CVE-2026-83617
xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.11 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true element and attribute name checks use the anchored QName_exact expression produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherits the multiline flag. A name with a valid first line followed by U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup therefore passes validation and is emitted verbatim in element start and end tags or attribute names. This bypasses the strict-serialization checks introduced for the earlier element-name and attribute-name injection advisories, while the default serialization path remains outside the strict guarantee. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
8.7
xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.11 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true element and attribute name checks use the anchored QName_exact expression produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherits the multiline flag. A name with a valid first line followed by U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup therefore passes validation and is emitted verbatim in element start and end tags or attribute names. This bypasses the strict-serialization checks introduced for the earlier element-name and attribute-name injection advisories, while the default serialization path remains outside the strict guarantee. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
- Record
CVE-2026-83617- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-91, CWE-625
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-69241
8.7
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.11 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true element and attribute name checks use the anchored QName_exact expression produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherits the multiline flag. A name with a valid first line followed by U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup therefore passes validation and is emitted verbatim in element start and end tags or attribute names. This bypasses the strict-serialization checks introduced for the earlier element-name and attribute-name injection advisories, while the default serialization path remains outside the strict guarantee. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
- Record
EUVD-2026-69241- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944
8.7
xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
Summary
An embedded line terminator bypasses the requireWellFormed serializer check for element and
attribute names. The check was added to fix GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj and GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm; a name whose
first line is well-formed slips past it and is serialized verbatim, so the characters after the line
terminator break out of the start/end tag or attribute. Callers who enabled requireWellFormed
specifically to neutralize those name-injection issues remain exposed.
Details
xmldom builds every grammar production through a shared regexp builder that compiles with the m
flag. The anchored full-string matcher used for element and attribute names, QName_exact = reg('^', QName, '$'), therefore inherits m. When it is applied as QName_exact.test(name) against
an already-assembled node name, the m flag makes $ match at an interior line terminator, so the
matcher accepts any value in which at least one line is a valid QName; the other lines are never
constrained. A payload whose first line is a valid QName, followed by a line terminator and breakout
markup, is what yields a working injection.
The serializer emits the accepted name verbatim into element start/end tags and attribute names, so
the bytes after the line terminator break out of the intended syntactic position. The check is
reached whenever a caller serializes, with requireWellFormed: true, a node whose name was set
through programmatic DOM construction (createElement, createElementNS, createAttribute,
createAttributeNS) with attacker-influenced input.
Root Cause
- A shared regexp builder compiles anchored productions with the
mflag. ^…$undermare line anchors, not string anchors.- A full-string validator built on such a production (
.test()) accepts any string with one conforming line, so a line terminator followed by breakout markup passes.
The triggering line terminators are the ECMAScript LineTerminator set: U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, U+2029.
Proof of Concept
const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
// Element name carrying an embedded line terminator + breakout markup:
const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null);
const el = doc.createElement('a\n><script>alert(1)</script');
doc.documentElement.appendChild(el);
// Caller opted into well-formed serialization, expecting invalid names to be rejected:
console.log(new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true }));
// Observed on the affected version: NO throw; the output contains the injected `><script>…`
// breakout, because the name's first line ("a") satisfies the m-anchored QName check.
// Expected: InvalidStateError (the name is not a valid XML QName).
// Control — a single-line invalid name IS correctly rejected, proving the check is active and
// that only the line terminator defeats it:
const ctrl = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null);
ctrl.documentElement.appendChild(ctrl.createElement('a b'));
new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(ctrl, { requireWellFormed: true });
// => throws InvalidStateError: The element name "a b" is not a valid XML QName
Impact
- Bypass of a previously shipped security mitigation. Applications that adopted
requireWellFormed: truespecifically to neutralize GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj / GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm remain exposed to element/attribute name injection. - XML / markup structure injection, and, where the serialized output is placed into an HTML context, downstream XSS.
Fix Applied
The anchored XML Name/QName validators used by the requireWellFormed serializer no
longer treat interior line terminators as satisfying the anchors, so a name is validated against the
whole string. A name containing a line terminator is rejected with InvalidStateError, closing the
bypass for element and attribute names. The default serialization path is unchanged.
⚠ Opt-in required.…
- Record
GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-91, CWE-625
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
8.7
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.11 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true element and attribute name checks use the anchored QName_exact expression produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherits the multiline flag. A name with a valid first line followed by U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup therefore passes validation and is emitted verbatim in element start and end tags or attribute names. This bypasses the strict-serialization checks introduced for the earlier element-name and attribute-name injection advisories, while the default serialization path remains outside the strict guarantee. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
- Record
CVE-2026-83617- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - Weakness
- CWE-91, CWE-625
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
8.7
xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.11 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true element and attribute name checks use the anchored QName_exact expression produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherits the multiline flag. A name with a valid first line followed by U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup therefore passes validation and is emitted verbatim in element start and end tags or attribute names. This bypasses the strict-serialization checks introduced for the earlier element-name and attribute-name injection advisories, while the default serialization path remains outside the strict guarantee. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
- Record
CVE-2026-83617- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-625, CWE-91
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVDEBIAN-CVE-2026-83617
8.7
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.11 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true element and attribute name checks use the anchored QName_exact expression produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherits the multiline flag. A name with a valid first line followed by U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup therefore passes validation and is emitted verbatim in element start and end tags or attribute names. This bypasses the strict-serialization checks introduced for the earlier element-name and attribute-name injection advisories, while the default serialization path remains outside the strict guarantee. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
- Record
DEBIAN-CVE-2026-83617- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944
8.7
xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
Summary
An embedded line terminator bypasses the requireWellFormed serializer check for element and
attribute names. The check was added to fix GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj and GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm; a name whose
first line is well-formed slips past it and is serialized verbatim, so the characters after the line
terminator break out of the start/end tag or attribute. Callers who enabled requireWellFormed
specifically to neutralize those name-injection issues remain exposed.
