CVE-2026-81728

Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this->db->query(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.

Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this->db->query(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.

Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this->db->query(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.

Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this->db->query(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.

Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST('updatekeys', 'array') in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.' = '.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace('/^.*./i', '', $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this->db->query(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.