name than the one the application asked to encode. RFC 1035 section 2.3.4 limits a label to 63 octets, and the two high bits of the length octet are reserved for compression pointers. put_string packed the length with put_pack("C", d.length) and put_label used it for labels, and thus any value from 0 to 255 could end up as a label length octet, including the reserved 0x40-0xBF range and the 0xC0-0xFF pointer range. Resolv::DNS::Name.create did not check per-label or total name length either, and thus an attacker-controlled hostname reached the encoder unchanged. An application that resolves an attacker-controlled hostname sends a query whose wire bytes name a domain the attacker chose. A hostname suffix that the application validates against an allowlist becomes padding that never appears on the wire, and thus allowlist and egress checks can be bypassed. The recursive resolver caches the response under the attacker's name, and DNS logs record that name rather than the one the application asked for. A label length whose low octet lands in the 0xC0-0xFF range produces a length octet that conforming parsers read as the start of a compression pointer, with the following attacker-controlled byte as the offset.(CVE-2026-80213)

RubyGems fails to re-validate path containment after filesystem symlink resolution during gem extraction. When a pre-existing symlink inside the destination directory points outside the extraction root, extracted files that appear to be written under the destination directory can instead be written outside of it, breaking the extraction safety boundary. The fix resolves the real path of the parent directory before writing and raises Gem::Package::PathError if it escapes the destination directory.(CVE-2026-82455)

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s):

• ruby %check fails in Konflux: Rinda multicast tests need network device [rhel-9.8.z] (JIRA:Rocky Linux-255606)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is the interpreted scripting language for quick and easy object-oriented programming. It has many features to process text files and to do system management tasks (as in Perl). It is simple, straight-forward, and extensible.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

• rubygem-mongo: MongoDB Ruby Driver: Data disclosure and denial of service via query-operator injection (CVE-2026-88030)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s):

• ruby %check fails in Konflux: Rinda multicast tests need network device [almalinux-9.8.z] (JIRA:AlmaLinux-255606)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is the interpreted scripting language for quick and easy object-oriented programming. It has many features to process text files and to do system management tasks (as in Perl). It is simple, straight-forward, and extensible.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Ruby is an extensible, interpreted, object-oriented, scripting language. It has features to process text files and to perform system management tasks.

Security Fix(es):

• resolv: resolv gem: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory growth from crafted DNS responses (CVE-2026-80212)
• rubygem-mongo: MongoDB Ruby Driver: Data disclosure and denial of service via query-operator injection (CVE-2026-88030)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency.

• CVE-2026-80212: fix unbounded class registration for unknown DNS types

• CVE-2026-80212: fix unbounded memory growth in the DNS resolver by no longer permanently registering an on-demand class for each unknown (type, class) pair as a Generic constant and a ClassHash entry, and by comparing generic resources and questions by their type and class values rather than by class identity
• CVE-2026-80213: enforce the RFC 1035 DNS label and name size limits when encoding by making the 63-octet label limit an invariant of Label::Str, guarding put_string and put_label, counting the encoded form in get_labels, and raising ResolvError for an oversized name in Name.create

• CVE-2026-80212: resolv: stop Resource::Generic.create from permanently registering a generated class for each unknown (type, class) pair as a Generic constant and a ClassHash entry, and compare generic resources and questions by their TypeValue/ClassValue instead of by class identity
• CVE-2026-80213: resolv: enforce the RFC 1035 label and name size limits when encoding by making the 63-octet label limit an invariant of Label::Str, bounding put_string and put_label, counting the encoded form in get_labels, and raising ResolvError for an oversized name in Name.create