Details
xmldom builds every grammar production through a shared regexp builder that compiles with the m
flag. The anchored full-string matcher used for element and attribute names, QName_exact = reg('^', QName, '$'), therefore inherits m. When it is applied as QName_exact.test(name) against
an already-assembled node name, the m flag makes $ match at an interior line terminator, so the
matcher accepts any value in which at least one line is a valid QName; the other lines are never
constrained. A payload whose first line is a valid QName, followed by a line terminator and breakout
markup, is what yields a working injection.
The serializer emits the accepted name verbatim into element start/end tags and attribute names, so
the bytes after the line terminator break out of the intended syntactic position. The check is
reached whenever a caller serializes, with requireWellFormed: true, a node whose name was set
through programmatic DOM construction (createElement, createElementNS, createAttribute,
createAttributeNS) with attacker-influenced input.
Root Cause
- A shared regexp builder compiles anchored productions with the
mflag. ^…$undermare line anchors, not string anchors.- A full-string validator built on such a production (
.test()) accepts any string with one conforming line, so a line terminator followed by breakout markup passes.
The triggering line terminators are the ECMAScript LineTerminator set: U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, U+2029.
Proof of Concept
const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
// Element name carrying an embedded line terminator + breakout markup:
const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null);
const el = doc.createElement('a\n><script>alert(1)</script');
doc.documentElement.appendChild(el);
// Caller opted into well-formed serialization, expecting invalid names to be rejected:
console.log(new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true }));
// Observed on the affected version: NO throw; the output contains the injected `><script>…`
// breakout, because the name's first line ("a") satisfies the m-anchored QName check.
// Expected: InvalidStateError (the name is not a valid XML QName).
// Control — a single-line invalid name IS correctly rejected, proving the check is active and
// that only the line terminator defeats it:
const ctrl = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null);
ctrl.documentElement.appendChild(ctrl.createElement('a b'));
new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(ctrl, { requireWellFormed: true });
// => throws InvalidStateError: The element name "a b" is not a valid XML QName
Impact
- Bypass of a previously shipped security mitigation. Applications that adopted
requireWellFormed: truespecifically to neutralize GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj / GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm remain exposed to element/attribute name injection. - XML / markup structure injection, and, where the serialized output is placed into an HTML context, downstream XSS.
Fix Applied
The anchored XML Name/QName validators used by the requireWellFormed serializer no
longer treat interior line terminators as satisfying the anchors, so a name is validated against the
whole string. A name containing a line terminator is rejected with InvalidStateError, closing the
bypass for element and attribute names. The default serialization path is unchanged.
⚠ Opt-in required.…
- Record
GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-625, CWE-91
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVUBUNTU-CVE-2026-83617
8.7
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.11 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true element and attribute name checks use the anchored QName_exact expression produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherits the multiline flag. A name with a valid first line followed by U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup therefore passes validation and is emitted verbatim in element start and end tags or attribute names. This bypasses the strict-serialization checks introduced for the earlier element-name and attribute-name injection advisories, while the default serialization path remains outside the strict guarantee. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
- Record
UBUNTU-CVE-2026-83617- CVSS 4.0
- 8.7 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-83617 No score
CVE-2026-83617 in @xmldom/xmldom - Patched by Root
Root has patched CVE-2026-83617 in the @xmldom/xmldom package for Root:npm. Multiple fixed versions available.
- Record
ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-83617- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
@xmldom/xmldomnpm |
0.9.11 to 0.9.11 | 0.9.12 |
node-xmldomDebian:12 |
All versions, plus listed versions 0.8.6-10.9.10-10.9.10-20.9.11-10.9.12-1 Show 5 moreShow less0.9.5-10.9.6-10.9.8-10.9.8-20.9.9-1 |
None known |
node-xmldomDebian:13 |
All versions, plus listed versions 0.9.10-10.9.10-20.9.11-10.9.12-10.9.6-10.9.8-10.9.8-20.9.9-1 |
None known |
node-xmldomDebian:14 |
before 0.9.12-1, plus listed versions 0.9.10-10.9.10-20.9.11-10.9.6-10.9.8-10.9.8-20.9.9-1 |
0.9.12-1 |
@xmldom/xmldomnpm |
0.9.11 up to 0.9.12 | 0.9.12 |
@xmldom/xmldomRoot:npm |
before 0.9.11-aikido.1 | 0.9.11-aikido.1 |
@rootio/xmldom__xmldomRoot:npm |
before 0.9.11-root.io.1 | 0.9.11-root.io.1 |
node-xmldomUbuntu:20.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 0.1.27+ds-10.1.27+ds-1+deb10u2build0.20.04.1 |
None known |
node-xmldomUbuntu:22.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 0.5.0-10.7.3-10.7.5-10.7.5-1ubuntu0.22.04.1 |
None known |
node-xmldomUbuntu:24.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 0.8.6-1 |
None known |
node-xmldomUbuntu:26.10 |
All versions, plus listed versions 0.9.8-20.9.10-20.9.11-1 |
None known |
node-xmldomUbuntu:26.04:LTS |
All versions, plus listed versions 0.9.6-10.9.8-10.9.8-2 |
None known |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-83617 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.7) in @xmldom Xmldom, published September 1, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.57%, the 47th percentile. Fixed in @xmldom/xmldom 0.9.12.
References
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.