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CVE-2026-82389

Bluetooth Classic HFP AG wipes an object still linked in the SDP request list on connect failure, causing a NULL dereference

6.5 Medium

In the Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile Audio Gateway role, hfp_ag_create() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_ag.c starts an SDP discovery toward the peer, which links the embedded ag->sdp_param._node into the SDP client's pending request list in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. If the subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() call fails, bt_hfp_ag_connect() cleaned up by memset()-ing the entire AG object while that node was still linked, and while ag->slc_work could still be queued on the system work queue. An in-flight SDP discovery cannot be cancelled — bt_sdp_discover_cancel() is declared in the public header but has no implementation — so the request stays in the list with its func, pool and uuid pointers zeroed.

The RFCOMM channel passed to bt_hfp_ag_connect() is taken from the peer's own SDP Hands-Free service record in the normal AG flow (bt_sdp_get_proto_param() performs no range validation, and samples/bluetooth/classic/handsfree_ag feeds the value straight through), so a remote BR/EDR device in radio range that advertises an RFCOMM channel outside the valid range 0x01..0x1e deterministically forces bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() to fail and reach the wipe. Reading the peer's SDP record requires no pairing, and the peer can also trigger the failure by dropping the ACL or racing an RFCOMM DLC on the same DLCI at the right moment.

When the SDP client next advances its request list, sdp_client_discover() dereferences the zeroed parameters — net_buf_alloc(param->pool, …) with a NULL pool and param->uuid->type — and the result-notification paths call through the NULL params->func. Zeroing a linked node also truncates the request list behind a stale tail pointer, and re-arming the freed AG slot re-appends the same node and can produce a self-looping list that hangs the Bluetooth RX thread. The impact is a crash or hang of the Bluetooth stack; the written value is a constant zero at a fixed static address, so no attacker-controlled write is available.

Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_HFP_AG that use the Audio Gateway role are affected.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Adjacent network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.23%Unchanged since Oct 27, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 6.5

Bluetooth Classic HFP AG wipes an object still linked in the SDP request list on connect failure, causing a NULL dereference

In the Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile Audio Gateway role, hfp_ag_create() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_ag.c starts an SDP discovery toward the peer, which links the embedded ag->sdp_param._node into the SDP client's pending request list in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. If the subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() call fails, bt_hfp_ag_connect() cleaned up by memset()-ing the entire AG object while that node was still linked, and while ag->slc_work could still be queued on the system work queue. An in-flight SDP discovery cannot be cancelled — bt_sdp_discover_cancel() is declared in the public header but has no implementation — so the request stays in the list with its func, pool and uuid pointers zeroed.

The RFCOMM channel passed to bt_hfp_ag_connect() is taken from the peer's own SDP Hands-Free service record in the normal AG flow (bt_sdp_get_proto_param() performs no range validation, and samples/bluetooth/classic/handsfree_ag feeds the value straight through), so a remote BR/EDR device in radio range that advertises an RFCOMM channel outside the valid range 0x01..0x1e deterministically forces bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() to fail and reach the wipe. Reading the peer's SDP record requires no pairing, and the peer can also trigger the failure by dropping the ACL or racing an RFCOMM DLC on the same DLCI at the right moment.

When the SDP client next advances its request list, sdp_client_discover() dereferences the zeroed parameters — net_buf_alloc(param->pool, …) with a NULL pool and param->uuid->type — and the result-notification paths call through the NULL params->func. Zeroing a linked node also truncates the request list behind a stale tail pointer, and re-arming the freed AG slot re-appends the same node and can produce a self-looping list that hangs the Bluetooth RX thread. The impact is a crash or hang of the Bluetooth stack; the written value is a constant zero at a fixed static address, so no attacker-controlled write is available.

Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_HFP_AG that use the Audio Gateway role are affected.

