CVE-2026-89274

The WP Recipe Maker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary Shortcode Execution in all versions up to, and including, 10.8.1. The vulnerability exists because WPRM_Metadata::sanitize_metadata() recursively calls do_shortcode() on every scalar field of the recipe's structured metadata array — including the reviewBody field, which is populated verbatim from the comment_content of approved wprm-comment-rating comments — without sanitizing or stripping shortcode tokens before execution; the subsequent wp_strip_all_tags() and strip_shortcodes() calls operate only on the output string after execution has already fully occurred, providing no protection against server-side shortcode invocation. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary registered WordPress shortcodes server-side on every recipe page render, causing shortcode output — such as attachment captions, private post fields, or other data exposed by installed shortcodes — to be embedded in the page's JSON-LD reviewBody metadata and disclosed to all visitors who load the recipe page. Successful exploitation requires the attacker's rated comment to pass the site's comment approval threshold, either via auto-approval or moderator action, before the injected shortcode begins executing on page loads.

The WP Recipe Maker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary Shortcode Execution in all versions up to, and including, 10.8.1. The vulnerability exists because WPRM_Metadata::sanitize_metadata() recursively calls do_shortcode() on every scalar field of the recipe's structured metadata array — including the reviewBody field, which is populated verbatim from the comment_content of approved wprm-comment-rating comments — without sanitizing or stripping shortcode tokens before execution; the subsequent wp_strip_all_tags() and strip_shortcodes() calls operate only on the output string after execution has already fully occurred, providing no protection against server-side shortcode invocation. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary registered WordPress shortcodes server-side on every recipe page render, causing shortcode output — such as attachment captions, private post fields, or other data exposed by installed shortcodes — to be embedded in the page's JSON-LD reviewBody metadata and disclosed to all visitors who load the recipe page. Successful exploitation requires the attacker's rated comment to pass the site's comment approval threshold, either via auto-approval or moderator action, before the injected shortcode begins executing on page loads.

The WP Recipe Maker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary Shortcode Execution in all versions up to, and including, 10.8.1. The vulnerability exists because WPRM_Metadata::sanitize_metadata() recursively calls do_shortcode() on every scalar field of the recipe's structured metadata array — including the reviewBody field, which is populated verbatim from the comment_content of approved wprm-comment-rating comments — without sanitizing or stripping shortcode tokens before execution; the subsequent wp_strip_all_tags() and strip_shortcodes() calls operate only on the output string after execution has already fully occurred, providing no protection against server-side shortcode invocation. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary registered WordPress shortcodes server-side on every recipe page render, causing shortcode output — such as attachment captions, private post fields, or other data exposed by installed shortcodes — to be embedded in the page's JSON-LD reviewBody metadata and disclosed to all visitors who load the recipe page. Successful exploitation requires the attacker's rated comment to pass the site's comment approval threshold, either via auto-approval or moderator action, before the injected shortcode begins executing on page loads.

The WP Recipe Maker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary Shortcode Execution in all versions up to, and including, 10.8.1. The vulnerability exists because WPRM_Metadata::sanitize_metadata() recursively calls do_shortcode() on every scalar field of the recipe's structured metadata array — including the reviewBody field, which is populated verbatim from the comment_content of approved wprm-comment-rating comments — without sanitizing or stripping shortcode tokens before execution; the subsequent wp_strip_all_tags() and strip_shortcodes() calls operate only on the output string after execution has already fully occurred, providing no protection against server-side shortcode invocation. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary registered WordPress shortcodes server-side on every recipe page render, causing shortcode output — such as attachment captions, private post fields, or other data exposed by installed shortcodes — to be embedded in the page's JSON-LD reviewBody metadata and disclosed to all visitors who load the recipe page. Successful exploitation requires the attacker's rated comment to pass the site's comment approval threshold, either via auto-approval or moderator action, before the injected shortcode begins executing on page loads.