CVE-2026-82427

Description

A topology's topology.blobstore.map lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without normalisation, in both AsyncLocalizer and Container.createBlobstoreLinks, and the symlink helper force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link.

A submitter could therefore use ../ segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the isolation that supervisor.run.worker.as.user is intended to provide.

Mitigation

Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites.

Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may reject submissions whose topology.blobstore.map entries contain path separators or .. segments before they reach Nimbus.

Credit

The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.

Description

A topology's topology.blobstore.map lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without normalisation, in both AsyncLocalizer and Container.createBlobstoreLinks, and the symlink helper force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link.

A submitter could therefore use ../ segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the isolation that supervisor.run.worker.as.user is intended to provide.

Mitigation

Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites.

Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may reject submissions whose topology.blobstore.map entries contain path separators or .. segments before they reach Nimbus.

Credit

The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.

Description

A topology's topology.blobstore.map lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without normalisation, in both AsyncLocalizer and Container.createBlobstoreLinks, and the symlink helper force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link.

A submitter could therefore use ../ segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the isolation that supervisor.run.worker.as.user is intended to provide.

Mitigation

Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites.

Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may reject submissions whose topology.blobstore.map entries contain path separators or .. segments before they reach Nimbus.

Credit

The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.

Description

A topology's topology.blobstore.map lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without normalisation, in both AsyncLocalizer and Container.createBlobstoreLinks, and the symlink helper force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link.

A submitter could therefore use ../ segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the isolation that supervisor.run.worker.as.user is intended to provide.

Mitigation

Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites.

Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may reject submissions whose topology.blobstore.map entries contain path separators or .. segments before they reach Nimbus.

Credit

The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.