Record
CVE-2026-82389
CVSS 3.1
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-476
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-109975 6.5

In the Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile Audio Gateway role, hfp_ag_create() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_ag.c starts an SDP discovery toward the peer, which links the embedded ag->sdp_param._node into the SDP client's pending request list in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. If the subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() call fails, bt_hfp_ag_connect() cleaned up by memset()-ing the entire AG object while that node was still linked, and while ag->slc_work could still be queued on the system work queue. An in-flight SDP discovery cannot be cancelled — bt_sdp_discover_cancel() is declared in the public header but has no implementation — so the request stays in the list with its func, pool and uuid pointers zeroed.

The RFCOMM channel passed to bt_hfp_ag_connect() is taken from the peer's own SDP Hands-Free service record in the normal AG flow (bt_sdp_get_proto_param() performs no range validation, and samples/bluetooth/classic/handsfree_ag feeds the value straight through), so a remote BR/EDR device in radio range that advertises an RFCOMM channel outside the valid range 0x01..0x1e deterministically forces bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() to fail and reach the wipe. Reading the peer's SDP record requires no pairing, and the peer can also trigger the failure by dropping the ACL or racing an RFCOMM DLC on the same DLCI at the right moment.

When the SDP client next advances its request list, sdp_client_discover() dereferences the zeroed parameters — net_buf_alloc(param->pool, …) with a NULL pool and param->uuid->type — and the result-notification paths call through the NULL params->func. Zeroing a linked node also truncates the request list behind a stale tail pointer, and re-arming the freed AG slot re-appends the same node and can produce a self-looping list that hangs the Bluetooth RX thread. The impact is a crash or hang of the Bluetooth stack; the written value is a constant zero at a fixed static address, so no attacker-controlled write is available.

Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_HFP_AG that use the Audio Gateway role are affected.

Record
EUVD-2026-109975
CVSS 3.1
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 6.5

In the Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile Audio Gateway role, hfp_ag_create() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_ag.c starts an SDP discovery toward the peer, which links the embedded ag->sdp_param._node into the SDP client's pending request list in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. If the subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() call fails, bt_hfp_ag_connect() cleaned up by memset()-ing the entire AG object while that node was still linked, and while ag->slc_work could still be queued on the system work queue. An in-flight SDP discovery cannot be cancelled — bt_sdp_discover_cancel() is declared in the public header but has no implementation — so the request stays in the list with its func, pool and uuid pointers zeroed.

The RFCOMM channel passed to bt_hfp_ag_connect() is taken from the peer's own SDP Hands-Free service record in the normal AG flow (bt_sdp_get_proto_param() performs no range validation, and samples/bluetooth/classic/handsfree_ag feeds the value straight through), so a remote BR/EDR device in radio range that advertises an RFCOMM channel outside the valid range 0x01..0x1e deterministically forces bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() to fail and reach the wipe. Reading the peer's SDP record requires no pairing, and the peer can also trigger the failure by dropping the ACL or racing an RFCOMM DLC on the same DLCI at the right moment.

When the SDP client next advances its request list, sdp_client_discover() dereferences the zeroed parameters — net_buf_alloc(param->pool, …) with a NULL pool and param->uuid->type — and the result-notification paths call through the NULL params->func. Zeroing a linked node also truncates the request list behind a stale tail pointer, and re-arming the freed AG slot re-appends the same node and can produce a self-looping list that hangs the Bluetooth RX thread. The impact is a crash or hang of the Bluetooth stack; the written value is a constant zero at a fixed static address, so no attacker-controlled write is available.

Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_HFP_AG that use the Audio Gateway role are affected.

Record
CVE-2026-82389
CVSS 3.1
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-476
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 6.5

Bluetooth Classic HFP AG wipes an object still linked in the SDP request list on connect failure, causing a NULL dereference

In the Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile Audio Gateway role, hfp_ag_create() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_ag.c starts an SDP discovery toward the peer, which links the embedded ag->sdp_param._node into the SDP client's pending request list in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. If the subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() call fails, bt_hfp_ag_connect() cleaned up by memset()-ing the entire AG object while that node was still linked, and while ag->slc_work could still be queued on the system work queue. An in-flight SDP discovery cannot be cancelled — bt_sdp_discover_cancel() is declared in the public header but has no implementation — so the request stays in the list with its func, pool and uuid pointers zeroed.

The RFCOMM channel passed to bt_hfp_ag_connect() is taken from the peer's own SDP Hands-Free service record in the normal AG flow (bt_sdp_get_proto_param() performs no range validation, and samples/bluetooth/classic/handsfree_ag feeds the value straight through), so a remote BR/EDR device in radio range that advertises an RFCOMM channel outside the valid range 0x01..0x1e deterministically forces bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() to fail and reach the wipe. Reading the peer's SDP record requires no pairing, and the peer can also trigger the failure by dropping the ACL or racing an RFCOMM DLC on the same DLCI at the right moment.

When the SDP client next advances its request list, sdp_client_discover() dereferences the zeroed parameters — net_buf_alloc(param->pool, …) with a NULL pool and param->uuid->type — and the result-notification paths call through the NULL params->func. Zeroing a linked node also truncates the request list behind a stale tail pointer, and re-arming the freed AG slot re-appends the same node and can produce a self-looping list that hangs the Bluetooth RX thread. The impact is a crash or hang of the Bluetooth stack; the written value is a constant zero at a fixed static address, so no attacker-controlled write is available.

Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_HFP_AG that use the Audio Gateway role are affected.

Record
CVE-2026-82389
CVSS 3.1
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-476
Updated
2026-11-04
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2026-82389 6.5

In the Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile Audio Gateway role, hfp_ag_create() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_ag.c starts an SDP discovery toward the peer, which links the embedded ag->sdp_param._node into the SDP client's pending request list in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. If the subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() call fails, bt_hfp_ag_connect() cleaned up by memset()-ing the entire AG object while that node was still linked, and while ag->slc_work could still be queued on the system work queue. An in-flight SDP discovery cannot be cancelled — bt_sdp_discover_cancel() is declared in the public header but has no implementation — so the request stays in the list with its func, pool and uuid pointers zeroed. The RFCOMM channel passed to bt_hfp_ag_connect() is taken from the peer's own SDP Hands-Free service record in the normal AG flow (bt_sdp_get_proto_param() performs no range validation, and samples/bluetooth/classic/handsfree_ag feeds the value straight through), so a remote BR/EDR device in radio range that advertises an RFCOMM channel outside the valid range 0x01..0x1e deterministically forces bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() to fail and reach the wipe. Reading the peer's SDP record requires no pairing, and the peer can also trigger the failure by dropping the ACL or racing an RFCOMM DLC on the same DLCI at the right moment. When the SDP client next advances its request list, sdp_client_discover() dereferences the zeroed parameters — net_buf_alloc(param->pool, …) with a NULL pool and param->uuid->type — and the result-notification paths call through the NULL params->func. Zeroing a linked node also truncates the request list behind a stale tail pointer, and re-arming the freed AG slot re-appends the same node and can produce a self-looping list that hangs the Bluetooth RX thread. The impact is a crash or hang of the Bluetooth stack; the written value is a constant zero at a fixed static address, so no attacker-controlled write is available. Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_HFP_AG that use the Audio Gateway role are affected.

Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2026-82389
CVSS 3.1
6.5 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
zephyr
Ubuntu:16.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
3.1.2-13.1.2-1build1
None known
zephyr
Ubuntu:18.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
3.1.2-1build13.1.2-1build2
None known
zephyr
Ubuntu:20.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
3.1.2-1build3
None known
zephyr
Ubuntu:22.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
3.1.2-1build3
None known
zephyr
Ubuntu:24.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
3.1.2-1.13.1.2-1.1build1
None known
zephyr
Ubuntu:26.10
All versions, plus listed versions
3.1.2-4
None known
zephyr
Ubuntu:26.04:LTS
All versions, plus listed versions
3.1.2-1.1build13.1.2-4
None known

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
factsOSV
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-82389 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.5) in Zephyrproject Zephyr, published October 26, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.23%, the 13th percentile. No source names a fixed version.

References

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